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National and Trans-National Agendas in Antarctic Research 
from the 1950s and Beyond 
 
Report of the 3rd Workshop of the SCAR Action Group on the 
History of Antarctic Research 
25-26 October 2007, Byrd Polar Research Center, Columbus, Ohio, USA 
 
Cornelia Lüdecke 
 
 
The 3rd Workshop of the Action Group of the Scientific Committee on Antarctic Research on 
the History of Antarctic Research was organised by Raimund E. Goerler, Assistant Director of 
The Ohio State University Libraries and his colleagues at the Byrd Polar Research Center 
(Columbus, Ohio, USA) from 25-26 October 2007. This year the workshop discussed “National 
and transnational agendas in Antarctic Research from the 1950s and beyond”. About 20 
participants came from Australia, Chile, Germany, Great Britain, Sweden and USA.  
 
After the welcome speeches and a review on the history of the action group, which was founded 
in 2004, the first session of the workshop started with Peder Roberts (Department of History, 
Stanford, USA), who asked the question “What Has All This Got To Do With Science?” and 
presented the “Rhetoric of Scientific Devotion in the Planning of the International Geophysical 
Year” (IGY, 1957-1958). His answer showed that on the surface, everything functioned as an 
emblem of international co-operation in scientific endeavour. However people have to ask how 
and why the IGY came to possess that symbolic value, and to consider it as an integral part of a 
broader political picture. 
 
Jason Kendall Moore’s (Centro de Estudios Hemisféricos y Polares, Viña del Mar, Chile) paper 
was titled “Playing Dice: Toward a Scientific Explanation of U.S. Leadership in the Formation 
of the Antarctic Treaty of 1959”. Moore focused on inconsistency of the American leadership 
with a number of other factors which nearly led to the treaty’s non-ratification, and which 
exposed the non-commitment of U.S. officials to their own policy. 
 
In the second session Rip Bulkeley (Exeter College, Oxford, United Kingdom) analysed “The 
Role of Antarctic Diplomacy in the Origins and Conduct of the IGY”, which culminated in 
France being the first and still the only country with an Antarctic claim to install a permanent 
station outside ‘its’ sector 46 years from the signing of the Treaty. 
 
In the second session after lunch break outside in the sun, Jorge Berguño (Chilean Antarctic 
Institute, Santiago, Chile) explained “The Search of an Organisational Framework for Antarctic 
Research (1948-1985)”. The course of IGY demonstrated that binding undertakings and 
concerted action in scientific programmes could be achieved without transferring all the 
authority to a single scientific body. In 1958, ICSU established the Special (later Scientific) 
Committee for Antarctic Research (SCAR). In 1985 SCAR was fully incorporated as a 
permanent observer into the mainstream of the Antarctic Treaty System (ATS). 
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In this context M. Consuelo León Wöppke (Universidad Marítima de Chile, Chile) presented an 
interpretive analysis of “The state of Chilean science before and during the International 
Geophysical Year”, before the Chilean emphasis shifted to the role of political and scientific 
elites in shaping public opinion. 
 
Cornelia Lüdecke (SCAR History AG, Munich, Germany) referred to a country which did not 
actively take part in the today called 3rd International Polar Year in talking about “The 
International Polar Year (1957-1958) as Reflected in German Media“. The time of the Cold War 
was characterised by the use of military terms to describe interests in Antarctica. This was 
clearly visible in the analysed western German newspapers and even in popular books on 
Antarctic research of the 1950s. 
 
Ann M. Dozier (University of Rochester, Rochester, New York, USA) gave a lively report of her 
investigation of “Getting the Science Done: Perspectives from McMurdo” during three austral 
summers between 2002 and 2005. She observed how organisational bureaucracy and the 
scientists' professional autonomy created inherent tensions and how these were exacerbated by 
the uncertainties of conducting science in a polar environment. 
The first day finished with a workshop dinner and a pleasant dinner speech by Tim H Baughman, 
(University of Central Oklahoma, USA) on „Amundsen, Cook and the Belgica, the first 
international scientific and multi-national expedition to the Antarctic“. 
The 3rd session on the next day started with Jason David (The Ohio State University, Columbus 
Ohio, USA), who dealt with “The development of biology as a discipline in Antarctica”, its 
growth in the amount undertaken particularly on the Antarctic continent and its connection to 
larger trends in both the history of biology and the context of Antarctic science.  
 
Adrian Howkins (University of Texas at Austin, Austin, USA) talked about “British Antarctic 
Science, 1944-1959”, which first was increased on the Antarctic Peninsula, before it co-operated 
with international research efforts. Finally Britain sought to harness the scientific goodwill 
generated by the IGY to bring about political change in Antarctica leading to the Antarctic 
Treaty of 1959.  
 
Then the IGY veteran John C. Behrendt (University of Colorado, Boulder, CO, USA) reminded 
us to the “First (1957-58) Geophysical Investigation of the Filchner-Ronne Ice Shelf (FRIS)”. He 
discussed the results including the determination of maximum ice thickness of the southernmost 
area of the FRIS of 1300 m which was in significant contrast to a re-measurement of this area in 
the 1990s of only 1100 m suggesting significant melting during the interval. 
 
Aant Elzinga (University of Göteborg, Göteborg, Sweden) focussed on the discussion of the 
European Antarctic Project (EAP) abandoned in 1975 and the multinational European Project for 
Ice Coring in Antarctica (EPICA) starting up in 1995 seen as “The shaping of a European Effort 
in Paleoclimatology”. 
 
In the 4th session after lunch break in the polar library, Irina Gan (University of Tasmania, 
Australia) led us “To the great unknown: Soviet IGY Antarctic Expeditions 1955-1958“. The 
setbacks and obstacles encountered by the 2nd Russian Antarctic expedition in particular almost 
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resulted in failure of the whole Soviet IGY commitment. Nevertheless obstacles were overcome 
and plans finally concluded successful. 
 
The last paper was given by Lisbeth Lewander (University of Göteborg, Göteborg, Sweden) on 
“Swedish Polar Politics 1955-1970”, when Cold War developments in the Far North were severe 
concerns, which had an impact on Swedish undertakings in polar areas. Archive studies showed 
that occasionally decision makers were hesitant on what course on action to depart upon, such as 
in the case of the political status of Antarctica in the 1950´s. 
After the workshop, participants left home with very good memories of interesting discussions 
and exchange of various aspects of the history of polar research around the IGY.  
The Proceedings of the 3rd SCAR workshop on history of Antarctic research will be published in 
the electronic series of the Byrd Polar Research Center as part of the Digital Repository of the 
Knowledge Bank of the Ohio State University. 
 
The next presentations of the SCAR history AG will be in the session 5.7 on "Polar History and 
Institutionalisation of Polar Research - The International Polar Years" during the SCAR/IASC 
Open Science Conference in St. Petersburg, 8-11 July 2008. 
 
The 3rd SCAR workshop was supported by the Scientific Committee on Antarctic Research 
Cambridge (UK); the Byrd Polar Research Center and the Friends of the Byrd Polar Research 
Center, Columbus (USA); the Frederick A Cook Society (USA); Schimank-Stiftung, Hamburg 
(Germany); and Deutsches Zentrum für Luft und Raumfahrt, Oberpfaffenhofen (Germany). 
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OPENING SPEECH 25 OCTOBER 2007 
Cornelia Lüdecke 
 
Welcome to all participants of the 3rd SCAR Workshop here in the Byrd Polar Research Center, 
Columbus, Ohio, where we will discuss a total of fourteen papers that will be presented by the 
SCAR Action Group on the History of Antarctic Research. You may ask what this so called 
“Action Group” is all about. 
 
The former SCAR president Prof. Thiede from the Alfred Wegener Institute for Polar and Marine 
Research in Bremerhaven asked me during the 21st International Polar Conference at Kiel 
(Geomar) in March 2003 to initiate an international group of SCAR members and other scholars 
to work on the history of Antarctic research in connection with the coming 50th anniversary of 
SCAR, which will be celebrated in St. Petersburg next year. 
 
I started to send many letters to friends and some others whose addresses had been provided to 
me. This resulted in a collection of promoting letters and an informal application to establish a 
SCAR group on the History of Antarctic Research. But unfortunately the SCAR secretariat was 
unconcerned and unclear as to where or how such a group would fit within the existing SCAR 
framework. This was only the start of my efforts. I had so much more work ahead of me. 
 
A correspondence started with the SCAR secretary general at that time, Peter Clarkson, who 
turned out to be very helpful. He suggested our group should become an Action Group under the 
Delegate Committee on Standing Committees and Outreach. He informed me that the Action 
Group might prepare a history of research in the Antarctic with particular reference to SCAR and 
its role. The group would have a limited lifespan and would be expected to complete its research 
and prepare a publication by 2007. 
 
On 7th January – it’s already the year 2004 – I wrote my first two page application to create such 
an Action Group upon which should be decided during the SCAR executive meeting in 
Bremerhaven on the coming 20-21 January. 
 
The result of the discussion was presented in an email by the new secretary General Colin 
Summerhayes. During the meeting at Bremerhaven it had been decided that I should write a full 
proposal (which meant 15 pages of text) to be discussed by the next SCAR delegates meeting in 
Bremen in October of the same year. 
 
At that stage I was wondering, why I have to make such an effort. Do the delegates really want to 
read so much about something wanted by the SCAR leadership? Later I was told the background. 
The SCAR delegates were not aware that the initiative did not come from me – a person 
unknown to all except one of them – but from the SCAR president himself. 
 
Well. I had to prepare a full proposal which had been hard work for a non-native English speaker, 
but with the help of our Swedish colleague Aant Elzinga I finally wrote ten pages.  
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Our aim should be to “obtain insight in the development, how Antarctic research was 
institutionalized within SCAR, to what degree research in the Antarctic has been driven by 
scientific criteria and to what extent compromises were made in the light of political barriers and 
logistical limitations. In historical perspective, a review will be made of essential background 
factors at work, both scientific and non-scientific ones, when nations were moved to participate 
in the International Geophysical Year (IGY, 1957-1958) at the time of the Cold War. Additional 
socio-cultural background factors will be considered with regard to major nations that chose not 
to contribute to the IGY.”  
 
According to this the group should work on the “History of Institutionalization of Antarctic 
Research within SCAR”. I made it clear that we do not want to provide a history of the 
foundation of SCAR or of the development of SCAR within its first 50 years. This is left for 
others. I submitted my full application in July 2004 
 
During the first SCAR Open Science Conference at Bremen (Germany) in July 2004 I was 
searching for possible members to form an action group. Some of you may remember when I 
introduced myself during the dinner party at the Bremen Science Center. I was lucky to find some 
people who were interested in joining the group. 
 
Finally five months later, I received an official answer by Colin Summerhayes saying that “The 
delegates agreed to establish an Action Group that would report to the Delegate Committee on 
Outreach and Administration. It was expected that the Group would be chaired initially by C. 
Lüdecke. The Group must have a broad international membership as similar research is on-
going or has been done in several nations.” We have made it, after 21 months! 
 
“Steps of Foundation of Institutionalized Antarctic Research” became the title of the 1st 
SCAR Workshop on the History of Antarctic Research, which I would organize at the Bavarian 
Academy of Sciences and Humanities in Munich (Germany) from 2 – 3 June, 2005. 
 
We had a wonderful participation of graduate students (including several PhD students), polar 
researchers, science historians, and Antarctic veterans. Apart from the oral presentations we had 
some posters and two additional written contributions. Due to the location at the Bavarian 
Academy of Sciences we included a description of the Filchner expedition to the south-eastern 
Weddell Sea in 1911-1912, because the Academy houses the Filchner Archives. Besides – when 
one of the planned speakers could not come – we had an additional paper on Georg von 
Neumayer, one of the founders of the 1st International Polar Year, which did not really fit into the 
time period given for our work, but it was important for understanding the origin of the Polar 
Years. 
 
When we had to decide where to meet for the second SCAR history workshop, our colleague 
Jorge Berguῆo from the Chilean Antarctic Institute invited us to come to Santiago de Chile in 
2006. This was a very good idea, because it opened the possibility to include South American 
colleagues to join the Action Group, which worked out very nicely. 
 
So with the wonderful help of Jorge we have had the 2nd SCAR History Workshop on 
“Multidimensional Exploration of Antarctica around the 1950s" in the building of the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Santiago de Chile from 21 - 22 September 2006. 
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After the 1st and the 2nd workshop were completed papers were written by the presenters, 
reviewed by two of the participants and accepted in revised form. An extended index was added 
and finally the proceedings of the first workshop were published in the Reports of Polar and 
Marine Research of the Alfred Wegener Institute in Bremerhaven in September 2007. With this 
achievement the originally demand of a publication in 2007 is fulfilled. We still work on the 
proceedings of the 2nd workshop. 
 
Now we have the pleasure to be here at the Byrd Polar Research Center to have our 3rd SCAR 
Workshop on "National and Trans-National Agendas in Antarctic Research from the 1950s 
and Beyond", from 25 –26 October, 2007. I guess that we all look forward to it. 
 
Concerning the next meeting 2008 I have been already asked by SCAR to organize a session 
during the SCAR/IASC 2008 Open Science Conference (OSC) on “Polar History and 
Institutionalization of Polar Research – The International Polar Years” at St. Petersburg, 
Russia from 8 – 11 July 2008. 
 
The secretary General already told me that SCAR wants a continuation of our group, which has 
to be discussed during the Delegates Meeting in Moscow after the St. Petersburg conference next 
year, thus we have to discuss this tomorrow after the end of the workshop. My idea is, if we 
continue with our workshops we should not exclude Arctic research, because both belong 
together. For instance Svalbard had been the place for many training expeditions of people going 
to Antarctica. Similarly, experiences from ice core drilling in Greenland are very useful for 
drilling in the Antarctic. 
 
My idea is to maintain a group on history of polar research that is not restricted to the time period 
starting with the International Geophysical Year. Otherwise we could form an International 
Commission on History of Polar Research (ICHPOR) within the International Union of History 
and Philosophy of Science / Division on History of Science and Technology. 
 
Let’s keep this in mind during the next two days. 
 
Herewith I want to open the 3rd SCAR history workshop. 
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‘WHAT HAS ALL THIS GOT TO DO WITH SCIENCE?’  
THE RHETORIC OF SCIENTIFIC DEVOTION IN BRITISH GOVERNMENT PLANS 
FOR THE INTERNATIONAL GEOPHYSICAL YEAR 
 
Peder Roberts 
 
Abstract 
 
Recent scholarship has begun to emphasize the political dimension of the International 
Geophysical Year (1957-58, hereafter IGY). This paper examines British government reactions 
to the IGY Antarctic program. By focusing on policymakers rather than scientists, a picture 
emerges of the IGY as a crisis rather than an opportunity, embedded in Britain’s wider struggle 
to adjust to new geopolitical circumstances. The IGY Antarctic program is considered within the 
context of British Antarctic activity at the time, including the Falkland Islands Dependencies 
Surveys (FIDS), the Norwegian-British-Swedish Antarctic Expedition (NBSX), and the British 
Commonwealth Trans-Antarctic Expedition (TAE). Each project performed a political function 
but with different rhetorical markers and modes of organization (including funding): respectively 
as an instrument of colonial occupation, an exercise in limited multilateral cooperation, and an 
attempt to assert the Commonwealth as a meaningful political unit. The IGY reshaped the mode 
of political engagement with the Antarctic by entrenching a rhetoric of scientific devotion. For 
Britain, a strategy of strong demarcation between scientific and political activity might safeguard 
its territorial claims from effective occupation by other IGY parties. But the construction of a 
sharp rhetorical distinction between science and politics did not mean the IGY was an apolitical 
event: instead, it echoed contemporary geopolitical trends in which displays of scientific strength 
outweighed colonial-era histories. The game of separating sovereignty from IGY activity 
ultimately became irrelevant amid the new political geographies of the 1950s. 
 
Introduction 
 
The fiftieth anniversary of the International Geophysical Year (IGY) has prompted a welcome 
renewal of scholarly attention.1 There is much to reconsider. Scientists have long characterized 
the event as a triumph, demonstrating that international cooperation in the name of science could 
transcend political divisions, even at a time of significant Cold War tensions.2 This is especially 
true of the IGY Antarctic program, regarded by many scientists and historians as an important 
step on the road to the Antarctic Treaty (ratified in 1961).3  
 
As morally agreeable as this view may seem, it significantly underplays the role of government 
actors in facilitating the IGY and shaping its rhetorical construction as a scientific rather than a 
political event. The Antarctic Treaty reinforces this view with its apparent demarcation of 
Antarctica as a space uniquely suited to scientific activity. At a time when competition for 
                                                 
1 The work of the SCAR History Group has been crucial in this regard. See the special 2007 volume of Berichte zur 
Polar- und Meeresforschung (560), Steps of Foundation of Institutionalized Antarctic Research; the special October 
2008 edition of the Journal of Historical Geography (34); Dian Olson Belanger (2006); and Friedman (2004). 
2 This may be seen both in contemporaneous accounts such as Dufek (1957) and J.T. Wilson (1961). 
3 Bulkeley (2009) has surveyed the relevant literature and concluded that no historical consensus exists on whether 
the IGY led causally to the Antarctic Treaty.  
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natural resources has reemerged – oil and gas in the twenty-first century, rather than gold, 
uranium, and whales in the twentieth – the Treaty today appears more a fragile artifact than the 
embodiment of enlightened modernity, despite some hopeful suggestions that its main tenets 
could be applied to a future Arctic Treaty. The contingency of the Treaty’s construction thus 
returns to the spotlight, and with it, the construction of Antarctica as a space for science during 
the 1950s. I take my cue from scholars such as Klaus Dodds,4 Ronald E. Doel,5 Aant Elzinga,6 
and Adrian Howkins7 who have begun to integrate both the broad currents of Cold War 
international relations and the specific relevance of Antarctic science to analyses of the IGY 
Antarctic program. These perspectives do not question whether scientists felt the IGY effort in 
Antarctica was a good thing, but ask how and why the massive financial resources it required 
were mobilized: in short, how states became interested in Antarctic science rather than why 
scientists became interested in Antarctica. 
 
The aim of the present paper is to build from these foundations in two new directions. First, I 
base my study on British rather than American discussions, revealing a defensive and reactive 
approach to the IGY Antarctic program that bore parallels to Britain’s growing marginalization 
in a geopolitical environment marked by decolonization and superpower duopoly. State support 
for Antarctic science derived from a particular set of political motives based on the preservation 
of territory and prestige. Science could function as a tool of statecraft, but when practiced 
without awareness of overarching political constraints, it could actively undermine state aims. 
The IGY Antarctic program therefore presented Britain with a crisis rather than an opportunity. 
Second, I consider the devotion to science that characterized the IGY not as a transparent 
commitment, but as a discursive convention that governed permissible actions in a particular 
setting.8 This permits a deeper level of analysis than simply observing that specific scientific 
activities could possess hidden political motives. As perhaps the ultimate symbol of civilized 
modernity, ‘pure’ science provided a powerful source of legitimacy for engagement with the 
Antarctic, and for ostentatious displays of state power.9  
 
British Political Attitudes to Antarctica Leading up to the IGY 
 
From the 1930s onward Britain adopted a defensive position regarding its Antarctic territories. 
Having formally expanded the Falkland Islands Dependencies (FID) in 1908 and 1917 as well as 
facilitating Australian and New Zealand claims during the 1920s and 1930s, Britain along with 
its former colonies claimed title to well over half the Antarctic land mass. Like the smaller 
French and Norwegian claims, these were based on historical discovery and vulnerable to legal 
arguments based on occupation or engagement. This was especially true in the FID as the decline 
of shore-based whaling eliminated an important form of administrative activity.10 Concern over 
                                                 
4 Dodds (2002; 2008). 
5 Doel (2003). 
6 Elzinga (2007). 
7 Howkins (2008a). 
8 This approach draws on Aant Elzinga’s argument that clear rhetorical demarcation between politics and science 
sublimates the former beneath the latter rather than creating an ‘apolitical’ sphere. See Elzinga (1993). 
9 This was never more clear than during the Space Race – itself an outgrowth of the IGY. See for instance 
McDougall (1985). 
10 For discussions of the legal bases of Antarctic territorial claims during this period, see for instance Beck (1986); 
Jacobsson (2004); Quigg (1983). 
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Argentine claims in the Antarctic Peninsula led to the initially secret Operation Tabarin, 
dispatched in 1943 to establish a more permanent British presence. At the end of the Second 
World War Operation Tabarin was renamed the Falkland Islands Dependencies Survey (FIDS) 
and placed under the formal control of the Colonial Office. It remained Britain’s primary 
instrument in the quest to preserve control of the FID during the early postwar years.11 
 
The mission of FIDS included surveying and descriptive scientific work as well as removing 
artifacts denoting Argentine and Chilean sovereignty, such as flags.12 The FIDS Scientific 
Director during the 1950s, Vivian Fuchs, would later describe this work as a ‘politico-scientific’ 
exercise.13 As well as demonstrating British sovereignty, FIDS performed a range of surveys 
over a vast and in parts inaccessible area to determine which regions held most potential value 
(both economic and strategic) in the event of international arbitration or a negotiated settlement 
of Antarctic territorial claims.14 This form of Antarctic field science was fundamentally a 
political performance, a costly process with ever-present risks both to human life – three men 
were killed in 1948 alone – and to national prestige, for instance if staff needed to be rescued by 
a foreign power. 
 
The costs of continuous engagement help explain why the Foreign Office was increasingly open 
to some form of international settlement of Antarctic claims, as long as it formally legitimized 
British sovereignty and took place on Britain’s terms. In March 1946 a group of South African 
geologists quietly suggested an ‘international polar year’ but received a strongly negative 
reaction from Whitehall because it could invite unwelcome competition. The Interdepartmental 
Polar Committee – formed in 1928 to coordinate British and imperial policy in the Arctic and 
Antarctic regions – recommended instead that Commonwealth states discreetly strengthen their 
claims individually without pursuing a premature international project, a move with limited 
relevance to South Africa as a non-claimant state. The primary reason for rejecting the South 
African plan was not fear of Argentine or Chilean claims, but fear of providing the USSR with a 
pretext for becoming involved with Antarctica.15 Indeed, when the United States proposed a 
‘condominium’ sharing power between itself and the seven other states claiming Antarctic 
territory (thus excluding the USSR), Britain was the only other state to respond positively.16 
 
The British Government offered both moral and financial support to one international venture, 
the Norwegian-British-Swedish Antarctic Expedition of 1949-52 (NBSX), because it would help 
solidify Scandinavian backing for British claims in a future international settlement.17 Developed 
from an idea by the Swedish geographer and glaciologist Hans W. Ahlmann, the expedition was 
organized by an international committee. Ultimate responsibility rested with the Norwegian 
Polar Institute (founded in 1948), which – as Robert Marc Friedman has shown – was a powerful 
symbol of Norway’s commitment to playing a leading role in progressive engagement with its 
territories in the polar regions, down to head-hunting the distinguished oceanographer Harald 
Ulrik Sverdrup from the Scripps Institution of Oceanography at the University of California (San 
                                                 
11 The inception and history of Operation Tabarin are described and analyzed in Howkins (2008b). 
12 This dual remit is discussed in Dodds (2000). 
13 Fuchs (1982: 11). 
14 See for instance United Kingdom Foreign Office (March/April 1949).  
15 Interdepartmental Polar Committee (26 March 1946). 
16 See for instance P.J. Stirling (11 April 1949). 
17 On the origins of the NBSX, see Friedman (2004) and Lewander (2007), 123-141. 
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Diego) as its first leader.18 The expedition’s carefully crafted public image as a purely scientific 
venture accorded with this aim and enhanced its value as an instrument of state prestige. 
For Britain the NBSX represented safe, mutually strengthening cooperation between established 
Antarctic stakeholders, even though it did not visit any British territory. Sir Evelyn Shuckburgh 
of the Foreign Office characterized it as ‘the sort of scientific cooperative effort in which we 
ought to take a lead, as it supports the theory that we believe in an “open door” in the 
Antarctic.’19 Drawing upon scientists from all three states and sporting a multinational 
organizational structure, the NBSX symbolized progressive cooperation.20 While exclusively 
national activities such as FIDS demonstrated that Britain was effectively engaging with its 
territory, international activities like the NBSX could preserve Britain’s strong position within a 
concrete multilateral framework. 
 
Internationalism did not mean extending an equal welcome to all states; indeed, the 
organizational structure of the NBSX showcased a particular mode of mutually reinforcing 
cooperation between states with existing Antarctic interests. Interwar conflicts between Britain 
and Norway over the status of Bouvet Island and the boundaries of the Australian Antarctic 
Territory,21 while serious at the time, were by now secondary to their joint status as claimants to 
Antarctic territory with a preference for administrative structures that privileged historical 
engagement. The experiences of World War Two had strengthened the political relationship 
between the two states, and Norway’s close links to Britain even led to official discussions about 
the possibility of its joining the British Commonwealth during the 1950s.22 The NBSX 
represented (cautious) multilateralism in which Britain was a partner. Strongly progressive 
rhetoric successfully effaced its aim of preserving the national prestige acquired during earlier 
decades. 
 
On the other hand, it is crucial to consider FIDS as a component of British colonial policy. 
Operating under the authority of the Colonial Office and the Governor of the Falkland Islands, 
FIDS represented a mode of activity aimed at defining a British world rather than representing 
Britain within an open sphere. The massive geopolitical readjustment following World War Two 
produced an entirely different world order that undermined imperial power as defined earlier in 
the century, both on pragmatic and moral grounds. John Kent has argued that Britain initially 
attempted to balance the US and Soviet resource bases through an imperial-style arrangement 
between Europe and Africa, with the ‘special relationship’ between the US and the UK 
secondary while the latter attempted to find a position of independent strength.23 The brief 
symbolic power of the Commonwealth24 derived from its status as a new articulation of empire – 
the same reason for its ultimate impotence. 
 
A third mode of Antarctic exploration drawing on colonial legacies came to the foreground after 
the return of the NBSX in 1952. From early 1953 figures including Sir Miles Clifford (Governor 
                                                 
18 Friedman (1995). 
19 Shuckburgh (4 December 1948). 
20 The characterization of the NBSX as a distinctly new and progressive event is clear from the official published 
account by expedition leader John Giæver (1954). 
21 See for instance Grenfell Price (1963: 14-27). 
22 See for instance United Kingdom Foreign Office (1953). 
23 Kent (1993). 
24 See for instance Hansen (2001) and Webster (2005). 
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of the Falkland Islands), Vivian Fuchs, Sir James Wordie (polar veteran and key figure at both 
the Scott Polar Research Institute [SPRI] and the Royal Geographical Society) and Air Marshal 
Sir John Slessor championed plans for a crossing of the continent via the South Pole, conducted 
entirely across territory claimed by the Commonwealth. This would complete Ernest 
Shackleton’s aborted Imperial Trans-Antarctic Expedition of 1914-16, in which Wordie had 
participated, and secure prestige for the British Commonwealth through the performance of a 
historically resonant feat. Prospective leader Fuchs argued that ‘[a] trans-continental journey 
made wholly within territory claimed by the British Commonwealth … would gain prestige and 
at the same time contribute to the solidarity of Commonwealth interests.’25 The Commonwealth 
Relations Office (until recently the Dominions Office) quickly saw the emblematic value of the 
plan and offered full support. Whereas FIDS epitomized quiet but functional occupation aimed at 
strengthening British sovereignty, a trans-Antarctic crossing could earn prestige by 
demonstrating the Commonwealth’s vitality, much like the 1953 ascent of Mount Everest (which 
Wordie also played a key role in organizing). It is no coincidence that Sir Edmund Hillary of 
Everest fame was chosen to lead the expedition’s main support party. 
 
The three modes of operation symbolized by FIDS, the NBSX, and the Trans-Antarctic 
Expedition (TAE) were not a priori incompatible, but they reflected different approaches to an 
evolving problem. Strengthening Britain’s current claims (such as through FIDS) would enhance 
its negotiating position when some form of international agreement was eventually reached, 
ending the need for continuous expenditure that post-war Britain could ill afford. However, 
open-ended scientific programs could allow the United States and – far worse – the Soviet Union 
to establish significant presence in the Antarctic, their greater resources enhancing their 
bargaining power at any future international settlement while diminishing the prestige of 
historical achievements. Joint ventures such as the NBSX that foregrounded science reaffirmed 
British commitment to progressive international cooperation while solidifying existing territorial 
arrangements. If the TAE generated sufficient recognition and prestige it could alleviate the latter 
concern, but its value derived from rhetorical resources that were losing traction, and it risked 
being overshadowed by the IGY. 
 
Early British Reactions to the IGY 
 
As is well known, the IGY was conceived as a successor to the previous International Polar 
Years in 1882-83 and 1932-33,26 but neither had significant political consequences. 
Consequently, it was understandable that Whitehall should hope this situation would be 
replicated during the IGY. Word of the planned event first reached Whitehall in early 1952, but 
did not attract much attention, although Robert Cecil suspected the event could lead to ‘awkward 
possibilities’ involving the USSR.27 The assumption within the Colonial Office was that the 
Royal Society would probably decide to send a party to the FIDS, at which point government 
                                                 
25 Fuchs (undated).  
26 This account is reproduced in many places. See for instance Fogg (1992: 168-69) or Walton and Doake (1987: 
32). 
27 The first mention of the IGY in Colonial Office files is a note by ‘JMM’ (15 December 1951) inquiring about 
rumors that had been circulating. Cecil’s note (to J.S. Bennett) was from 8 March 1952.  
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would be asked for financial support, preferably as a discrete entity so as not to detract from the 
budget or remit of FIDS.28 
 
Shortly afterward the IGY also came to the attention of the Foreign Office. The Foreign Office’s 
Antarctic specialist during this period was Brian Roberts, veteran of the 1934-37 British Graham 
Land Expedition and part-time employee of the SPRI in Cambridge.29 Roberts’ detailed and 
multifaceted knowledge of polar issues ensured his voice commanded attention, if not always 
authority. As early as 1954 he noted that the IGY would: 
 
stimulate a great deal of polar activity which would otherwise probably not occur … 
I am beginning to think that we should … arrange … declarations that Antarctic 
activities connected with the I.G.Y. are scientific and not directed to political ends. 
This kind of thing is likely to be favoured by all the key people who have initiated 
the I.G.Y. Otherwise we may all find ourselves involved (without anyone wishing it) 
in a competition where each country tries to demonstrate that it is best qualified to 
cover the Antarctic part of the programme.30 
 
For Roberts, characterizing the IGY as apolitical was an effective means of separating its 
activities from potential sovereignty implications. Roberts was by no means advocating a 
normative antithesis between science and politics: in fact, his advocacy of a more politically 
engaged vision for the SPRI would ultimately be responsible for his eventual marginalization at 
the organization he considered his spiritual home.31 Using metropolitan expertise to develop the 
colonial periphery was a well-worn theme in British statecraft. In the early post-war years the 
scientific expert was an increasingly visible driver of progress within the Commonwealth,32 but 
this represented the application of new tools within an old colonial order. By contrast, the IGY 
was an international scientific event in which the superpowers might become heavily invested, 
and Britain’s role would not reflect the historically dominant position it had enjoyed.  
 
As Roberts saw it, the best hope to manage the IGY lay in constructing it as a purely scientific 
event without any political dimension. Rigid boundaries between scientific and political realms, 
with the IGY located in the former, represented the best hope for Britain to preserve its territorial 
position. This placed the IGY into a separate category from nationally-organized scientific 
operations such as FIDS that possessed an explicit political purpose. If the IGY could be driven 
by scientists interested narrowly in their own research projects, and if it could be kept separate 
from the bigger geopolitical picture, the storm might pass without consequences for sovereignty. 
                                                 
28 See in particular J.S. Bennett’s note (15 March 1952) from a lunch meeting with James Wordie (at the time 
involved with both FIDS and the informal Polar Year committee through the Royal Society). 
29 It is to be regretted that no biography of Roberts has yet been written, though an illuminating set of recollections 
have been published (King and Savours [eds], 1995). 
30 Roberts (28 October 1954). 
31 Debenham to Roberts (15 October 1942) and Roberts to Debenham (21 October 1942). Roberts fell out with SPRI 
Director Frank Debenham in 1942 when the latter took umbrage at Roberts’s characteristically ambitious and wide-
ranging analysis of the organization’s future direction. Debenham was uncomfortable with any change from the 
Institute’s mission as an aid to explorers. Roberts was later overlooked for the SPRI directorship in the 1950s in a 
move that signaled the Institute’s new state-directed role as a scientific research unit attached to Cambridge 
University rather than an information center serving British interests.  
32 See for instance MacKenzie (2001: 29). 
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When it became apparent by early 1955 that the IGY would involve substantial state-sponsored 
Antarctic activities, especially from the United States, British policymakers quite understandably 
saw it as a growing crisis. An event on this scale could not be kept free from contemporaneous 
political dynamics. The Foreign Office worried that plans for a definitive territorial settlement 
would be sidelined until after the IGY, by which time Britain’s strong history of Antarctic 
engagement could easily be overshadowed by the massive programs from other nations.33 Even 
if declarations of apolitical intent could be translated into a formal separation between 
sovereignty and IGY activity, the prestige associated with such massive achievements could not 
be demarcated away. The strong rhetorical devotion to science that came to characterize official 
United States and Soviet IGY statements transformed Antarctica from an object for political 
administration to a theater for scientific prowess.34 
 
As originally envisioned, the Royal Society was responsible for organizing Britain’s 
participation in the IGY, although the Foreign Office in particular was increasingly aware of 
potential political difficulties. To maintain sovereign authority over its Antarctic territories 
Britain required any states wishing to work inside FIDS to seek formal permission, thereby 
recognizing Britain’s status as the sovereign power. The immediate threat came from Chile and 
Argentina, which Britain countered with increased short-term FIDS activity to shore up its 
current position and a proposed application to the International Court of Justice for a definitive 
settlement. The major concern for both Britain and the United States was the Soviet Union, 
which had begun to highlight its historical engagement with the Antarctic (through the voyages 
of Thaddeus von Bellingshausen in the early nineteenth century) while increasing its role in the 
Antarctic whale fishery.35 Without any territorial claims of its own the USSR could entrench its 
presence without being bound to any mutual recognition – such as that between the territorial 
claims of the UK and Norway. From late 1954 the US pressured Britain to occupy a station at 
Vahsel Bay in order to forestall a possible Soviet base, believing there was ‘no doubt that some 
kind of an accommodation could be worked out between our two Governments and that the 
important thing was to keep out the Communists.’36 
 
Those currents extended to the meetings of the Comité Spécial de l’Année Géophysique 
Internationale (CSAGI), through which the IGY Antarctic program was organized. Before the 
first major planning meeting, held in Paris in July 1955, the Royal Society delegation was 
thoroughly briefed on the implications of base locations for British territorial rights. Following 
the policy of demarcation between IGY activities and sovereignty, delegation leader Sir David 
Brunt was instructed to formally state that the Royal Society was a ‘non-government 
organization and that anything said during the discussions on Antarctica at the Conference 
cannot in any way be held to prejudice the position of Her Majesty’s Government as regards 
United Kingdom sovereignty over the Falkland Islands Dependencies.’37 The statement shored 
                                                 
33 See in particular United Kingdom Chancery in Moscow (25 August 1955).  
34 Both the US and the USSR engaged in highly symbolic Antarctic projects, with the former establishing a base at 
the South Geographic Pole and the latter making the first journey to the Pole of Inaccessibility.  
35 Soviet statements about the Antarctic were summarized and critiqued by Roberts (March 1955). 
36 Wilkinson (15 December 1954). 
37 Man (undated). 
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up Britain’s position in regards to territory while doing nothing to address the IGY’s value as a 
source of political capital through prestige.  
 
Both the Foreign Office and the Colonial Office underestimated the scale of planned IGY 
activity and the number of non-territorial angles with political ramifications. When the results of 
the Paris meeting reached London the Foreign Office expressed unhappiness at Argentina’s 
apparent dominance of activities on the contested Antarctic Peninsula. J.S. Whitehead of the 
Foreign Office was disappointed at the British delegation’s apparent naivety, complaining that 
‘[t]he United Kingdom appears to have come out of this conference very badly … Politics, 
without doubt, are playing a considerable part in the IGY and the sooner the U.K. delegations 
realize this and act accordingly, the better.’38 Humiliatingly, British stations would apparently be 
in radio frequency groupings centered on Argentine stations. This caused the Colonial Office to 
consider advocating complete British withdrawal from the IGY,39 as though Britain could make 
the event go away simply by choosing to ignore it. 
 
Whitehall attributed the apparent success of Argentina in advancing its position within the 
Falkland Islands Dependencies, and the Soviet Union in proposing a substantial Antarctic 
program with little prior warning, to political maneuvering. The British scientists were innocents 
who could not be trusted to keep the proceedings apolitical. In light of the success of other states 
in obtaining political prestige through a process marked clearly as purely scientific, there was 
general agreement within the Foreign Office that an official government observer should attend 
the next organizational meeting in Brussels to ensure British interests were adequately 
represented. In the words of Ivor Vincent of the Foreign Office: 
 
 the scientists who would make up our own Delegation, and no doubt others as well, 
would naturally not have prominently in mind the political implications of the 
arrangements for the International Geophysical Year in the Antarctic. But the 
delegations of certain other countries would not take such a purely scientific view.40 
 
The presumption of political innocence was perhaps more local than universal. United States 
IGY planning bore the fingerprints of Lloyd Berkner, veteran of Richard Byrd’s 1927 Antarctic 
expedition and now a key mover in the highest circles of both science and political 
administration.41 Britain had no such man.42 Before the start of IGY planning the Royal Society 
had not been significantly involved with Antarctica since losing a bitter power struggle with the 
Royal Geographical Society over the 1901-04 National Antarctic Expedition.43 FIDS was run 
from the Colonial Office with few connections to the wider scientific community. In separating 
the IGY Antarctic program from both FIDS and the concurrent TAE, which had clear political 
                                                 
38 Whitehead (26 July 1955). 
39 Vincent (23 August 1955). 
40 Vincent (1 September 1955). Italics added for emphasis. 
41 For an account of Berkner’s life and career, see Needell (2000). My thanks to Ron Doel for prompting reflection 
on the contrasting approaches between the United States and the United Kingdom. 
42 The nearest candidates were Wordie and Brian Roberts. Both held graduate degrees in science and possessed 
strong government connections, but neither moved in the highest circles of science policy. 
43 On the Royal Society/Royal Geographical Society dispute, see for instance Baughman (1999).  
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aims, British policymakers presumed a fundamental separation between the two modes of 
Antarctic engagement that other states did not necessarily share.44 
 
While the Royal Society remained Britain’s official representatives at CSAGI meetings, the 
government’s inter-departmental Antarctic Committee would now determine the parameters of 
their actions.45 The presence at subsequent CSAGI meetings of a Foreign Office observer 
empowered to act as a puppet-master when required was perceived as necessary given the 
attitude of other states. The fact scientists were to remain the only on-stage actors confirmed 
Whitehall’s preference for rigid demarcation – extending to the adoption of scientific masks for 
active participants in the CSAGI meetings – and acknowledgment that political ends would now 
have to be furthered by scientists as actors, not instruments. 
Britain’s solution to the problem of radio frequency reporting neatly illustrates how it adapted to 
the pursuit of political aims in a context dominated by devotion to science. Unable to openly 
criticize the arrangement on political grounds, as it had been reached by a group of ostentatiously 
non-partisan scientific experts, the Foreign and Colonial Offices sought to annul it on technical 
grounds. Vincent was instructed to persuade the Royal Society that British stations reporting to 
Argentine or Chilean bases was ‘undesirable on grounds of scientific efficiency.’46 A.H. 
Sheffield of the Colonial Office was sent in a non-official capacity as an expert in radio 
frequency questions and to ‘cover political contingencies.’47 Sheffield succeeded in being named 
head of the CSAGI Radio Transmissions Working Group during the Brussels meeting. He 
quickly reached a solution that satisfied all parties while removing British stations from a 
hierarchy topped by Argentina, achieving a political aim through deployment of arguments based 
on practical benefit to the IGY program as a whole.48 Operating as a non-governmental figure in 
a technical capacity, Sheffield succeeded admirably in his mission to dispel a threat to British 
prestige (and potentially sovereignty, as radio frequencies are granted by state authority). The 
most significant controversy in Whitehall appears to have been whether the Royal Society or the 
Colonial Office should be responsible for his expenses:49 evidently the distinction between 
scientific and political activities extended right through to accounting.  
 
Demarcating a Safe Space 
 
During the final series of pre-IGY CSAGI meetings in 1956, British government attitudes 
continued to reflect the event’s potential dangers. Antarctica was becoming a political minefield 
in other ways too. Early that year the ship carrying the TAE’s eastern party had become trapped 
in pack ice, temporarily leading to fears of an embarrassing rescue by Argentina (which unlike 
                                                 
44 Although there were discussions about logistical cooperation between the two ventures, the TAE and the British 
IGY party remained organizationally distinct. 
45 Vincent (23 August 1955). The broader context of this note was a Chilean government approach to the British 
government over official coordination of IGY activities, which Vincent rejected on behalf of the Foreign Office by 
claiming that British IGY planning was entirely in the hands of the Royal Society.  
46 Vincent (1 September 1955). 
47 Willis (27 July 1955). 
48 Anonymous (16 September 1955). The memorandum states not only that Sheffield’s nomination was suggested 
by CSAGI convener Georges Laclavere, but that the results he achieved in the Radio Transmissions Working Group 
were actively welcomed by the Argentine delegation. 
49 Litchener (28 May 1956). The matter was discussed widely in May 1956 within the Colonial Office.  
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Britain, owned an icebreaker).50 Even worse, India’s representative at the United Nations – 
Arthur Lall – circulated a draft memorandum at the UN to make Antarctica ‘usable only for 
peaceful purposes’ and explicitly citing the IGY as evidence of international interest in the 
continent’s future.51 Lall’s proposal threatened to replace a power-sharing arrangement between 
traditional Antarctic powers with a form of global administration, replacing the clubby 
internationalism of the NBSX with a model that negated colonial-era histories. British UN 
representatives silenced Lall by bluntly warning of dire consequences for Commonwealth unity 
if his proposal were taken further, invoking the very bonds that his proposal would weaken.52 
 
The major CSAGI planning meeting in Paris, from 30 July to 4 August 1956, featured direct 
British political representation through Foreign Office observer Ivor Vincent. While Sheffield 
described it as ‘extremely arduous,’53 the Australian diplomatic observer Murray Bourchier felt 
‘political content was low and any attempt to introduce political considerations met with the 
most vigorous condemnation from the Chairman (Colonel Laclavere) and many delegates, 
especially those of Norway, U.S.A. and U.S.S.R.’54 Both assessments were true. The rhetoric of 
scientific devotion dominated official proceedings, while British figures fretted behind the scenes 
about political challenges. 
 
One incident from the Paris conference perfectly captures the rhetorical hegemony of devotion to 
science during the meeting. Admiral George Dufek, leader of the US delegation, attended a post-
lunch session ‘primed with strong drink.’55 As Bourchier wrote in a confidential report: 
 
In the course of a long and rambling discourse by the Russians Admiral Dufek (U.S.) 
who had been put to sleep by it, suddenly woke up and shouted very loudly “what 
has all this got to do with science?” The American delegation looked embarrassed 
but nothing more was said, and after a few moments of attentive silence the Russians 
proceeded with their dissertation, which was in fact exclusively scientific in 
character.56 
 
Dufek’s exclamation revealed both the simmering US-Soviet tensions that permeated IGY 
planning and the manner in which political objectives were expressed within the particular 
environment of the CSAGI meetings. The admiral’s criticism of the Soviet speakers reflected the 
tools at his disposal; challenging their scientific commitment and intent was the strongest insult 
possible. British reports of the Dufek incident characterized it as amusing, partly as it occurred 
during a session of tediously specialized scientific discussion, and because the outburst 
confirmed the rules of discussion rather than challenging them. Even drunken insults had to be 
framed in terms of scientific devotion. 
 
The most overt manifestation of political concerns in IGY business came from the Argentine 
delegate Admiral Rodolfo Panzarini, who provided a golden opportunity for other 
                                                 
50 United Kingdom Naval Attaché in Buenos Aires (5 January 1956). 
51 For more details on this episode, see Howkins (2007). 
52 United Kingdom delegation to the United Nations (10 May 1956). 
53 Sheffield (14 August 1956).  
54 Bourchier (29 August 1956).  
55 Vincent (3 August 1956). 
56 Bourchier (29 August 1956). 
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representatives to confirm the discursive order by vigorously punishing a perceived 
transgression. Panzarini objected to a map of Antarctica used by the French glaciologist Pierre 
Lejay as it named only one territorial claim – that of France over Adélie Land – and hence 
constituted a political statement. Laclavere angrily ‘bewailed the fact that so many diplomats had 
invaded a scientific conference,’ in the words of Ivor Vincent, after which ‘[t]he Russian 
delegate seized this wonderful opportunity to make a speech in favour of scientific pureness of 
mind and this received approving nods from scientists of all delegations.’57 Vincent promptly 
briefed Sir David Brunt to back these sentiments, ensuring Britain conformed to the overarching 
norms. 
 
The Panzarini-Lejay incident may have focused attention on Argentina’s contested sovereignty 
claims, but Vincent’s behind-the-scenes discussions with Chilean and Argentine figures revealed 
the Soviet Union as a greater threat. The Chilean representative seemed ‘scared out his skin by 
the thought of having Russians in the Drake Passage.’58 But how could Soviet engagement in the 
Antarctic be curtailed? The most striking feature of Vincent’s confidential report on the Paris 
meeting is its apparent naivety over the innocence of Soviet delegates. Adhering perfectly to the 
ideal of devotion to science, the Soviets ‘put across an increasingly ambitious programme for 
their Antarctic expeditions without anyone being in a position to limit them in any way.’ 
Individual Soviet representatives were all ready to chat quite freely on any subject and ‘[o]ne 
lady scientist of the delegation was seen all by herself at a party in Versailles.’59 This accorded 
with earlier official Soviet announcements on their IGY plans, which stressed the event’s 
international character and the USSR’s willingness to contribute to the advance of science, an 
eminently logical position from the political perspective as the USSR had no territorial claims to 
safeguard. 
 
Although a Foreign Office/Colonial Office report from the 1955 CSAGI meeting in Brussels 
described the Soviet delegation as ‘politically controlled,’ suggesting manipulation of otherwise 
innocent figures, those sentiments did not appear in Vincent’s reports from 1956. What Vincent 
interpreted as absence of political strategy, driven by the ‘scientific fear of getting into politics,’ 
allowed the USSR to plan a substantial IGY program with concomitant prestige.60 It also meant 
the USSR could establish a significant Antarctic presence with no guarantee of withdrawal at the 
end of the IGY: if continuing engagement were justified in terms of scientific results, it could be 
cast as an expression of devotion to science rather than an act of imperialism.  
 
Indeed, the greatest threat British policymakers saw in the IGY was its potential to evolve from a 
discrete event to an ongoing engagement, thus permanently altering the continent’s political 
landscape. This began to come true even before the event began when proposals emerged in late 
1956 for a one-year extension into 1959. Frank Corner of the New Zealand High Commission in 
London argued (with little support) for an extension on the grounds that his own nation would 
thereby have a stronger reason to maintain an Antarctic presence, while an additional year would 
prevent the Soviet Union claiming its work was not yet complete.61 Brian Roberts argued that the 
                                                 
57 Vincent (3 August 1956). 
58 Vincent (3 August 1956). 
59 United Kingdom Chancery in Moscow (25 August 1955). 
60 United Kingdom Foreign Office and Colonial Office (26 September 1955).  
61 Vincent (20 December 1956). 
17
   
 
proposal was politically damaging, especially as any IGY prolongation would further efface 
Britain’s historical achievements in the Antarctic, but recognized that rejecting it would be 
difficult as it would mean ‘appearing before the world as not co-operating in the advance of 
International Science.’62 Fortunately for the Foreign Office, the Royal Society argued against the 
proposal on ‘purely technical’ grounds, citing the desirability of limited data collection 
accompanied by timely analysis rather than open-ended fieldwork – particularly when non-
Antarctic IGY programs had already ceased.63 
 
The Paris CSAGI meeting of 1956 was the last to feature substantial British political 
representation. By the middle of 1957 the heavy organizational work was done and the Foreign 
Office decided not to send observers to future planning meetings; ‘[p]olitical observers are … 
only useful in helping to detect and resist moves made for political reasons. Most of the usual 
moves of this kind must now have been made, and the Scientists are better aware of the 
pitfalls.’64 The Foreign Office felt the Royal Society delegation been educated to the point where 
they could spot traps like the IGY extension and combat them on scientific grounds, but it is also 
apparent that IGY organization had reached a point where it was dominated by the how rather 
than the why of scientific activity. Political crisis management could now shift to other arenas, 
most notably negotiations over Antarctica’s long-term administrative future. 
 The dominance of the rhetoric of scientific devotion, so powerfully inscribed upon the IGY, 
ultimately also shaped the articulation of the TAE. The expedition was a major point of 
controversy within British circles from the first discussions in 1953. Although championed by 
the Commonwealth Relations Office and the Colonial Office, the Foreign Office harbored 
serious reservations based on the TAE’s dubious prestige value in the face of the IGY. The SPRI 
Director, Colin Bertram, refused to offer more than personal support for his friend Fuchs.65 By 
the middle of 1955 Brian Roberts felt the scale of US IGY plans would destroy the political 
value of the TAE: 
 
… the gilt is coming off the gingerbread. The effort will appear rather pathetic in 
relation to the American (and perhaps Russian) aircraft and ground parties 
crisscrossing his route. Even the arguments about scientific contributions have worn 
thin with Dr. Fuchs’ refusal to accept any aid from the Americans (dropping fuel and 
explosives for seismic soundings, etc.)66 
 
Once the journey began Fuchs suffered serious delays, culminating in the support party under 
Edmund Hillary reaching the Pole first – after the United States had established an IGY research 
station there anyway. Ill-feeling between Fuchs and Hillary damaged the expedition’s value as an 
exercise in Commonwealth solidarity.  
 
But perhaps the strongest testament to the IGY’s success in defining science as the key to 
legitimate Antarctic activity came when Fuchs finally completed the crossing and sent a five-
word telegram to Queen Elizabeth II: ‘Our scientific work is completed.’ A Daily Telegraph 
                                                 
62 Roberts (28 December 1956).  
63 Vincent (11 January 1957).  
64 Hildyard (16 May 1957). 
65 Commonwealth Trans-Antarctic Expedition Committee of Management (10 March 1955).  
66 Roberts (15 July 1955). 
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editorial (erroneously describing the TAE as part of the British IGY effort) captured the new 
paradigm: 
 
They are the first men to make this journey. Yet achievement for its own sake 
belongs to a past phase of pioneering; the conquest of Everest was perhaps its final 
landmark. Scientific curiosity is now the spur, and the Commonwealth Trans-
Antarctic Expedition was part of a massive and meticulously planned international 
inquiry. For Dr. FUCHS and his companions, success means that they have secured 
and duly delivered the data they were sent to seek … 67 
 
In Britain the imperial explorer was no longer a figure of authority. Far from being a fresh 
chapter reaffirming Commonwealth vitality, the TAE was an awkward postscript.68 
 
Conclusions 
 
Scholars still debate whether the IGY led causally to the Antarctic Treaty, but most concur that 
its symbolic power made viable a form of administration drawing moral authority from the 
continent’s scientific importance. British political responses to the IGY complicate this picture. 
On the one hand, the IGY laid a set of ‘facts on the ground’ through the scale of Soviet and US 
activity that diminished Britain’s position as a leading Antarctic nation. Brian Roberts’s fear that 
historic achievements would be undermined by more recent, large-scale activities came true. Nor 
did the TAE succeed in reinvigorating British prestige as its backers had hoped. The formal 
continuation of IGY-based activities that Britain dreaded also occurred, under the aegis of the 
newly-formed Special Committee for Antarctic Research (set up through the International 
Council of Scientific Unions). 
 
At the same time, it is important to note that the near-hegemonic rhetoric of devotion to science 
that marked IGY organizational meetings was a viable political strategy for Britain as well as the 
United States and the Soviet Union. By establishing IGY activities as apolitical, Britain hoped to 
minimize its sovereignty implications. This should be seen as a defensive strategy to an 
unwelcome event. The strategy had limited success, as there were no formal challenges to British 
sovereignty on account of IGY activities, but removing sovereignty implications from IGY 
activities could not strip them of prestige value. The main effect of separating science from 
politics was to remove a potential barrier to massive national projects carried out by the 
superpowers. Absence of overt political motive actually enhanced their significance by enabling 
IGY Antarctic activities to be characterized as apolitical contributions to human progress. Like 
the Space Race, IGY programs in Antarctica exemplified national strength through conspicuous 
resource consumption in the name of science rather than the territorially-based outlook that 
dominated British discussions. It is instructive to recall that British figures saw the IGY as a 
distraction from a definitive administrative agreement over Antarctica rather than a step in the 
path towards it. 
 
                                                 
67 Daily Telegraph (3 March 1958). 
68 Dodds has argued, however, that the TAE was a significant event in New Zealand (2005).  
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The initial hopes of British bureaucrats for an apolitical IGY were doomed: no event on this 
scale could be apolitical in the age of state-driven science. However, the manner in which British 
political strategy was pursued during its organization also reflected confusion over the political 
consequences of scientific activity. The Royal Society might cynically be seen as a front that 
confirmed British commitment to ideals of scientific devotion while figures such as Vincent and 
Sheffield manipulated its actions for political ends. Sir David Brunt’s autonomy ended when it 
touched issues of concern to the British government. Yet there was also a genuine feeling, 
particularly within the Foreign Office, that the concept of an apolitical IGY was valid even if 
circumstances made it a pipe dream. 
 
British political engagement with the organization of the IGY should perhaps, therefore, be seen 
as a failure because policymakers mistakenly viewed it as a discrete event located in the realm of 
the international scientific community that could be separated from political consequences. 
Instead of triumphantly vindicating the power of science over politics, the IGY came to 
exemplify a new mode of politics through science, one that measured national strength more in 
terms of prestige than territorial holdings. Rigorously demarcating science from political 
consequences worked only when those consequences were defined in terms of sovereignty 
claims. The mere fact of Soviet and American activity at unprecedented levels confirmed the 
power of those states through the prestige their work generated within a discursive environment 
that mandated rhetorical devotion to science. These dynamics were subsequently inscribed upon 
the Antarctic Treaty. This was politics in a new key, not science in the place of politics.  
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POLAR INTERNATIONALISM, DIPLOMACY, AND  
THE INTERNATIONAL GEOPHYSICAL YEAR 
 
Rip Bulkeley 
 
Abstract 
 
The International Geophysical Year (IGY) of 1957-58 is widely believed to have inspired and 
facilitated the 1959 Antarctic Treaty, which partly resolved or at least postponed a cluster of political 
conflicts over Antarctica. But when the history of the idea of internationalizing Antarctica is 
surveyed, especially in its later phases, the causal connections between the IGY and the Treaty are 
revealed as far from simple. 
 
The internationalization of polar regions was mooted by jurists and others from the early 20th century 
onwards. Then in the late 1940s a trend in US public opinion coincided with an official policy 
review, and two versions of internationalization were suggested for Antarctica by the US State 
Department. The available but circumstantial evidence suggests that the 1950 proposal for a Third 
Polar Year was triggered by that conjuncture at least as much as by scientific motives. If so, then 
while science in the form of the IGY may have assisted diplomacy in the late 1950s, ten years 
beforehand diplomacy had already done much to advance the cause of international science in 
Antarctica. 
 
Formulating the Idea, 1907-1939 
 
The Antarctic Treaty may be 50 years old in December 2009, but the idea of it will be roughly twice 
that age. Whatever science contributed to the Treaty later on, it did not have very much to do with 
the original conception. True, several scientific expeditions to Antarctica in the 19th and early 20th 
centuries had international elements. In particular, a cluster of expeditions around the turn of the 
century were partly aimed at supplementing the modest sub-Antarctic portions of the International 
Polar Year of 1882-83, but they seldom synchronized or otherwise coordinated their observations. 
This relatively internationalist period was followed by a more nationalistic phase, which included the 
British claim to the Antarctic Peninsula and neighbouring territory, formulated in 1908 and refined 
into an explicit polar sector in 1917, and the competition between Scott and Amundsen to be the first 
to reach the South Pole, played out from 1910 to 1912. If the scientists had established a permanent 
international coordinating body for polar research in general or Antarctic research in particular, they 
might have had some quiet influence on political developments. But in the end their national 
perspectives, loyalties and paymasters prevented this. 
 
The International Polar Commission which had directed the first Polar Year of 1882-83 was 
reorganized in April 1884. But it took no new initiatives and did not reconvene for seven years, when 
it took just 90 minutes on the morning of 3 September 1891 to dissolve itself (Mittheilungen, 1882-
91, pts 6 & 7). Thirteen years later Henryk Arctowski (1871-1958) proposed to the 8th International 
Geographical Congress (IGC), meeting in the United States, that a similar international scientific 
programme should be mounted, primarily in Antarctica. In a fuller account of his ideas he explained 
that this would amount to a second Polar Year, to be held 25 years after the first (Arctowski, 1904, 
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1905). Then in September 1905 the London Times reported in sceptical tones that during the 
International Congress for World Economic Expansion at Mons a section devoted to “Expansion of 
Civilization in New Countries” had passed a resolution proposing a new international body for polar 
research, to be supported by the Belgian government.1 A provisional scientific commission convened 
the following year, and again in 1908. The group seems not to have approached the International 
Meteorological Organization, which had sponsored the first Polar Year, and they received only 
lukewarm endorsements from the IGC. It took over seven years before a fully functional 
International Polar Commission, supported by only half the 22 eligible countries,2 was formally 
constituted during the 10th IGC, held at Rome in April 1913. Its members were advised that their first 
meeting would be held at St Petersburg in 1916. But the death of their chairman, the Russian 
geologist Feodosii Chernyshev (1856-1914), in January 1914 and the outbreak of war in Europe later 
that year effectively put an end to the project (Elzinga, 2004).3 
 
The story of the 1959 Antarctic Treaty does begin in the early years of the 20th century, but not with 
science and not in the Antarctic. The Spitsbergen ‘coal rush’ started with small-scale Norwegian 
operations in the late 1890s and accelerated with British and American investments after 1900. After 
an exchange of diplomatic notes between Sweden and Russia in 1871, an understanding had existed 
to the effect that the Spitsbergen or Svalbard Archipelago, located about 700 km away from the 
European mainland, should be regarded as without sovereignty, or terra nullius. But with the advent 
of year-round economic activity in permanent settlements such as Longyear City, the continuation of 
anarchy was no longer feasible. Furthermore, after achieving full independence from Sweden in 1905 
the Norwegian government had renewed its interest in the resources of the archipelago. In 1908 it 
invited other interested governments to attend a conference on the matter in 1910. Despite 
difficulties posed by the Swedish and Russian governments a convention on internationalization was 
drafted in 1912. But the plenary conference did not meet until June 1914, and had to be suspended 
during the First World War. Then under the Svalbard Treaty of 9 February 1920 Norwegian sole 
sovereignty over the archipelago was recognized with important qualifications.4 All citizens of states 
party to the treaty were to have equal rights of access and economic activity; taxes could only be 
raised for and spent on local administration; and Norway accepted restrictions on its military activity 
in the archipelago. 
 
Well before it was resolved, the issue of Spitsbergen began to resonate in legal circles. In 1907 the 
editor of a London law journal toyed with the idea that a good solution might be the instalment of an 
independent scientific commission as rulers of Spitsbergen.5 Then the French jurist and diplomat 
René Dollot (1875-1962) published two influential articles (under a pseudonym) about sovereignty 
in Polar Regions (Waultrin, 1908, 1909). He mentioned, but did not support, the idea that 
Spitsbergen’s sovereignty might be shared in a condominium (1908: 121). In 1910 however Thomas 
                                                 
1 The Times, 27 September 1905, p. 5. In the paper’s opinion, the role allotted to the Belgian government was “not, 
perhaps, calculated to inspire unlimited confidence”. 
2 Britain, France, Germany and Norway were amongst the absentees. 
3 Elzinga (loc. cit.) argues that this IPC was continued by the World Meteorological Network after 1918. There was 
of course a cultural continuity, embodied in people like Arctowski and La Cour, but the present author is not 
persuaded that the IPC was continued as an organization. 
4 A proposal from the Netherlands, that Spitsbergen should become a League of Nations mandate, presumably to 
Norway, was not successful. 
5 The Law Magazine and Review, 1907, (33) p. 85. 
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Willing Balch (1866-1927) welcomed Norway’s apparent intention to preserve Spitsbergen as „a 
joint possession of all mankind“. (Although that was not how things eventually turned out, as we 
have seen, he was quite right at the time.6) And he went on to propose that “both East and West 
Antarctica” should be internationalized in the same way (Balch T., 1910: 275).7 To the author’s 
knowledge, he was the first person ever to do so. 
 
Dollot (above) also discussed whether sovereignty could be exercised over frozen seas, or whether 
they should simply be subject to maritime law.8 The question had arisen from a speech made by the 
Canadian Senator Pascal Poirier (1852-1933) on 19 February 1907, which Dollot quoted at length. 
Attributing the idea to a recent discussion between Canadian and American explorers at the Arctic 
Club in New York, Poirier had declared that Canada (and every other country bordering the Arctic 
Ocean) had a right to claim any new land found in the seas to its north between lines (meridians) 
defined by the north-western and north-eastern points of its existing territory.9 To a jurist, however, 
the problem was to understand why the Arctic Ocean should be treated differently from other oceans, 
in which sovereignty over islands could not be claimed hypothetically and beforehand, but only after 
they had been discovered, occupied and officially administered. Was the Arctic Ocean an exception 
because its frozen waters constituted a land-like surface on which people could live, travel, and 
engage in economic activities? (A sort of aqua firma – RB.) But did not ships also sail through it? 
Poirier claimed only Arctic lands for Canada, but the question of sovereignty over ice has been 
debated by jurists ever since (Pharand, 1969; Rothwell, 1996: 261-68). In his early papers Dollot 
concluded cautiously that the law would depend on whatever science might determine about how 
stable and stationary the ice of the Arctic Ocean really was (Waultrin, 1909: 655-56). 
 
The significance for the internationalization of Antarctica was that those who thought it legitimate 
for states to claim some sort of rights or title over the frozen wastes of the Arctic Ocean, and not just 
over its islands, sometimes went on to assimilate the two polar regions for legal and political 
purposes.10 This was not an option for those who differentiated legally and in other ways between a 
broadly maritime Arctic Ocean and a – probably – continental Antarctica. During the 20th century no 
states adopted an undifferentiated approach covering both polar regions, though Britain at least toyed 
with one when it transferred Senator Poirier’s sectoral doctrine from the Canadian Arctic to the 
                                                 
6 For the intentions of the Norwegian and Swedish governments to that effect, despite their shaky conceptions of the 
notion of terra nullius, see (Jacobsson, 2004). 
7 T. W. Balch was a son of Thomas Balch (1821-77), an authority on the international law of arbitration, and he 
made the continuation of his father’s work his own. His elder brother Edwin Balch (1856-1927) was a historian 
of Antarctic exploration, and T. W. Balch took care to follow his brother’s preferred nomenclature for the region 
(Balch, E. S., 1902). On 9 March 1912, while commenting on Amundsen’s success in reaching the South Pole, 
the New York Times expressed approval for T. W. Balch’s idea under the sub-head “Plan of International 
Possession” (p. 6). 
8 In several European languages the Arctic Ocean was called the ‘Frozen Ocean’ or ‘Ice Ocean’, which perhaps gave 
the impression that its ice surface was an unbroken and permanent natural structure. 
9 The first appearance of the sector theory in print may have been on a visiting card designed by the Canadian 
explorer Joseph-Elzéar Bernier (1852-1934) in about 1901, which showed a sector reaching to the North Pole 
between the meridians of 141 and 60 W (Dorion-Robitaille, c 1978: 30). In 1904 the Canadian government 
published a map to the same effect (Timtchenko, 1997), but it did not become (semi-)official Canadian policy 
until the 1920s. Poirot’s speech is often dated as 20 February, but from Dollot’s slightly confusing citation it 
appears that it was given on the 19th and published on the following day in the Comptes rendus du Sénat. 
10 Some Soviet jurists accepted the territoriality of Arctic ice, but tended to differentiate between the two regions as 
strongly as colleagues who did not (Taracouzio, 1938: 348-51). 
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Antarctic Peninsula almost before that gentleman had finished speaking. 
 
Between 1898 and 1914 the eminent French jurist Paul Fauchille (1858-1926) prepared six 
posthumous editions of Henry Bonfils’ (1835-97) Manuel de droit international public. At first 
Fauchille differentiated between the polar regions – unclaimable water in the Arctic, claimable land 
in the Antarctic (Bonfils, 1912: 361); he repeated that opinion in the 1914 edition. But eleven years 
later, in a final revision published under his name, he took the opposite position. His new, 
assimilative conclusion was that stable ice could in some sense be appropriated, and that all states 
were entitled to share in any benefits to be derived from both polar regions, though perhaps some 
more than others (Fauchille, 1925: 706-708). Refining T. W. Balch’s proposal, he suggested that the 
polar regions could be managed on a collective legal basis as “une sorte de condominium plural” 
(Fauchille, 1925: 658). But he stopped short of proposing the newly-created League of Nations, to 
which he had served as a delegate, for this role. 
 
During the 1920s the governments of Australia, Britain, France, and New Zealand all concerned 
themselves with Antarctica in various ways, as too did the proliferating whale factory ships of 
Norway and other countries. Public opinion was slow to respond until Richard Byrd’s (1888-1957) 
first expedition arrived in Antarctica at the end of December 1928. A few weeks later the long-range 
weather forecaster Herbert Browne (1862-1936) wrote to the New York Times with the first known 
proposal that Antarctica should become “a trust for the nations of the world ¼ under the League of 
Nations”.11 Within 14 months his idea was repeated at least three times from both sides of the 
Atlantic and of the political spectrum.12 It would continue to be aired throughout the 1930s.13 
 
In December 1930 the editor of Foreign Affairs, Hamilton Armstrong (1893-1973), asked the State 
Department’s Geographer Samuel Boggs (1889-1954) for an article about Antarctica.14 Armstrong 
too was doubtless responding to Byrd’s first expedition. He may also have known that Boggs had 
recently written a departmental memorandum on US policy options for Antarctica (Quigg, 1983: 
129). Boggs replied that it was an inappropriate time for such a public article from him because 
circumstances were changing. (He may understandably have been hoping for an early determination 
of US policy, which did not eventuate.) But in September 1933 he completed a substantial 
monograph on the issues surrounding claims to sovereignty in polar regions (first published 36 years 
after his death). In it he proposed that all countries should be entitled to place „temporary or 
permanent“ scientific stations anywhere in Antarctica regardless of territorial claims, and that the 
question of Antarctic sovereignty should receive a multi-national solution along the lines of 
Spitsbergen (Boggs, 1990: 114-15, 123). The first point may have been new; the second was an 
indifferently worded restatement of the views expressed by T. W. Balch 23 years earlier. 
                                                 
11 New York Times, 16 February 1929, p. 10, emphasis added; the letter was dated 13 February. 
12 The Living Age (Boston), vol. 336 #4340, April 1929; Vladimir Karapetoff (1896-1948), letter, The Nation (New 
York), vol. 130 # 3369, 21 January 1930; “The Grab for Antarctica”, Week-end Review (London), vol. 1 # 7, 26 
April 1930. A resolution along the lines of the Svalbard Treaty, with Britain taking the role of sovereign 
custodian of Antarctica, was also proposed at this time: L. H. Martin “Land Claims in Antarctica Come to the 
Fore”, New York Times, 5 January 1930, p. XX5. 
13  Thus the statement that, as of July 1939, “Internationalisation schemes had not yet been proposed” (Moore, 
2004: 20) can only be sustained by inserting the word ‘officially’. 
14 Armstrong-Boggs, 16 December 1930: Papers of Samuel Whittemore Boggs, US Library of Congress, [1] \State 
Department A-B/. 
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(Indifferently, because while Spitsbergen had seemed likely to be internationalized back in 1910, by 
1933 it was an integral part of Norway with certain international obligations but no sharing of its 
sovereignty or administration.) 
 
In 1932 the French geographer Camille Vallaux (1870-1945) published an article about territorial 
claims to polar regions in which he argued that they should, or might, give way to 
internationalization (Vallaux, 1932). And in 1934 Jesse Reeves (1872-1942), a jurist and professor of 
political science at the University of Michigan, concluded that the “essentially international” nature 
of Antarctica should be recognized by international agreement (Reeves, 1934: 119). 
 
The following year saw an unusual intervention from a semi-official quarter. Frank Debenham 
(1885-1963) was an Australian geologist who took part in Robert Scott’s (1868-1912) last expedition 
to Antarctica. In 1921 he became the first director of the Scott Polar Research Institute (SPRI) in 
Cambridge, England, which had close ties to the Foreign Office; in 1928 he was executive secretary 
to the 12th IGC at Cambridge, which had no polar meetings;15 and in 1931 he was appointed 
Cambridge’s first Professor of Geography. In September 1935 he addressed the British Association 
for the Advancement of Science, meeting at Norwich, on “Some Aspects of the Polar Regions”. His 
lecture was framed as a set of harmless fantasies, running from futuristic wind-farms in Antarctica, 
which might somehow beam their power to the rest of the world “when coal is scarce and oil 
exhausted”, to a possible sanatorium on Spitsbergen. Along the way Debenham paused to consider 
the unsatisfactory political situation in Antarctica: 
“It is probably too late for any alternative arrangement to be adopted, but had there been a 
League of Nations in existence at the beginning of this century, before any claims had been 
laid in the Antarctic, the protection and administration of this last and least useful continent 
would have been a most appropriate subject for League administration as an ‘international 
park’ of vast proportions which should be open to all nations who would respect its amenities. 
     Political might-have-beens, however, are no more useful than social ones, and claims to 
territory, which can do little beyond giving a large splash of colour on the map, are bound to 
continue.”16 
It was an anodyne but effective way to shrug off a proposal which did not accord with British 
imperial policy. 
 
The proposal, however, persisted. In 1937 the Christian Century, widely regarded as “liberal 
protestantism’s most influential weekly” (Addison, 2004: 85), endorsed it with an editorial.17 And in 
1939 the British Fabian lawyer Thomas McKitterick seemed to accept Britain’s title to the Antarctic 
Peninsula, but then suggested, in assimilative vein, that all polar territories should “be put 
permanently outside the sphere of colonial acquisition ¼ and ¼ governed by an international 
commission” (McKitterick, 1939: 96-97). 
 
Back in January 1934 the Norwegian government, responding to Britain’s recent annexation of the 
vast Australian Antarctic Territory, had withdrawn a previous expression of interest in multilateral 
negotiations about the future of Antarctica, in favour of further bilateral exchanges (Bush, 1982 (2): 
                                                 
15 Apart from a social gathering at SPRI. 
16 The Times, 6 September 1935, p. 6. 
17 „Conflicting Claims to Antarctica“, Christian Century, 23 June 1937, (54) 796-797. 
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150). International negotiations do not amount to negotiated internationalization, which was not 
proposed by Norway at that time. But in 1938, with diplomatic exchanges making little progress, the 
Norwegian Ministry of Trade directed its Svalbard and Arctic Ocean Survey to prepare an 
International Polar Exhibition that should open in Bergen in May 1940 (Anon., 1945). An 
international conference of polar explorers was to have been an important part of the event. 
Norwegian officials stressed that the claims issue was not on the conference agenda, but less than 
two weeks before the German invasion of Poland the Manchester Guardian still cherished the hope 
that the meeting would reconcile the overlapping Antarctic interests of Argentina, Britain, Chile, 
Germany, Norway and the United States.18 Prevented by the outbreak of war, the might-have-been 
Bergen conference has been called “a lost opportunity for the then still unborn Antarctic community 
of nations” by one historian (Berguño, 2000: 97). 
 
A final point about the 1930s is that anyone contemplating an international arrangement for 
Antarctica may have derived some modest encouragement from the admittedly slow progress being 
made with creating one for the related business of whaling. Conferences convened by the League of 
Nations at Berlin in 1930 and by Norway and Britain at London in 1937 resulted in a protocol which 
banned the killing of all right and gray whales. 
 
Approaching the United Nations, 1940-1947 
 
Early in 1940 the proposal to internationalize Antarctica acquired something it had lacked for 30 
years – a sympathetic organization, namely, the Women’s International League for Peace and 
Freedom (WILPF). On 31 March the New York Times published a letter from the veteran peace 
campaigner and social activist Emily Greene Balch (1867-1961).19 E. G. Balch had played a leading 
role in founding the Women’s International League after the First World War, and had been honorary 
president of its international section since 1937. In her letter she noted with approval that “the 
possibility of a solution [to postwar colonial questions] by creating some sort of international status 
for all places where independent self-government is not yet practicable has been considerably 
discussed here and even more in England”.  She proposed, by way of a pilot project, that instead of 
making its own territorial claim in Antarctica the United States should advocate the “international 
administration” of “polar regions” by “a consortium of all, a world trust”. Her assimilative 
explanation, that this would be possible because both polar regions had “no populations ¼, no vested 
rights, no history”, suggests that she may have been influenced by Fauchille, whose Traité was 
published while she was working for WILPF at Geneva after the First World War.20 
 
The war did not put an end to the efforts of the Women’s International League. From its office in 
New York it distributed a mimeographed newsletter to its supporters and to such allied decision-
                                                 
18 New York Times, 27 July 1939, p. 7; Manchester Guardian, 18 August 1939, p. 8. 
19 E. G. Balch and T. W. Balch were not related in the usual sense of the word, having no common male ancestor 
closer than medieval Somerset. However they shared not just a surname, but an interest in international law and 
arbitration and a habit of writing letters to The Nation. They surely knew of each other’s existence. 
20 E. G. Balch’s ideas about polar regions were coloured by her support for the creation of an international maritime 
authority, a proposal that she espoused in 1924 and on which she may also have consulted Fauchille (Randall, 
1964: 373-75). Living by that time just outside her native Boston, she is likely to have seen some or all of the 
earlier pieces in The Living Age, the New York Times, The Nation and Christian Century that were cited in the 
previous section. 
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makers as could be reached. As the war was drawing to its close and attention was starting to focus 
on the world order which should follow it, Balch repeated her proposal in that organ (Balch, E. G., 
1945). 
 
To the author’s knowledge, no one else found time to advocate the internationalization of Antarctica 
while their country was taking part in the Second World War.21 A suggestion that it was mooted by 
New Zealand’s then Deputy Prime Minister Walter Nash (1882-1968) at a press conference on the 
Canberra Agreement in January 1944 is not confirmed in the reports by journalists who attended.22 
Within three years, however, much would change. 
 
Two developments in 1946 reawakened political concerns about Antarctica. First, the conflict 
between Britain, Chile and Argentina, over their rival claims to sovereignty in the Antarctic 
Peninsula and neighbouring islands, was predictably revived and intensified as a result of Britain’s 
installation of permanent stations in the area by means of the wartime Operation Tabarin. And 
second, a captured German Antarctic whaling flotilla, which had been assigned to the Soviet Union 
by the Tripartite Maritime Commission in December 1945, was finally handed over to its new 
owners (after 15 months in British hands) on 26 September 1946. The Russians, in short, were 
coming. 
 
One response to these events was the US Navy’s large-scale Antarctic reconnaissance, training and 
flag-showing exercise, Operation High Jump, which was conceived in mid-1946 and carried out in 
the austral summer of 1946-47. Other responses were more pacific. 
 
By November 1946 the US Department of State had formed the opinion that the best option for 
Antarctica was some form of UN trusteeship. The Department of Defense was not immediately 
persuaded, and the lack of consensus led to a further policy review intended to weigh the submission 
of a new American claim and all other claims to the United Nations alongside other options (Moore, 
1999: 198).23 Much of the publicity and public support for internationalization over the next twelve 
months may have been a by-product of internal policy debates in Washington. However that does not 
negate the possible influence of such a climate of opinion on scientific circles. 
 
An editorial in the liberal New Republic in November 1946 was an early straw in the wind. 
Commenting on rumours of a possible ‘uranium rush’ in Antarctica, the magazine suggested that a 
United Nations trusteeship would be preferable, and continued: “one member of the [UN] 
Secretariat’s Department of Trusteeship thinks it would be a ‘good idea’. The time has come for the 
Secretariat to take the initiative.”24 A few days later the Washington Post also suggested that the 
                                                 
21 Gidel (1951: 132) cited an editorial in the London Daily Herald on 7 January 1942, but no such item was found 
on that date, nor in an extensive search of other wartime issues of the paper. 
22 Unfortunately Dollot (1949: 189) gave no reference for his statement that New Zealand favoured a UN solution 
for Antarctica as early as 1944. He and others may have been misled by (Johnstone, 1944) which perhaps first 
smuggled the word ‘Antarctic’ into a purported analysis of the Canberra Agreement, a document that had never 
mentioned the place. 
23 See also New York Times, 6 January 1947, p. 21. While ceding no particle of the British claim, even The Times 
deposed that “Antarctica is not a fit subject for national rivalries or political bargaining” – 11 January 1947. 
24 New Republic, 25 November 1946. 
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United Nations should play a role.25 At the other end of the world, the New Zealand Cabinet had 
privately reached the same conclusion by Christmas Eve (Templeton, 2000: 89).26 
 
In March 1947 the Washington Post polled local residents and found that 66% were in favour of a 
UN trusteeship and 23% opposed it. Whatever its methodology, the results suggest that in the late 
1940s American public opinion may not have been quite so neglected by policy-makers who 
favoured internationalization, nor a fortiori quite so “negligible”, as has been thought.27 In April the 
New York Times also took up the cry.28 
 
In May 1947 the executive committee of the Women’s International League, meeting in Geneva, 
decided to take up its international president’s idea and propose to the United Nations that 
trusteeships should be created for the Arctic and the Antarctic. In August and September this was 
supported by WILPF branches in Denmark and Finland.29 The submissions from Scandinavians who 
should perhaps have known better repeated the assimilation of the Arctic with the Antarctic as 
equally “uninhabited”, “unappropriated and masterless” areas, which had marred E. G. Balch’s 
original conception. 
Meanwhile in June 1947 a second, perhaps more influential, citizens’ group, the American 
Association for the United Nations, had published a report calling for “the creation of an 
international regime for the Antarctic Continent, to be administered directly by the United 
Nations”.30 
 
In October 1947 the Trusteeship Council placed the WILPF petitions on the agenda for its second 
session;31 on 11 December 1947, with its chairman Francis Sayre (1885-1972) presiding, it rejected 
them.32 Its grounds were later said to have been that the creation of such regimes was outside its 
competence (Hanessian, 1960: 449). Since six UN member states – Canada, Denmark, Finland, 
Norway, the Soviet Union, and the United States – were governing the affairs of large indigenous 
and settler populations in the Arctic without appealing for help from the United Nations, the 
                                                 
25 Editorial, Washington Post, 3 December 1946, p. 8; see also 2 January 1947, p. 6. 
26 See also New York Herald Tribune, 29 December 1946. Early New Zealand thinking about UN-based 
internationalization was not confined to, and sometimes explicitly rejected, the trusteeship option (Templeton, 
2000: 138-140). 
27 (Moore, 1999: 125); see also (Moore, 2004) for a fuller exposition of the interpretation that Antarctic non-
claimancy and internationalism were unpublicized and unpopular in the postwar United States, and that 
nationalism prevailed not only in the column-inches of hero-worship devoted to Admiral Byrd but also with 
actual public opinion. 
28 Editorial, 16 April 1947, p. 24. Laurence Gould (1948: 110) cited an unpublished “careful and exhaustive study” 
of the legal issues, completed by Richard Young of the Harvard University Law School in May 1947, which had 
also come down in favour of UN control. 
29 The petitions were sent to the Secretary-General and passed by him to the Trusteeship Council. The three 
petitions from Denmark and one from Finland were identically worded. 
30 Fifth report of the Commission to Study the Organization of the Peace, chairman James T. Shotwell, summarized 
in Washington Post, 12 June 1947, p. 7. 
31 UN Trusteeship Council T/PET/GENERAL 15, 16 & 18, 4 & 9 October 1947. 
32 New York Times, 12 December 1947, p. 14. Sayre’s practice at the Trusteeship Council was to transfer his 
functions as a US delegate to his alternate and then to chair the proceedings as impartially as possible. 
Throughout his life he stood by the principles of his first father-in-law, President Woodrow Wilson. And in 1919 
he had been encouraged by the example of Spitsbergen to hope for great things from the future League of 
Nations (Sayre, 1919: 92-97).  
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difficulties facing an assimilative, ‘bi-polar’ proposition were probably insurmountable (Beck, 1986: 
271). But surprisingly, that was not the end of the matter. 
 
In 1948 the long-drawn-out US policy-making process produced an outcome that will be summarized 
below. There is no record of Francis Sayre having taken part. He was a distinguished diplomat who 
had served his country in Thailand and the Philippines before seeking a UN appointment and 
reverting to his early interest in international administration as the first president of the Trusteeship 
Council. But in 1948, while still in that post, he took the unusual step of publishing an article in the 
American Journal of International Law in which he explained that, unlike the League of Nations 
mandate system, there would appear to be no legal barriers to setting up an Arctic and an Antarctic 
Trusteeship under the United Nations, just as the WILPF petitions had urged (Sayre, 1948: 265-66). 
That was also the view taken, less publicly, by the State Department.33 
 
Sayre’s apparent dissent from the Council’s decision can be explained in several ways. He may have 
agreed with the substance of the petitions but not their form. The main WILPF petition had been an 
idealistic shopping list, calling not only for polar trusteeships but also for progress on disarmament, 
UN control of aviation and the oceans, and more appointments for women as UN officials. And the 
supporting petitions had asked only for a study of the polar trusteeships idea, not for actual 
trusteeships. Furthermore, as Sayre pointed out, the Trusteeship Council was obliged to implement 
the wishes of  the governments themselves  and not some agenda of its own. But his choice of words 
leaves open the possibility that his dissent was real. He had been a supporter of international 
administration in appropriate circumstances for 30 years, and was a well-known worshipper of the 
League (Kuehl & Dunn, 1997: 143). Now his government, or at least department, had finally found 
something that it wished to internationalize. So he may well have been the unnamed UN official 
quoted by the New Republic in November 1946 as favouring a trusteeship for Antarctica. But even if 
he was, he could never have secured approval for the poorly drafted WILPF petitions against the 
political barrier represented by the presence of four Antarctic claimant states (Australia, Britain, 
France and New Zealand) on the Trusteeship Council. 
 
But the most extraordinary thing about Sayre’s article was not that he felt the need to write it, nor 
that, in those more deferential and less information-thirsty days, the American and international press 
paid no attention to the apparent U-turn that it represented. It was, rather, the extent to which it was 
ignored in the professional literature of the day. It was probably published too late to be discussed by 
Dollot (1949). But that was no excuse for Mouton (1962), or for Hayton (1956) and Hanessian 
(1960), both of whom mentioned the UN petitions. Before the internet, bibliographies depended 
largely on citations by scholars of further work by their colleagues. The effectiveness of the tacit 
boycott that surrounded Sayre’s article is evidenced by its – doubtless inadvertent – omission from 
one of the most comprehensive bibliographies of the period (da Costa, 1958). 
 
Of necessity, this chronicle of the idea that Antarctica should be placed under international 
administration has been limited to scanty printed vestiges from a handful of countries. Had the author 
been equipped to access Scandinavian sources, more examples might have been found. As far as it 
goes, the narrative suggests that Antarctic internationalization remained a minor matter for all 
                                                 
33 FRUS 1948, (1) 981. 
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concerned, and made only slow progress with public opinion between April 1910 and the end of 
1947. Keeping it just about in the public domain appears to have been the achievement of a small 
number of Christian internationalists, most but not all of whom were Americans inspired in part by 
their country’s anti-colonial traditions. Significantly, some of them were or had access to decision-
makers. At the end of the 1940s their perseverance was rewarded when leading American 
newspapers, prompted by the chauvinist territorialism surrounding Operation High Jump, endorsed 
the idea of internationalization. (Whether or not they were also briefed by State Department officials 
will probably never be known.) When the president of the UN Trusteeship Council himself accepted 
that internationalization was a valid option, whether for reasons of state (below) or reasons of law, its 
time appeared to have come. 
 
Science as Co-Opted Ancillary, 1947-1950 
 
Immediately after the Second World War the State Department may have shared the view of the 
British Foreign Office (and the Royal Navy) that an international settlement in Antarctica was 
undesirable because non-claimant countries, especially the Soviet Union, would insist on 
participating.34 But the rise of tensions in the region during 1946 and 1947 prompted a policy review 
which eventually recommended that the United States should first issue a formal claim to all areas to 
which it was thought to have some title, based on extensive exploration over the previous 110 years, 
and then quickly lead a joint application to the United Nations for a trusteeship over the whole of 
Antarctica by the eight claimant countries – Argentina, Australia, Britain, Chile, France, New 
Zealand, Norway, and the United States. (It is worth noting that the Truman Administration tended to 
see the UN trusteeship system as instrumental to US national interests, for example in respect of the 
Pacific island groups which it had recently conquered from Japan.) The problems of an 
(unprecedented) eight-power administration were played down.35 
 
As hinted at by phrases like “special trusteeship”, the State Department was never committed to 
handing Antarctica over to the United Nations unconditionally and outright.36 But when the 
Department of Defense joined the British Foreign Office in the objection that no UN-based 
arrangement could exclude the Soviet Union, the policy was modified by including the option of 
creating an autonomous eight-power condominium that would not be answerable to the UN in any 
way.37 Phrases such as “international administration” and “special regime” were used for this 
arrangement.38 Whether national claims were to be renounced or merely suspended was left unclear. 
By July 1948 the Secretary of State was confident that the revised policy would deny to our most 
probable enemies participation in the control of all or any areas in Antarctica.39 
 
                                                 
34 FRUS 1946 (1) 1492-93. 
35 FRUS 1948 (1) 981. 
36 FRUS 1948 (1) 962. 
37 Joint Chiefs of Staff - Sec Defense, 19 March 1948, plus attached Proposed Letter for Sec Defense to Sec State; 
also Lt Col R. B. Simpson, Mem Rec ‘Antarctic Policy Developments’, n.d. but c April/May 1948: all at USNA, 
RG 330, Sub/Num Files 1947-1953, Entry 341, [23], \Antarctic – US Policy/. See also: Sec Interior - Act Sec 
State, 8 January 1948, and Sec State - US Emb London, 4 March 1948: both in FRUS 1948, (1) 962, 965-66. 
38 See for example: FRUS 1948, (1) 997; also Draft Agreement on Antarctica, 22 March 1948: USNA, RG59, 
Decimal File 1945-49, 800.014 Antarctic, [4083]. 
39 Marshall - Forrestal, 9 July 1948: USNA, RG330, OSD CD 27-1-9, NND 790030, Entry 199, [120]. 
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The American plan was discussed with British diplomats at the end of 1947 and in the first part of 
1948. A Draft Agreement was circulated to the other claimant states for comment in June and then 
more formally, as US policy, in August 1948. Most were not impressed. Chile and Argentina 
dismissed the idea of internationalization as “unacceptable”; Australia described its right to Antarctic 
territory as “unchallenged” and “had never thought of the necessity for an international 
administration”; Norway considered the American scheme “unnecessary”; and France delayed its 
response in the not unfounded hope that nothing would ever come of the matter.40 Although Britain 
was initially quite positive, and tried to persuade Australia and New Zealand, a State Department 
official confessed to a British diplomat, in March 1949, that the overall response had been 
preponderantly negative.41 
 
By mid-1948 American officials were therefore searching hard for arguments that might persuade the 
claimant nations to abandon long-established policies. After all, five of the seven already recognized 
each other’s claims. All would have been content for the United States to join them by claiming the 
unclaimed sector in Western Antarctica which had long been informally reserved for that purpose.42 
And by the end of the year the parties to the most intense territorial dispute, Argentina, Britain and 
Chile, had opened negotiations that would lead to them limiting their naval deployments in the 
Antarctic. For a time it probably seemed that conflict avoidance could be achieved without 
disturbing the status quo. 
 
What was needed was a new positive incentive. Ideally, as one independent commentator expressed 
it that year, a programme of work should be internationally agreed and then carried out either 
severally or collectively (Gidel, 1951: 136).43 But what sort of work? In April 1948 the US Secretary 
of Defense James Forrestal (1892-1949) admitted that the future strategic value [of Antarctica] ¼ to 
the United States or to our most probable enemies cannot be accurately predicted at this time in view 
of the dearth of information concerning the region, but added that on present knowledge the chief 
value of the Antarctic is in scientific and meteorological fields, both of which have very great 
military import.44 In July the State Department’s Geographer Samuel Boggs repeated the point less 
bluntly in a version of the Draft Agreement on Antarctica. In his words “scientific data that may be 
obtained only in the Antarctic regions are urgently needed” and therefore “facilitation of 
comprehensive scientific exploration ¼ is of prime importance”. The eight-power regime would set 
up an administrative commission empowered to “draw up an overall plan of exploration, 
investigation and scientific and technical development”.45 The example of the Norwegian-British-
Swedish Expedition, still in preparation at the time, may have encouraged this approach.46 
                                                 
40 FRUS 1948, (1) 995, 1003, 1009, 1011-13; 1949, (1) 793-795. 
41Mem, Con, Hulley & C.A.G. Meade (British Embassy), 23 March 1949: FRUS 1949, (1) 795. New Zealand’s 
problem seems to have been that it would have preferred a UN trusteeship, and was less attracted by the 
condominium option which replaced it. 
42 The United States, however, was developing a non-sectoral and non-continuous claim. See for example the map 
of “Territorial Claims in Antarctic”  prepared by the CIA in October 1947: USNA, RG330, OSD CD 27-1-9, 
NND 790030, Entry 199, [120]. To the extent that this became known to the other claimants, it made them even 
less inclined to support the new American proposals. 
43 Originally published in 1948. 
44 FRUS 1948, (1) 972. 
45 ‘Draft Agreement’, note 38 above. 
46 The NBS expedition included citizens of Australia and Canada as well as the sponsoring countries; offers of 
personnel from South Africa and the United States were not taken up. 
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In line with this strand of policy-making, the State Department approached the US National 
Academy of Sciences in July 1948 with a request for its advice “as to the nature and scope of 
scientific operations that are feasible in the Antarctic”.47 The Academy held a preliminary meeting 
on 26 July and a fuller conference on 27 September, on the basis of which it submitted a final report 
in May 1949.48 As Samuel Boggs told the Academy scientists when thanking them in September 
1948, “The real purpose ¼ was to get advice as to what ¼ would be done best on an international 
basis. To that extent the [meetings] have done a great deal and it is now possible to say that we have 
already been talking with the top scientists in this country”. The admission that political plausibility 
was a consideration would not have been lost on his audience.49 
 
One of the first people invited to take part by Academy president Alfred Richards (1876-1966) was 
the ionospheric physicist Lloyd Berkner (1905-67) at the Carnegie Institute of Washington’s 
Department of Terrestrial Magnetism. In 1928-29 Berkner had joined Richard Byrd’s first Antarctic 
expedition as pilot, radio engineer and radio scientist; in 1936 he became secretary of an 
international Mixed Commission on the Ionosphere; in 1946-47 he served as executive secretary of 
the Joint [Army and Navy] Research and Development Board (JRDB) while the armed services were 
being brought together to form the new Department of Defense (Needell, 2000: 19-31, 59-60, 109-
18). 
 
Formal papers to the Academy’s conference were discouraged, but Berkner (alone) produced one 
nonetheless. In it he set out a long wish-list of geophysical measurements, including the extension of 
the existing international network of ionospheric recorders into the Antarctic, and stated that a 
scientific expedition would need about three years to prepare, including two for the acquisition of 
apparatus and training of observers.50 
 
Three months before Under Secretary Lovell’s invitation to the Academy, however, Antarctic 
diplomacy had taken a novel turn. On 7 April 1948 the Chilean Antarctic Commission met for only 
the ninth time since its formation in 1906. One of its members was Julio Escudero Guzmán (1903–
84), a professor of international law who had helped to delimit his country’s Antarctic claim in 1940, 
and had later served on the trusteeships committee of the United Nations founding conference at San 
Francisco.51 In the course of a general discussion about how best to respond to the diplomatic 
initiatives coming from the United States, Escudero proposed to the Commission that Chile should 
                                                 
47 R. A. Lovett, Under Secretary of State, letter to A. N. Richards, president of the National Academy of Science, 9 
July 1948: Archives of the National Academies of Science, Central Policy Files, 1946-1949, \Committee on 
Antarctic Research: 1949; 1948/. 
48 The State Department supplied the agenda for the preliminary meeting and paid the costs of both, about $3,300 – 
Memo 27 July 1948: USNA, RG59, Decimal File 1945-49, 800.014 Antarctic, [4083]. 
49 Richards - Boggs, 21 July 1948; Minutes of Preliminary Meeting, 26 July 1948; Minutes of Conference, 27 
September 1948: both at NAS-NRC Central Files. NAS report, „Antarctic Research: Elements of a Coordinated 
Program“, 2 May 1949: USNA, RG 59, Decimal File 1945-49, 800.014 Antarctic, [4084]. 
50 L. V. Berkner, “Some Significant Polar Observations and Experiments in Electricity and Magnetism”, paper to 
National Academy of Sciences Conference on Antarctica, 27 September 1948: NAS-NRC Central Files. The last 
point, and other remarks he made in the discussion, were directed at what he and others saw as the scientific 
inadequacies of Operation High Jump. 
51 His role at San Francisco was probably a watching brief, guided by concern about northern hemisphere powers 
using trusteeships to legitimize their presence in the southern hemisphere. 
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invite a US diplomat to Santiago, in the hope that Washington would welcome face-to-face talks and 
even, perhaps, a secret bilateral treaty. With evident relief the Commission decided to leave things to 
the only man in the room with any idea of what to do.52 
 
In July 1948, just as the US Academy of Sciences was becoming involved, Caspar Green, a State 
Department official, arrived in Santiago for talks with Escudero, representing the Chilean 
government. The professor responded coolly to the trusteeship idea, and remarked that the United 
States appeared to be proposing a complicated political agreement for the relatively simple purpose 
of facilitating scientific research. At their final meeting on 17 July he handed Green the draft of an 
eight-power agreement, approved by the Minister of Foreign Affairs, which amounted to a 180-
degree reversal of the US approach. Instead of seeking international agreement as a prerequisite for 
scientific cooperation, Escudero suggested that the parties shelve the unresolved issue of territorial 
claims for at least five years, and in the meantime agree to mount a joint programme of scientific 
investigations, supported by mutual exchange of all resultant information and publications. New 
bases and expeditions would be encouraged, but would be deemed to have no bearing on any 
existing or future claims to sovereignty. When the United States officially circulated its 
condominium proposal in August, Chile responded in October by repeating this alternative.53 
 
The Escudero Proposal was welcomed by the State Department as having “real merit”,54 and it 
remained central to both Chilean and US Antarctic policy for the next six years. The condominium 
idea was getting nowhere, but claimant governments were always happy to express support for 
scientific cooperation, and if a conclusive solution to the Antarctic problem was unattainable, its 
collective postponement might be worth having. 
 
However, the State Department was reluctant to renounce its earlier and grander goal of formal and 
permanent internationalization. US officials might join the Chileans in polishing successive drafts of 
an Escudero-type agreement; they might encourage their southern colleagues to circulate such 
documents informally to the other six claimant states; they might even indicate to a third party such 
as Britain that the revised Escudero Proposal was the only realistic way forward.55 But because they 
were not prepared to identify their own government completely with the Proposal, it made little real 
progress. 
 
This schizophrenic policy, in which ‘treaty first’ was the official position, but an international 
                                                 
52 Acta de la novena sesión, 7 April 1948, Comisión chilena y actas de sesiones 1906-48, (2) p. viii: M RR EE, 
Santiago. 
53 Escudero and Green had four meetings on three days, with an interval of two days before the last one. (Officials 
from the Chilean Foreign Ministry and British Embassy were present, but played no part in the discussions.) It is 
possible, therefore, that Escudero wrote and translated his draft agreement, and ran it past his Foreign Minister, 
on those two days, namely 15 and 16 July 1948. According to Jorge Berguño, however, Escudero’s original text 
was extensively revised in the Foreign Ministry (personal communication). That suggests the final version was 
prepared before Green arrived, and was handed over at their 30-minute closing session precisely because, as 
Escudero stated at the time, it was not intended for immediate discussion but rather for studied consideration by 
the State Department – Green-Escudero, Memoranda of Conversations, 13 - 17 July 1948, + handwritten notes 
on appended draft: USNA, RG59, Decimal File 1945-49, 800.014 Antarctic, [4083]. 
54 Hulley - Thompson & Woodward, „Antarctica - Chilean Suggestion for a Declaration“, 26 August 1948: USNA, 
RG59, Decimal File 1945-49, 800.014 Antarctic, [4084]. See also (Pinochet de la Barra, 1994: 73). 
55 MemCon, Hulley & Meade, 23 March 1949: see note 41 above. 
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‘science first’ initiative would be welcomed, provided that the United States did not have to become 
too openly involved, remained in force when a Third Polar Year was proposed in April 1950. In 
particular, the records show that, pace Bush (1982 (1): 57), the Escudero Proposal was not 
abandoned by the State Department on the outbreak of the Korean War in June 1950. There were 
other problems, but its nemesis was a more modest military clash, the Deception Island incident of 
1953, in which a British shore party demolished an unoccupied Chilean hut as well as an occupied 
Argentine one, by which time preparations for the IGY were well in hand. Even after that setback it 
struggled on for a short time.56 
 
With science having played such a central role both in State Department thinking about the 
internationalization of Antarctica, and in the counter-proposal advanced by Chile, the question arises 
whether those exchanges may have prompted, or helped to prompt, the proposal for a Third Polar 
Year, which was put forward about 18 months later in April 1950. As we have seen, Lloyd Berkner, 
who is usually credited with the suggestion, took a leading part in the meetings at which the 
Academy was urged to focus on a possible programme for international scientific work in Antarctica. 
(As executive secretary of the JRDB he may also have seen some of the earlier exchanges between 
the Departments of State and Defense which clarified US interests in Antarctica as primarily 
scientific.) 
 
In October 1949 Berkner started working for the State Department on a study of its overall 
responsibilities in the field of science. His final report was submitted six months later (Berkner, 
1950). Neither the published report nor its secret annex on intelligence gathering, a major focus of 
the study, seems to have contained any discussion of international scientific programmes, as opposed 
to meetings and organizations. (But the latter has not yet been entirely declassified.) And there is no 
evidence that Berkner was told about the Escudero Proposal or asked for any further comments about 
international science in Antarctica beyond those he had recently made. 
 
On the other hand, Berkner had worked in Antarctica and he was for the time being the Department’s 
visiting expert on all aspects of international science.57 Until he left Washington in 1951 he was a 
famously well-informed insider, with connections throughout the science, foreign policy and 
intelligence communities. It would have been natural for him to learn, officially or unofficially, that 
the diplomats were talking about a five-year international scientific effort in Antarctica. And he was 
better placed than any State Department official, or than Escudero for that matter, to realize that such 
a project would entail a Polar Year on a larger scale than its two predecessors.58 
 
                                                 
56 A State Department summary from May 1950 spelt out once again that „a sound program of Antarctic 
investigation could best be implemented through joint international effort“: Draft Information Memo on US 
Policy, 17 May 1950: USNA, RG59, Decimal File 1950-54, 702.022, [3066]; see also (Moore, 2001: 16-17). At 
the end of 1953 officials in Washington and Santiago were still discussing how to launch what was known as 
Chile’s „status quo proposal“: MemCon w Chilean Minister-Counsellor, 26 October 1953: USNA ibid. [3067]; 
Minutes, Chilean Antarctic Commission, 26 November 1953, + attached memo 24 November 1953: M RR EE, 
Dirección Política - Departamento de Límites, 1949-56, 1958. 
57 The Academy and State Department are separated only by a quiet back street, and until the 1980s were connected 
by a pedestrian subway. From 1948 to 1950 Berkner passed between them many times. 
58 For more on Berkner’s status and position in Washington, see (Needell: 2000, 97-153). 
On 5 April 1950 eight people attended the dinner party given by Abigail and James Van Allen at 
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which the IGY was proposed, initially as a Third Polar Year. The problem for the historian is not just 
that neither Berkner nor any of the others subsequently mentioned any circumstances that may have 
prompted the idea, apart from its purely scientific attractions. It is that there are other candidates, 
besides Antarctic diplomacy, for the role of external stimulus. They include the first post-war 
proposal for a Polar Year, which was put forward by South African geologists in 1946 but swiftly 
squashed by the British Polar Committee in London; the repeated expressions of liberal US press and 
public opinion about Antarctica during 1947 (above), rarely though these mentioned science; the 
winding up of the Second Polar Year in 1949, in which the Department of Terrestrial Magnetism was 
closely involved; Cold War concerns about the lack of geophysical data from the Soviet bloc, some 
of which was seen as urgent for the development of long-range missiles; and a growing interest in 
comparing upper atmosphere data from sounding rockets launched simultaneously at dispersed 
locations. Berkner and most others present would have been aware of all but, possibly, the first of 
these. 
 
Conclusions: From IGY to Treaty 
 
A handful of private citizens had made themselves party to Antarctic policy discussions and kept 
internationalization on the list of options for four decades, until it was adopted by the State 
Department in 1948. The evidence is admittedly inconclusive, but it suggests that their critiques of 
the Antarctic ventures of Richard Byrd were every bit as effective with the wider US public as the 
fervent nationalism which hailed the Admiral in so much of the media. It was in that context that, 
soon after the Second World War, diplomats began promoting something they did not even know 
was called a Polar Year until it was taken up by scientists in 1950. The political contribution of the 
IGY, however, is harder to pin down. 
 
Behind the scenes, much of the planning and execution of the IGY in Antarctica was a matter of 
politically competitive business as usual. (This cannot be illustrated properly for lack of space.) Rival 
diplomats took a large part in the top-level preparations. Even declarations that the IGY was non-
political were resented as political by some of those who paid them lip-service. The claimants went 
to ‘their’ sectors and issued the usual proprietorial welcomes to ‘visiting’ expeditions. The non-
claimants acted out postures of non-claimancy. The United States prompted and assisted its allies to 
occupy as many locations as possible, and took on extra ones itself, in an unsuccessful bid first to 
prevent and then to minimize Soviet participation. The Trans-Antarctic Expedition tried to stage a 
last hurrah for British imperialism. The mother-daughter radio communications network was badly 
distorted by national interests. National flags and military emblems were flourished on all sides. 
Considerable effort was expended on military and resource programmes that were nothing to do with 
the IGY, some of them ongoing within established national Antarctic organizations. Several stations 
were not really considered to be IGY stations, even if some of their observations, usually 
meteorological, were sent in. 
 
Arrangements for Antarctica after the IGY were also circumscribed by politics. It was unthinkable 
for the Weather Central to be transferred to Mirny Station, or for Halley Station to be abandoned to 
possible Argentine occupation. Australia held out against extending the ‘non-political’ IGY because 
it would sanction Soviet stations in its claimed territory. The United States bequeathed some of its 
extra stations to allies on a sectoral basis; the recipients affected to see this as endorsement. Some 
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scientists privately disparaged the work of colleagues from other countries. The terms of reference of 
the new Special Committee for Antarctic Research, and similar bodies, represented a centralization 
of power, towards the International Council of Scientific Unions and away from the unions 
themselves, which was not universally welcomed. 
 
The treaty negotiations, carried out by diplomats, were protracted and difficult, and came close to 
failure. They were the final stage of a diplomatic process which began before the IGY was thought of 
and which encompassed the utility of scientific cooperation well before that particularly outstanding 
example came to hand. That said, however, they were probably rescued by the IGY. 
 
The actual science that scientists were doing for the IGY in Antarctica was not politically important, 
as long as their exploring achievements were respectable and they kept the photographs flowing back 
to their national media. What mattered, and mattered greatly, was the appearance of internationalism 
which was fostered by the programme’s highly effective publicity. Added to that was the 
commitment of political leaders to maintain that ostensible transformation of the situation. It was no 
accident that the government which had committed itself least to the IGY, that of Argentina, would 
pose the greatest problems for negotiators. 
 
To put this another way, the political contribution of the scientists was that, guided to some extent by 
diplomats, they out-Escuderoed Escudero. The State Department had proposed full-blooded legal 
internationalization to secure (and direct) Antarctic science as a common (or at least a Western) 
good. Escudero, in a defensive move aimed at protecting Chilean sovereignty, had countered by 
proposing a temporary inter-governmental agreement just to do the science. But with the IGY, 
governments were not even parties to the non-existent agreement, so to speak.59 Escudero had 
suggested starting small; the IGY went ahead and started even smaller. (The fact that its detailed 
planning began just after the Escudero process ran into serious problems cannot possibly have been 
foreseen, but was a real bonus.) As the Treaty later showed, getting agreement to something very like 
the Escudero Proposal was no light matter. One has to wonder whether Escudero realized that when 
he suggested it. And if the IGY effectively finessed the diplomatic log-jam, Escudero included, one 
has also to wonder who, at the time, may have realized that it could serve that purpose. 
 
Postscript 
 
It took 46 years from the signing of the Treaty for the first Antarctic station ever to be installed by a 
claimant country outside ‘its’ sector. And France acquired a non-claimant partner, Italy, before doing 
so. It remains the only such station. 
 
Symbols and Abbreviations 
 
[##] box 
\??/ folder 
M RR EE Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores 
                                                 
59 Not that they were on an equal footing. The United States government received more advance information and 
consultation about politically sensitive developments in the IGY than any other, because most of the time they 
were initiated by American scientists, and above all by Berkner. But that is another story. 
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NAS-NRC Archives of the National Academies of Science and National Research Council 
RG Record Group 
USNA US National Archives 
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THE SEARCH FOR AN ORGANIZATIONAL FRAMEWORK FOR ANTARCTIC   
RESEARCH (1948-1985) 
 
Jorge Berguῆo 
 
Abstract 
 
This paper takes up certain elements of the protracted negotiations that led towards the signing of 
the Antarctic Treaty. It brings into focus a number of aspects that have been generally neglected 
or, at least, not sufficiently emphasized in the literature on the subject. The issue addressed is: 
what type of scientific organization was envisaged by different actors to serve as the cornerstone 
of a viable international regime for Antarctica? A review is made of four successive models 
proposed at different stages of the negotiations with an eye to managing the emerging Antarctic 
Science.  
 
The first attempt to construct a model for a scientific management component within the 
framework of a multipartite political regime for Antarctica emerged in 1948 in the proposals for 
a trusteeship or a condominium made by the United States. The U.S. draft for a condominium in 
its Article III made provisions for what was called an Antarctic Commission. This body was 
meant to constitute the government of the territories and, affiliated with it there was to be a 
Scientific Board. The function of the latter would be to draw up a General Plan for exploration, 
investigation, plus scientific and technical development.  
 
In a second model the U.S. suggestion of an Antarctic Commission was replaced by the notion of 
a Consultative Committee contained in a Chilean counter-proposal in 1949 for a temporary 
Modus Vivendi, whose principles specifically touched on a framework, conditions and role for 
science. Two countries associated to this proposal, the U.S. and the UK, desired a strong 
“Consultative Committee” whereas Chile preferred an informal consultative body. When Chile 
bowed to the views of its partners, Australia considered the powers of the Consultative 
Committee as the “thin end of the wedge in whittling away national sovereignty and setting up 
the international regime favored by the United States and the Soviet Union”, a cautionary view 
also shared by Argentina. 
 
The third model that emerged was embedded in a proposal coming from the UK. Owing to its 
radical character the proposal evoked opposition from all the claimant countries, including the 
internationalist New Zealand. The reason was that the new scheme advocated the creation of a 
“High Authority”, centralized scientific planning system and no links with the United Nations. 
 
The fourth – and final – model is the one that thanks to a combination of fortuitous 
circumstances is in place today, namely SCAR. The course of the International Geophysical 
Year, the cooperative discipline it imposed in dealing with global scientific issues, and the birth 
of the Special (later Scientific) Committee for Antarctic Research (SCAR) brought about a new 
situation. Taken altogether these developments contributed to the decision (1959) at the 
Washington Conference to empower that body to fulfill the function of a scientific arm of the 
Antarctic Treaty. A Chilean proposal for an International Institute of Antarctic Investigations 
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which echoed the 1948 initiative of Thomas Huxley was overrun by a constructive arrangement 
that still stands today.  
 
The Background of the 1948 American Antarctic Initiative    
   
Several authors have provided valuable insights regarding the origin and development of 
American policies towards Antarctica. The most comprehensive of these is the essay by Jason 
Kendall Moore, “Tethered to an Iceberg: United States Policy toward the Antarctic, 1939-1949”. 
His contribution to the understanding of U.S. motivations is a fundamental one, and it may be 
contrasted to the approach involved in the development of a more geopolitical perspective by 
C.C. Joyner and E.R. Theis in their book, “Eagle over the Ice. The U.S. in the Antarctic”.  J. K. 
Moore’s essay identifies the difficulties, hazards and risks involved in a global approach that led 
to apparent contradictions, not only within the U.S. Latin American sphere of influence, but also 
on the broader international scene. Joyner and Theis on the other hand conclude that, in spite of 
these difficulties, the U.S. had the final word in the construction of the Antarctic Treaty System. 
Jason K. Moore for his part asserts that the Chilean “Escudero Plan” laid the foundation for the 
Antarctic Treaty.1  In my view, both of the forgoing interpretations have their respective merits. 
Nevertheless it is possible to provide a more complex and nuanced approach if one probes 
carefully into the nature of the particular types of international regimes considered by the various 
actors at different historical conjunctures. In doing so, one also has to consider the structures for 
the coordination and management of science provided for in those proposals tabled by different 
parties during the negotiations opened by the 1948 American initiative for an Antarctic 
International Regime. 
 
Basically, when compared to the approach taken by Moore and Joyner, as well as the one 
assumed by the Chilean historian Consuelo León, the present essay differs methodologically by 
focussing attention primarily on the outcome at each stage of the protracted negotiations that 
occurred over a longer period of time, starting in 1947 and ending 1959. Moore, Joyner and also 
León emphasize the process and performance of policy actions. Consequently they focus 
predominantly on the fabric of policy-making reflected at various stages in the decision-making 
process. In that particular context, their contributions remain essential. However there is yet 
another dimension that needs to be considered, one that generally comes to the fore in the genre 
of diplomatic history. In that domain the writer is wont to reflect upon the finished product, be it 
a treaty, a modus vivendi, a peace truce or an armistice, an alliance or any binding instrument 
agreed upon or unilaterally imposed. In those cases the analyst makes his/her assessment of the 
finished product in the context of the prevailing historic circumstances. This approach has been 
taken, in particular, in my previous paper on “The Intellectual Sources of the Antarctic Treaty” 
introduced at the II SCAR Workshop on the History of Antarctic Research. It is important to 
acknowledge that it is generally recognized that the methodology of traditional diplomatic 
history nowadays gains indispensable support from scholarship in neighbouring fields, i.e., 
political science, international law and the theory of international relations and, in that respect, 
the present paper complements rather than contradicts the existent literature. 
 
 
 
                                                 
1  Moore: 126 
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The First Initiative Concerning an Antarctic Scientific Framework  
 
A Chilean demarche at the State Department, made on 13 October 1947, requesting the U.S. 
views on certain Antarctic matters and suggesting a possible International Conference on 
Antarctica was answered negatively by the U.S. on 3 November 1947, confirming a previous 
statement made by the U.S. Secretary of State on January 7 of the same year, to the effect that 
“the relative importance of Antarctic questions in view of the many more important current 
topics which exist, was not such as to justify a conference”.2 However, a few days later, on 27 
January, a confidential U.S. policy paper put forward the preferred option for an eventual 
settlement of territorial problems by international agreement. The substance of the option 
oscillated between the notion of a UN Trusteeship and that of an eight-power condominium 
wherein all claims would merge and consolidate under a single authority. It is important to 
recognize that both alternatives highlighted the pursuit of global scientific objectives.   
 
By early March 1948, the U.S. was busy considering the implications of a resolution concerning 
European possessions in the Western Hemisphere. Such a resolution was to be introduced at the 
Bogotá Inter-American Conference, and it would have bearing on the U.S. position concerning 
the Argentine-Chilean Antarctic dispute with Britain. While both Argentina and Chile viewed 
the upcoming Bogotá Conference as an opportunity to rally Latin American support for their 
respective Antarctic claims, and to further maintain their distance from the Anglo-Saxon Powers 
(United States and Britain) or at least carve out their mutual differences, they did not want to 
place their national claims to Antarctica under the umbrella of “decolonization” of European 
Territories in the Western Hemisphere. Nonetheless, expectations of a further clash or the 
weakening of an Inter-American interest clearly signalled to the U.S. the importance of an 
independent path towards a solution of the Antarctic problem. In this context, U.S. State 
Department planners recommended first, as a way to overcome the dispute, support for an 
international status for Antarctica in form of a UN trusteeship. 
 
Wishing to anticipate and influence discussion of Antarctic matters at Bogotá, in July 1948 the 
U.S. initiative was conveyed to Argentina and Chile through a special envoy, Caspar Green, and 
distributed simultaneously on 9 August, in Washington, to all other claimants in the form of draft 
treaties containing the two options: UN trusteeship, or alternatively a condominium with no UN 
linkages. The first option was quickly dropped because it was contentious and had already been 
rejected by the United Kingdom and other claimants. The second option entailed a treaty that 
would establish an Antarctic Commission, a body that was meant to constitute the actual 
government of the territories with full executive and administrative powers.3 
 
The first model for an Antarctic scientific administration thus emerged as a by-product of the 
powers entrusted to the postulated Antarctic Commission. A subordinate body, probably a 
Scientific Board, was also envisaged, having the task of establishing a “General Plan” wherein 
individual national projects would be integrated. Final decisions on both political and scientific 
matters were to be taken by the Antarctic Commission by a two- thirds vote. 
 
                                                 
2 Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS) 1947,  I: 1050-1052 
3 FRUS 1948,  I: 996-1001 
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Most of the responses to the U.S. proposal of 1948 fixed attention on the status of claims and 
included the rejection by all claimants, except the UK and to a certain extent New Zealand, of 
the fusion of such claims. The objective contained in Article II of the draft Agreement reads as 
flows: “…the Parties hereto merge and join their claims to, and interests in, specific portions of 
the area covered by this agreement (the Antarctic Continent and all islands south of 60º south 
latitude, except the South Shetlands and South Orkney Groups) and vest such individual claims 
and interests in the special regime hereby established…”. This text remained unacceptable to 
most claimants and, at least Norway and Chile rejected the exception concerning the two 
Antarctic archipelagos, as a matter of principle for both countries and, in the Chilean perspective, 
because such a formulation seemed to support the British approach towards a judicial settlement 
of the existing dispute. 
 
Two replies, one by France, the other by Norway, concerned also the operation of the 
institutional framework, and one of them touched specifically on the issue of scientific 
cooperation.  
 
The French Embassy in Washington sent an Aide-Mémoire to the U.S. State Department. This 
statement has hitherto not been published. It contains an initial positive reply to the concept of 
the condominium but indicated that the French Government felt that the internationalization of 
Antarctica could be realized without the abandonment of national claims of sovereignty in the 
area. The French diplomatic note moreover requested further clarification of the Antarctic 
Commission that was being envisaged as the decision-making system and asked about the 
intended scope of the regime. In response to the French request the State Department further 
elaborated and shed additional light on this sensitive aspect of the operation of the proposed 
regime. The following paragraph in the U.S. clarification is interesting for its idea of combining 
freedom of research with some kind of international coordination.  
 
“The United States proposal is intended to provide for complete liberty of bona fide scientific 
research. In order to promote the rational planning and carrying out of such research, the 
proposal recommends the development by interested countries, acting through the Antarctic 
Commission, of an overall Plan of Scientific Investigation. It is hoped that each of the 
participating countries might undertake, upon completion of the General Plan, so to plan its 
individual projects as to contribute to the accomplishment of some portions of that General Plan. 
It is felt this would be a useful arrangement to avoid duplication of effort, and promote full, well 
rounded investigation. However, with the single exception that no two expeditions should be 
stationed in such immediate proximity as to interfere with each others operation, the United 
States Government feels that each country should be entirely free to send independent 
expeditions into any part of the area. It is the thought of the United States Government that the 
regime would, as a minimum, promote and facilitate the exchange and common availability of 
scientific results”.4 
 
The foregoing statement satisfied neither France nor other claimant states, even though it was 
accompanied with the indication that the U.S. would welcome suggestions for further 
clarifications. None of the Parties, however, felt reassured regarding the overall powers of the 
Antarctic Commission and the nature of the international regime being proposed. It is useful to 
                                                 
4 FRUS 1948, I: 1005-1008 
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recognize, nevertheless, that the concept of a “General Plan” and its intended purpose of 
avoidance of  duplication of scientific effort and the promotion of “full, well rounded 
investigations”, anticipated in some ways the decisions taken much later at the 1955-57 Antarctic 
Conferences for the preparation of the International Geophysical Year (IGY). 
The Norwegian reply to the U.S., made on November 15, 1948 by Ambassador Morgenstierne, 
argued against political internationalisation and pleaded the case for an improvement instead of 
the replacement of existing scientific cooperation. Norway pointed to the existing international 
cooperation in areas such as whaling and the provision of meteorological information for 
navigational and scientific purposes in Antarctica. It was suggested that these exchanges and 
other types of scientific cooperation could expand into other scientific domains without any need 
to alter the existing legal and political status. A precedent for meteorological co-operation in the 
Southern Ocean had already existed for some years in the service provided for whaling ships by 
weather information centres at Cape Town and Sydney. The Norwegian suggestion, following an 
initiative by the South African Weather Bureau at Pretoria and on a recommendation in 1952 by 
the Commission for Maritime Meteorology of WMO, historically, also became a useful 
precedent for the IGY weather analyses in the Southern Ocean. However, the nature of 
Norwegian concerns in 1949 appear to have to arisen mostly in connection with the proposed 
Norwegian-British-Swedish Antarctic Expedition (1949-52), whose independence Norway 
wished to preserve.5 
 
The Alternative Proposal  
 
The U.S. proposals put forward in 1949 were also rejected by Chile. That country responded by 
introducing its own counter-proposal in the form of an “Antarctic Declaration”. The text 
advocated five points, supporting the following measures: 
 
• Commitment to full exchange of scientific information; 
• Sovereign rights of claimant states not to be prejudiced by new bases, installations or 
expeditions; 
• Common use of all scientific facilities established or developed in Antarctica; 
• No taxes on fishing fleets of participant governments; and 
• A stand-still on the status of claims during a renewable 5 year period. 
 
The first commitment built upon and amplified ingredients in the U.S. proposals. Nonetheless, 
the original draft of the Declaration - crafted by Professor Julio Escudero –underwent 
modification in the hands of other officials in the Chilean Foreign Ministry. References to 
common property or common use of scientific facilities in Antarctica (point three) were 
suppressed and hence not conveyed to Caspar Green. While the idea of an overall planning 
agency advocated by the Americans seemed to be rejected by other Parties, the common use of 
facilities and the notion of their international governance was considered an idealistic fantasy by 
Escudero’s own compatriots, who did not share his concerns either regarding possible damage to 
the whale stocks by acoustic experiments undertaken or planned by the Byrd expedition. 
Nevertheless, in the draft presented to Green, the full and complete exchange of the scientific 
product of Antarctic expeditions was emphasized and an “all data” clause anticipating article III 
of the Antarctic Treaty was included.  
                                                 
5 FRUS 1948, I: 1011-1013 
47
 
Some of the elements contained in the “Escudero Proposal” were included in the text of a 
“Modus Vivendi” (revised several times) discussed between Chile, the U.S. and the UK between 
1948 and 1953. The latter year was when the critical British actions in Deception Island 
dramatically changed the international scene. Nevertheless, the non-prejudicial clause (point 
two) became the forerunner of article IV in the Antarctic Treaty. During the negotiation of the 
Modus Vivendi, the British and Chilean negotiators only occasionally met in Washington, and 
the U.S. State Department synthesized both the Chilean drafts and the British amendments. 
Consultations to third Parties took place only after the three Parties (Chile, the U.S. and the UK) 
had agreed that sufficient progress had been made in these tripartite negotiations.  
 
Inclusion in the agreement of issues concerning licences and taxes imposed on whaling fleets 
(point four) was not admissible to the UK and the U.S., and would also be opposed later (when 
Antarctic Treaty negotiations started) by the USSR with reference to the already existing 
mandate of the International Whaling Commission (IWC). On the other hand, the various drafts 
of article IV of the Antarctic Treaty did not allow any side to press any existing juridical position 
and hence the requirement for whaling licences in Antarctic waters would in time disappear 
naturally. It is interesting to note also that whereas Chile was not considering a permanent but 
only a temporary stand-still situation, the UK believed that Chile was in fact trying to weaken the 
importance of administrative acts performed in the Antarctic regions by the British authorities. 
Such an endeavour, however, was hardly feasible within the time frame of a modus vivendi, and 
even less so when a strong majority at the Washington Conference imposed the notion that the 
Antarctic Treaty would stand as a permanent settlement. In Washington, consequently, Chile 
wisely decided to accept a metamorphosis of its idea as “preservation and conservation of living 
resources in Antarctic”, an idea encapsulated in article IX of the Antarctic Treaty. 
 
In the negotiations with Chile for a package agreement that started in 1949 the U.S. and the UK 
also coordinated their respective positions towards the Chilean proposal. They sought to include 
the notion of a “Consultative Committee” in the tripartite package before it was circulated to the 
other Parties. The institution of a “Consultative Committee” was meant to address all matters of 
common interest and, in particular, those concerning scientific cooperation. It therefore appeared 
to be a more democratic version of the earlier U.S. proposal for an Antarctic Commission, but 
agreement on its nature, scope and powers remained difficult to implement. For some time Chile 
tried to diminish and weaken the importance of the Consultative Committee. When Chile agreed 
to what seemed, in July 1951, to be the final version of the proposed “Antarctic Declaration” 
with the British and American requirements for a Consultative Committee, and the document 
was circulated to the other claimants, there was new opposition. Argentina and Australia 
opposed the proposal, in particular its Article 8 that stated “The Committee shall have authority, 
on behalf of the signatory countries, to grant permission to countries other than the signatory 
countries to conduct exploration and scientific investigation and research in the Antarctic area. 
However, the signatories will not recognize such expeditions carried out during the life of the 
agreement as a basis for territorial claims”. Australia insisted that the Consultative Committee 
and its procedures might ease the issue of Russian membership and “would be the thin end of the 
wedge in whittling away national sovereignty and setting up the international regime favoured by 
the United States and the Soviet Union”.6  Towards the end of 1951, the U.S. State Department 
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produced another revision of the Modus Vivendi and exchanges continued with Britain and Chile, 
now with a new emphasis on an imminent American claim.7 The British destruction of Argentine 
and Chilean huts on Deception Island in February 1953 effectively ended the discussion of an 
overall stand-still agreement, and shifted the efforts of diplomacy instead in the direction of 
trying to obtain a tripartite stand-still of hostilities (Argentina, Britain and Chile) through the 
renewal of a 1949 tripartite agreement on the limitation of naval expeditions. This was the 
situation when later the British unexpectedly introduced a surprising diplomatic turn of events on 
12 January 1959 by asking for political and scientific cooperation among the three claimants to 
the Antarctic Peninsula Region, an option that was still being discussed on the eve of the 
Antarctic Treaty. 
 
A Multinational Antarctic Authority 
 
In January and February 1958, during the IGY, the British Prime Minister reviewed with the 
Australian and New Zealand Governments proposals that the nations active in the Antarctic 
should discuss means of ensuring that Antarctica remained effectively de-militarized and entirely 
open for scientific investigation. The thrust of the MacMillan proposal appeared excessively 
internationalist to the Chilean and Argentine governments which firmly maintained their 
positions on questions of territorial sovereignty within the region. By 20 January 1958, the 
Australian Cabinet had opposed internationalization, while the New Zealand Minister Mr. Nash 
publicly advocated an international regime for Antarctica, under the auspices of the United 
Nations. The U.S. Department of State invited the Commonwealth countries to multilateral 
conversations to be held in Washington, where the pendulum swung back again to matters of 
Antarctic scientific organisation with an articulate British proposal.  
 
However, the British draft8  for a nine-power High Authority, comprising claimants plus U.S. 
and USSR, with only minimal links with the UN, was rejected by Australia, and remained 
unsatisfactory to New Zealand and the U.S.  Its federalist overtones reminded the British 
inclination for federal solutions in decolonization processes, perhaps excessively for the 
Australian nationalists, but insufficiently for New Zealand internationalists. 
 
The draft convention provided that the Parties would retain their titles or claims to Antarctica but 
would renounce all governmental, administrative and jurisdictional powers in favour of a “High 
Authority” entrusted with all governmental powers, including law-making capacities. It would 
promulgate uniform civil and penal codes, establish courts and even an Antarctic Police Force. 
The Authority would operate a system of inspection. A “Council”, whose powers would be 
recommendatory except for approval of the budget, would implement a centralised planning of 
Antarctic research by a majority vote of its members. 
 
One can reflect on the logic of this almost full internationalisation from the perspective of the 
UK. Britain had, through the years, somehow changed its position concerning its own Antarctic 
claim, but was also the nation with a larger and more profound investment in Antarctic science. 
While there was no acknowledged “merger” of the claims, these retained only a symbolic value, 
while participation in the scientific arena was significantly enhanced in the proposal. 
                                                 
7 FRUS 1951: 1734-1736 
8 Templeton: 185 
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The Role of IGY Structures and Decisions  
 
Negotiations on a legal-political Antarctic regime lasted more than a decade, extending from 
1947 until 1958, when the Preparatory Meeting for the Antarctic Conference was convened. The 
principles, decisions, arrangements and structures for the International Geophysical Year were 
stipulated at the various IGY Antarctic Conferences (1955-1957) a short but greatly productive 
period. A strong interdependence exists between the two processes, the scientific on the one hand 
and the political on the other hand, but any attempt to assert a cause/effect relationship is not 
enlightening.  
 
The relationship, rather, was dialectical. There was a very strong political and diplomatic 
Antarctic contribution to the organization and results of the IGY Antarctic Conferences. In turn 
there was a decisive input from the IGY to the Treaty System: organisational, planning, 
distribution of tasks and responsibilities, and codification of rules on the conduct of scientific 
investigations. Thus it was a matter of a co-evolution of political and scientific orders. Scientific 
needs made co-operation mandatory in both logistic resources and scientific results had to be 
shared. This was only possible because of the “Gentleman’s Agreement” initiated by Argentina 
and Chile which placed political problems temporarily in abeyance. The message to the political 
negotiators was that such fruitful cooperation could proceed only on the basis of the IGY 
political stand-still becoming a permanent feature of any future Antarctic settlement.9 
 
In summary, the legacy of the IGY, introduced into the Antarctic Treaty, includes the following 
guiding principles: 
 
(a)  Scientific activities and their associate logistics may not prejudice the legal and political 
positions of the participating nations (Resolution 1. Argentine-Chilean Interpretative Statement 
introduced at the Paris Antarctic Conference (1955). 
 
(b) The words, “Freedom of scientific investigation in Antarctica and cooperation towards that 
end, as applied during the IGY” (Article II, Antarctic Treaty), which encapsulates the living and 
continuing legacy. 
 
(c) The IGY ended in 1958. (“Geophysical Cooperation” in 1959 was not officially part of the 
IGY) but it was agreed that “scientific investigations should continue thereafter”. 
 
Conclusion 
  
The Antarctic Treaty refers to the IGY in its Preamble and in its Article II. According to Article 
II, the kind of scientific investigations made during the IGY, and cooperation to that end, “shall 
continue subject to the Treaty”. The sentence “as applied during the IGY” cloisters scientific 
research within restraints indispensable to its success (sitting of stations, international division of 
scientific labour, overall importance of global problems, economy in their solution, and free 
exchange of information). The Treaty also defines the scope, channels, procedures and structures 
for the conduct of science. 
 
                                                 
9 Whiteman V. 2: 1242-1243 
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Issues concerning the structure arose during the 1958 Antarctic Treaty Preparatory Meeting. 
Chile submitted a project for an International Institute for Antarctic Investigations funded and 
managed by the Parties.10  The inspiration for such a proposal came from Thomas Huxley, 
Executive Director of UNESCO who, in 1948, had suggested that UNESCO could host the 
Institute and build a bridge with the United Nations on the one side and the International Council 
for Scientific Unions (ICSU) on the other. At the time Huxley’s suggestion was not kindly 
received. Ten years later, the Chilean Delegation (with its revival of Huxley’s idea) was praised 
but not followed. The Chilean initiative, coming from a country whose lack of material resources 
had and adverse impact on its IGY research, was not aimed at the construction of a genuine 
international research institution, but primarily concerned with a United Kingdom initiative for a 
Protocol which would allow third Parties to pursue activities in Antarctica, without becoming 
Parties to the Treaty but adhering to its principles. Chile thought that the International Institute it 
advocated could become a more strict and demanding filter for the consideration of scientific 
proposals by non-member countries. At some time, members of New Zealand Prime Minister 
Nash’s staff had considered that SCAR could play that intermediary role as well, and the U.S. 
took the lead in proposing SCAR as the scientific arm of the Treaty. In a parallel process, a broad 
consensus emerged on the basis that scientific research should remain the preserve of the 
Antarctic Treaty countries and that countries that were Parties to the UN and manifested their 
interest in Antarctic research could accede to the Treaty or be invited to accede.  
 
However, the final product of what became a major issue, the relevant article XIII, is less open 
since the invitation to accede for a Party not member of the United Nations must be agreed by 
“all the Contracting Parties whose representatives are entitled to participate in the meetings 
provided for under Article IX of the Treaty”. While the U.S. and Chilean proposals concerning 
the scientific framework designed for the Treaty System differed,  they converged with the views 
of other Parties on one key aspect: the common aim to allow scientists from countries outside the 
ring of Antarctic Treaty signatories to participate in Antarctic scientific activity, but not to 
encourage third States to accede to political decisions unless and during such time as that new 
Contracting Party “demonstrates its interest in Antarctica by conducting substantial scientific 
research there, such as the establishment of a scientific station or the despatch of a scientific 
expedition”, as determined by Article IX.2. 
 
What seemed to be a liberal accession clause in Article XIII, was only a half-hearted acceptance 
of universality, since the opening for accession by “any State which is a member of the United 
Nations, or by any other State which may be invited to accede to the Treaty with the consent of 
all the Contracting Parties whose representatives participate in the meetings provided for under 
Article IX of the Treaty” would in fact limit participation in the implementation of  practical 
arrangements to the original signatories together with those acceding States which maintained a 
demonstrable interest in Antarctica by conducting scientific research. 
 
The Antarctic Treaty has as its declared objective the preservation of the freedom of scientific 
research, a freedom qualified by the reference to the significant discipline applied to scientific 
effort by the IGY. It is also a political accommodation through the protection awarded by Article 
IV of the Treaty to all legal positions, claimants, non claimants and basis of claim supporters. 
Moreover, the road towards this special international regime included the search for a mutually 
                                                 
10 Beck: 658 
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acceptable framework for scientific cooperation. This step was indispensable since the whole 
process of political accommodation within the evolving Antarctic Treaty System is governed by 
a special regime for science. The 12 original members are the States active in Antarctica during 
the IGY; the subsequent members are those Contracting Parties recognized as complying with 
the standards of “substantial scientific research”. The rule of consensus is thereby linked to a 
requirement of scientific activity to generate the decision-making procedures of the emerging 
system. 
 
Due to the distrust of third parties and fences designed to limit their participation, as well as the 
difficulty to relate the Antarctic Treaty System to the outside world, SCAR remained for many 
years the unofficial adviser and informal helper, kept at arms length by the ATS. Some Parties 
thought this informality and at times anonymity helped maintain the impartiality and 
independence of SCAR. 
 
Finally, at the Thirteenth Consultative Meeting (ATCM XIII, Brussels, 1985) the Parties 
required in Recommendation XIII-2, “regular reports” about the activities of its components, 
including SCAR, whose Chairman, Dr. Claude Lorius, expressed satisfaction with the 
acceptance by the Treaty of the hitherto “illegitimate child”.11  The updated ATCM Rules of 
Procedure, (ATCM XXVIII, Stockholm, 2005) make SCAR and other bodies (CCAMLR & 
COMNAP) permanent observers for the purpose of their reporting duties. 
 
Chile had, with its proposal for an International Antarctic Institute, inadvertently resurrected the 
issues that the “Consultative Committee” had raised at the time the Modus Vivendi was 
discussed. During the Washington Conference, a very important decision definitively settled this 
matter. There would be no Consultative Committee, SCAR would not perform that role, and 
consultation in accordance with Article IX would be forever a process, the vital and endless 
process of recommending measures to advance the principles and objectives of the Antarctic 
Treaty. With time, the Protocol would bring into a more complex Treaty System, not a 
“Consultative” but an “Advisory” Committee for the Environment (CEP).  
 
Some inconsistency in the matter of scope remains. The Treaty defines its area of application as 
south of 60ºS. SCAR has chosen the Antarctic Convergence which was favoured from the start 
by the USSR, and extends its studies into the Sub-Antarctic. The Protocol to the Antarctic Treaty 
for the Protection of the Environment (1991) obviously applies to the same area, but all its 
references to the Antarctic Environment are made in connection with the “dependent and 
associate ecosystems”. Scientific tradition, habits and practices make it extremely difficult to 
compress the scope of Antarctic science into artificial boundaries. Beyond the purely scientific 
interest, the boundary of the Antarctic domain versus the International Authority for the Seabed 
is undetermined and entangled in a discussion involving two lines applicable to the prohibition of 
Antarctic mining: 60º South or the Antarctic Continental Platform. Current work in progress on 
bio-regionalisation of the Southern Ocean, a common project for the Committee for 
Environmental Protection (CEP) of the Antarctic Treaty and the Commission for the 
Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources (CCAMLR) expands the area of scientific 
                                                 
11  This remark is not included in the respective SCAR Report or the ATCM XIII Official Report.  
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interest even beyond the Antarctic Convergence. In that broader context, the Census of Marine 
Life must be recognized as one of the outstanding contributions of the International Polar Year. 
 
Relations with the UN and its Agencies improved but remained ambiguous. In 1956, India 
requested that the Question of Antarctica be put on the Agenda of the UN General Assembly. 
India was persuaded to abandon its request, as was also the case with another attempt in 1958. 
Some decades later, during the negotiations pertaining to the Convention for the Regulation of 
Antarctic Mineral Resource Activities (CRAMRA) “The Question of Antarctica” was once again 
on the Agenda of the UN General Assembly and it took some years for its unsuccessful 
discussion to end. In both instances, India played a constructive role, and is now an important 
partner, as a Consultative Antarctic Treaty Party. The resilience of the Antarctic Treaty System 
has been demonstrated, but the interface of science, politics and law, continues to develop as a 
promise and a challenge to the Treaty System during the XXIst Century. 
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THE INTERNATIONAL POLAR YEAR (1957-1958)  
AS REFLECTED IN GERMAN MEDIA 
 
Cornelia Lüdecke 
 
Abstract 
 
The announcement of the International Geophysical Year (IGY, 1957-1958) brought Antarctica 
back into the headlines of West German newspapers in connection with the potential exploitation 
of mineral resources and territorial claims. The discussion of a private German expedition plan as 
well as of the general preparation of the IGY took place at a time of political and military rivalry 
between Washington and Moscow. In this context military metaphors were prevalent in 
newspaper articles. This built up a discussion on international management, referring to mineral 
resources and flight routes from South America to Australia. Antarctica mentally served as a 
resource base and there was a great optimism about its economic exploitation. Scientific 
preparations for the IGY were seen as components of a race to still unclaimed regions, and to 
reflect the economic and military demands of the great powers, which were considered to be 
looking for an expansion of their influence. The Cold War dominated the language of West 
German newspapers and illustrated magazines. During the IGY military terms were especially 
used in reports about the Commonwealth Trans-Antarctic Expedition (1955-1958). Even popular 
books published in East and West Germany focused - besides adventure - on mineral resources 
and on the possible significance of Antarctica from the military (especially Cold War) 
perspective. However books published in East Germany, moreover, also focussed on socialist 
heroes to strengthen the young state. 
 
Introduction 
 
The 3rd German Antarctic Expedition (1938/39) had performed the most extensive 
photogrammetric survey of the new discovery of Neu-Schwabenland with its high mountain 
range before World War II. The aim was to prepare occupation to secure whaling in an area 
which was claimed by Norway just before the German 
expedition reached Antarctica. A preliminary map of 
Neu-Schwabenland was produced very quickly in 1939 
and in a slightly corrected version in 19421. But without 
any ground control points it was very difficult to 
determine correct positions only from overlapping 
photographs. Nevertheless the Norwegian-British-
Swedish-Expedition (NBSX) to Antarctica (1949-1952) 
used this map of significant geographical discoveries for 
expanding their exploratory flights to the eastern border 
of their research area (Fig. 1)2. 
 
Figure 1. Flight routes of the Norwe-gian-British-Swedish-Expedition from Maudheim to Neu-
Schwabenland (Dronning-Maud-Land) in 19523. 
                                                          
1 Ritscher 1939, 1942. 
2 See maps on page 232 and 367 in Giæver (1956). On the NBSX see also Elzinga 2007 and Lewander 2007. 
55
A corrected map of Neu-Schwabenland was available as preprint but not before 19544. In the 
same year a map of the scale 1:4 million was published in four sheets by the same author5. Also, 
a popular German survey chart of Antarctica including some details of Neu-Schwabenland was 
distributed on 10 May 1954 (Fig. 2)6.  
 
Figure 2. Detail of a new German 
map of Antarctica showing Neu-
Schwabenland printed in 19547. 
 
Thus Antarctica was already a 
common topic for German 
geographers when the International 
Geophysical Year (IGY, 1957-1958) 
was officially announced in 1954. 
Now the southern continent entered 
the headlines of West German 
newspapers and the use of military 
terms and metaphors was not unusual 
as will be shown in this paper. 
Already in January 1953 a German 
magazine focussed on “Quarrels about the South Pole”, because “Nine nations have interests in 
the “last Continent” of the earth”8. These nations were listed as Argentina, Australia, Chile, New 
Zealand, South Africa, as well as Great Britain, Germany, the Soviet Union, and the USA. It is 
astonishing that Norway is not mentioned as claimant state. Territorial claims were seen in 
connection with the anticipated potential exploitation of mineral resources following Admiral 
Richard Byrd’s most recent expeditions (1939-1941, “Operation Highjump” 1946-47), although 
the economic problems of mining were not yet solved.  
 
However a great optimism about economic exploitation was prevalent. Instead of the 
internationalisation of Antarctica, an increased emphasis was placed on the strategic importance 
of Antarctica at the national level. In this context a regional newspaper published a long paper on 
a “Continent without people”9. Besides a review of the German contribution to Antarctic 
research, the author described the useless efforts towards an internationalisation of Antarctica. 
Instead, various national claims (Fig. 3), mineral resources, and strategic importance as well as 
future trans-Antarctic flight routes would ensure the South Pole region retained political 
importance, as had happened already for the North Pole region. 
                                                                                                                                                                                            
3 Giæver 1956: 367. 
4 Kosack 1958, first published as preprint in 1954a (Kosack 1954a). A final revision of the flight tracks and the 
subsequent revision of the map of Neu-Schwabenland was prepared in the middle of the 1980s (Brunk 1986, 1987). 
5 Kosack 1954b, Lüdecke 2009. 
6 IRO 1954. 
7 From IRO 1954. 
8 Anon. 31.1.1953. 
9 Sponsel 1954.  
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Figure 3. Map of Antarctica with 
international claims including Neu-
Schwabenland and the area of the Federal 
Republic of Germany in the same scale for 
comparison10. 
 
This map shows that a possible German 
claim would include a larger region than 
West Germany. In the accompanying article 
it was not defined, what a “German claim” 
would exactly mean. As it was addressed in 
a western newspaper, it obviously implied 
the expansion of the Federal Republic of 
Germany (FRG). The East German point of 
view at that time still has to be analysed.  
 
In principle there was a difference on both 
sides of the “iron curtain” dividing Germany 
into east and west. After a long debate about 
re-armament The FRG became a member of 
NATO in May 1955. Subsequently the 
“Bundeswehr” (Federal Armed Forces) was 
established in 1956, while France, Great Britain and the USA maintained their military bases and 
airports in West Germany. Also in 1956 the “Nationale Volksarmee” (National People’s Army) 
of East Germany was established and exploited by the Soviet Union for its hegemonic purposes.  
 
Germany and the International Geophysical Year 
 
Some west German scientists, especially the Göttingen geophysicist Julius Bartels (1899-1964), 
who had been elected as president of the International Association for Geomagnetism and 
Aeronomy (IAGA) in 1954 (until 1957), had been very influential in the preparation of the IGY. 
Bartels’ survey paper in the Naturwisssenschaftliche Rundschau, a journal providing a survey of 
current research in natural sciences, gave an overview on the first two International Polar Years 
and then explained the goals of the IGY11. Despite the wish of scientists from the FRG to 
participate in the IGY, it was more or less clear that West Germany could not send any 
expedition to Antarctica, which for the first time would be the main focus of a polar year. The 
non-participation was regretted by scientists and members of former polar expeditions like 
Johannes Georgi (1888-1972), who had been leader of station “Eismitte” during Alfred 
Wegener’s (1880-1930) last expedition to Greenland (1932-1933)12.  
 
                                                          
10 Sponsel 1954. 
11 Bartels 1955. 
12 Georgi 1955, 1956. 
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Against this background, the physician and famous mountaineer Karl Maria Herrligkoffer (1916-
1991) proposed a private German South-Polar Expedition with 30 participants costing 2 - 3 
Million DM (Fig. 4)13.  
 
Figure 4. Newspaper article about Herrligkoffer’s South Pole plans14. 
 
In a local newspaper his plan was described in military metaphors as participation in a “major 
scientific attack on the South Polar Land” to represent German claims. But Herrligkoffer’s 
controversial personality, described as someone who craved records and admiration, led to strong 
opposition from the geographical community in West Germany. Scepticism about his plan and 
warnings about his personality were made public in various newspapers15. Ultimately he could 
not realise his very ambitious, but -due to the costs- totally unrealistic plan. 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
13 Anon. 9.8.1955. 
14 Anon. 9.8.1955. 
15 Anon. 8.8.1955, see also Lüdecke 2007. 
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Military Context of the IGY 
 
In January 1956, strategic aspects of the IGY expeditions returned to popular consciousness, 
when headlines announced the start of a major offensive against the South Pole by the Russians 
in context with the wish of the Kremlin to rearrange Antarctica (Fig. 5)16.  
 
Figure 5. Newspaper article about the “Major attack on the South Pole has started”17. 
 
The scientific question of whether Antarctica was a continent or an archipelago of large islands 
was discussed also at that time18. Once again a new race to the South Pole was described also 
referring to quarrels about the mineral resources which were presumed to exist under the ice 
cover19. The IGY bureau, the “Comité Spécial de l’Année Géophysique Internationale” (CSAGI) 
in Paris was concerned about the sudden interest of great powers in the south polar region 
                                                          
16 Anon., 17.1.1956. 
17 Anon. 17.1.1956. 
18 Fett 1956. 
19 Anon. 9.2.1956. 
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causing quarrels and consequences on the diplomatic circles. There was even talk of Antarctica as 
a possible launching base for intercontinental rockets. The popular German magazine Stern (Star) 
described a “Cold War in Antarctica”, in which Americans and Britons together wanted to 
challenge the superiority of the Russians in this arena (Fig. 6)20. Also the future of Antarctica as 
strategic geographical element in military operations was highlighted for instance by using the 
word “bases” instead of “stations”, as scientists would have said. The journalist argued that the 
Americans wanted to occupy “new strategic key positions and preferably the largest part of the 
immense mineral resources”, thus making Antarctica “the newest centre in the battle of Great 
Powers for resources of raw materials and better military positions”21. 
 
 
Figure 6. Magazine article about the “Cold War in Antarctica”22. 
 
In due course, a new press release reported about the first five villages (!) with altogether 400 
inhabitants in effect manifesting territorial claims in Antarctica, and that depots were set for the 
Commonwealth Trans-Antarctic Expedition of 1957/5823. The story was illustrated by three maps 
                                                          
20 Stern 1956. 
21 Stern 1956. 
22 Stern 1956. 
23 WP 1956. 
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(Fig. 7), two of them showing the Antarctic continent with reference to the Mediterranean Sea 
and the territorial claims. The biggest map depicts the locations of the American, British, Russian 
and other bases in Antarctica. 
 
 
Figure 7. Location of the first villages in Antarctica. Circle with cross: American bases; circle 
with dot: British bases; triangle: Russian bases; black dot: bases of other nations24. 
 
A dynamic military type chart with the South Pole as general target in the centre underlined the 
military aspect in the spirit of the time (Fig. 8)25  
 
Figure 8. Attack of the South Pole from all sides except 
from the Norwegian and French sector26. 
 
The map shows the domain of the German expedition (Neu-
Schwabenland) in the Norwegian sector. The arrow towards 
the South Pole in the Australian sector in the east indicates 
that the advance has been underway since 1952. In the New 
Zealand sector, the joint British and New Zealand advance 
from the Ross Sea between the historical routes of Robert 
Falcon Scott (1868-1912) and Roald Amundsen (1872-1928) 
                                                          
24 WP 1956. 
25 Neue Post 1956.  
26 Neue Post 1956. 
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is labelled “in preparation”. This refers to the Commonwealth Trans-Antarctic Expedition. The 
Americans starting from their station at Little America on the western side of the Ross Sea are 
already “advancing”, while the Russian activities are placed in the unclaimed area of the Pacific 
sector of Antarctica and their advance is described as underway since 1955. This is an interesting 
misinterpretation of the facts, because the Russian expedition never went to that region but 
started in the Australian sector on the opposite side and marched towards the Pole of 
Inaccessibility. But the author thought in terms of a possible Russian occupation, which naturally 
only could take place in an up to then unoccupied area. Finally the British route was in 
preparation close to Vahsel Bay discovered by the 2nd German Antarctic Expedition (1911-1912) 
in the debatable area of Argentine, British and Chilean claims.  
 
During the public dispute about the distribution of this “gigantic ice cake” newspapers considered 
that (West) Germany had a legitimate right to be taken into account in the partition of Antarctica, 
not at least because it had made significant geographical discoveries in 193927. A “Future vision 
of coal, ore, uranium and oil” was promised on 12 February 1957, based on the already well-
known results from Byrd‘s second expedition (1933-1935)28. In contrast to former articles it was 
now explained that the economic problems of mining were not yet solved, which implied it was 
not too disadvantageous for the FRG not to be involved in the current Antarctic activities. 
 
Americans and Russians as Antarctic Rivals  
 
In January 1957 a West German magazine headline announced a “Final battle for the South Pole” 
between America and Russia29. While the claims to possession were in full swing, the impression 
was given of science being used to cover the power-political and economic-political race to the 
South Pole between America and Russia, or between American expedition chief Admiral Byrd 
and his opponent, the Russian expedition chief Somov. When political circumstances during the 
Cold War intensified scientific expeditions were more and more described as military operations. 
For example, the German journalist Heinz Steinitz, then living in New York, published a report 
in five parts in the nationwide newspaper Süddeutsche Zeitung about his journey to Antarctica 
(February - April 1957) as a guest aboard the American expedition ship “Curtiss”. The headline 
„Fortress Antarctica will be surrounded“ and subtitle “Researchers from twelve nations and an 
army of international help troops run the white ramparts of ice and rock” capture the style of 
Steinitz’s reporting30. He had a “complete Antarctic uniform” in his luggage when he boarded the 
“Curtiss” in Christchurch, which - in his eyes - seemed to be an area “behind the front”. This idea 
originated in Byrd’s recent naval part of the IGY expedition known as operation “Deep Freeze” 
(1955/56), which used Christchurch as “supply station” and “operations base”. Steinitz even 
termed the earlier big Antarctic expeditions as “triumph of science”, which recalled Leni 
Riefenstahl‘s famous movie “Triumph of the Will” about the NSDAP convention at Nuremberg 
in 1934. 
 
Steinitz described the unique situation of a peaceful international collaboration with a so-called 
planning “scientific general staff” in the hinterland and with professors holding the authority, 
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while governments and armies became an auxiliary supplier of material. In this setting the 
military machine was reduced to an executive instrument of the scientific high command forming 
the “modern big army”. It was prepared “to deliver the deciding trial of strength”. The whole 
article reflects the significant military support for science especially in US operations. But 
Steinitz also made the remark that Antarctica fought back with its own weapons of ice, snow, 
crevasses, and blistering storms and already had taken some human lives. Antarctica was a 
continent with a strong connotation to “demonstrating power” and weakening the “faith of 
victory of the human aggressor”. 
 
The first part of the newspaper series was accompanied by a comic style map, oriented in such a 
way as to allow the reader to follow the direction of the Commonwealth Trans-Antarctic 
expedition from the Weddell Sea to the Ross Sea (Fig. 9).  
 
Figure 9. Comic style map of the activities in Antarctica during the International Geophysical 
Year 1957-195831. 
 
The headline of Steinitz’s fourth report stated that “The eternal ice is not yet distributed” and that 
national claims were withdrawn for the moment32. Nevertheless he mentioned that military 
experts were discussing the strategic importance of Antarctica in the future. Another reporter of 
that time labelled Antarctica as a “treasury in night and ice”, which had triggered a race of 
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nations to the South Polar continent, while the IGY was seen as an “invasion of scientific 
expeditions”33. 
 
Finally Steinitz used his material to publish a book about the seventh Continent (!), harking back 
to Wilhelm Filchner’s (1877-1957) travel account of the 2nd German Antarctic Expedition (1911-
1912) with the title “To the sixth Continent” in 192234. Concepts of the continents Eurasia and 
America obviously had changed in the meantime resulting in different ways of counting. Besides 
a description of expeditions and everyday life in Antarctica during the IGY, Steinitz addressed 
the new major question “Why fight for Antarctica?” in 20 pages. He argued that it made sense to 
use Antarctica as “living space” (“Lebensraum”), which had been an essential concept during the 
Third Reich, and also as a base of natural resources 35. It would thus be justified to think about 
the continent’s future. He repeated old arguments, already well-known from the Third Reich: the 
explosive pressure of increasing population forced the habitation of new grounds, which seemed 
to be only realistic close to the shore line of Antarctica. Up to then the armistice was not broken 
during the IGY, but Steinitz continued to describe the uncomfortable feeling that “nothing but the 
word of honour of a handful of university professors preserve the icy continent from the 
intervention in the world wide arms race”36. This chapter culminated in the question. “To whom 
does Antarctica belong and what is it going to become?”37 The author saw the solution in the 
fatal decision between life and death, decline and preservation of the human race. Consequently 
Steinitz did not give a chronology of Antarctic exploration in the appendix, but a chronological 
list of political events concerning claims referring to the sub-Antarctic Islands and Antarctica.  
 
The Commonwealth Trans-Antarctic Expedition 
 
When the Commonwealth Trans-Antarctic Expedition was going to start the polar crossing at the 
end of December 1957, the newspaper Bonner Rundschau from the capital of the FRG began a 
14-part series titled “With the Everest conqueror to the South Pole”38. It was written by Noel 
Barber from the London Daily Mail and translated for German readers. Barber had a chance to go 
to the American McMurdo Base at the Ross Sea and to visit the Amundsen-Scott Base at the 
South Pole, established by the USA in August 1957 as part of the American IGY program. In the 
first articles of his series, Barber introduced the idea of a “race” to the South Pole between the 
Commonwealth Trans-Antarctic Expedition and - as Steinitz called it - the New Zealand South 
Polar Expedition, which had the task of depot laying for the crossing (Fig. 10).  
 
Figure 10. Line of approach of Fuchs’ expedition from 
the Weddell Sea and Hillary’s expedition from the Ross 
Sea. The originally planned meeting of both expeditions 
should have taken place at Depot 700 (km)39.  
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In his second article Barber focussed on the Russian expedition, which he labelled as a “general 
mobilisation of the Soviets” for the exploration of Antarctica to manifest their possessory 
claims40. He saw the Russian research within the IGY as make-pretend to bring a huge amount of 
equipment onto the Antarctic plateau and to hoist flags with hammer and sickle on the white 
continent. This effort was carried through with a huge expenditure. Barber described their base 
“Mirny” in the so-called Australian sector of Antarctica as real town (!) with the best 
accommodations and highest standard of living. Although the Russians had promised to remove 
this base after the finish of the IGY, Barber’s impression was that the Russians might stay. 
 
Besides this strategic perspective in a global context with Cold War, journalists were very happy 
when the Trans-Antarctic Expedition turned into an adventure story with two protagonists. On 
the one hand there was the depot expedition led by the conqueror of Mount Everest, the New 
Zealander Sir Edmund Hillary (1919-2008), who would become the third person to arrive at the 
South Pole on land and, on the other hand there was his fellow expeditioner, the British Dr. 
Vivian Fuchs (1908-1999), whose start from the Weddell Sea coast unfortunately was delayed. 
Additionally his scientific investigations of the ice thickness by seismic measurements slowed 
Fuchs down, because they took much more time than intended due to crevasses and other 
barriers. However the idea of a race between both expeditions had not at all been Fuchs’ original 
intention, but was a real gift for the press. 
 
In his sixth report Barber mentioned the start of a “Cold War” between Hillary and Fuchs41. 
Hillary had made an unplanned and rapid advance to the South Pole, which he reached on 2 
January 1959 instead of waiting at the depot camp as planned. Hillary defined 19 January 1958 as 
the date of no return, because then only four weeks would be left to finish the crossing i.e. to 
accomplish the last 2.000 km before the onset of the Antarctic winter. However, Fuchs had 
rejected Hillary’s idea that due to the slowness and delay of his own party they might have to 
winter over at the South Pole and continue the crossing of Antarctica the following spring. In 
response Hillary refused to meet the Fuchs at Depot 700 to guide him to McMurdo at the Ross 
Sea in the short remaining time (see Fig. 10), which he called “foolish, daredevil, and risky”. 
Finally the dispute was settled by his announcement to guide Fuchs during the last part of the 
crossing42 . Consequently, from the eighth report of 11 January 1958 onward the series focused 
on the British under the new title “Station South Pole waits for Dr. Fuchs”43. 
 
In the tenth part of the series a new aspect emerged, when 
Barber reported about the Russians who now attacked 
“their” South Pole, the prestigious Pole of Inaccessibility 
(Fig. 11)44. In this context Barber repeated the notion of a 
general Soviet mobilisation at the beginning of 1958 to 
participate in the exploitation of the polar region.  
 
Figure 11. Map showing various tracks to different Poles 
on Antarctica45. 
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At the same time, Hillary’s unplanned and rapid advance towards the South Pole seemed to be a 
clear ‘declaration of war’ and a human drama between Fuchs and his rival46. Nevertheless Barber 
pleaded in Hillary’s favour that it was well-known in Antarctica that Fuchs had made some 
psychological mistakes in his behaviour. In the end Fuchs arrived at the South Pole just in time 
on 19 January 1959 and - what a surprise - everybody had the impression that he was “the 
absolute chief of the expedition, radiating intelligence and serenity”47. Immediately Hillary’s 
insubordinate behaviour was totally forgotten, when the new star was born. 
 
West German Books on Polar Research 
 
Besides the current reports from Antarctica in newspapers and magazines, many books were also 
published on polar research in both East and West Germany. In the FRG, the geographer Hans-
Peter Kosack (1912-1976) had collected information to write the first scientific regional 
geography of Antarctica in the German language, when he was working on the revision of the 
map of Neu-Schwabenland and on the production of a new map of Antarctica48. His book 
chapters referred to nomenclature49, exploration, topography, climate, magnetism, the aurora 
australis, the Southern Ocean, glaciation, fauna and flora, as well as to economy, political claims, 
and human colonisation. In the main part Kosack gave a description of single Antarctic regions. 
He also addressed aims and tasks of future Antarctic research during the upcoming IGY, such as 
meteorological stations (preferably the cheaper automatic type needed for local weather 
forecasting), and magnetic measurements to improve navigation. A survey of the ionosphere 
causing faults in wireless telegraphy might also have practical utility, and oceanographic 
investigations concerning whaling in the Southern Polar Sea were mentioned as well as 
prospecting for mineral resources. Consequently he mentioned the demand for international co-
operation to support the different investigations.  
 
Kurt Hassert (1868-1947), an expert on colonial and economic geography, had prepared an 
analysis of polar research and the history of expeditions to the North and South Pole before he 
died in 1947. Unfortunately the finished make-up of the book was a victim of the aerial warfare 
during WW II. Finally it was published posthumously in 1956, at a time when German readers 
were eager to learn more about the unknown continent due to the upcoming IGY50. Before his 
death in 1947, Hassert stated that “science, commerce, and politics were similarly interested in 
polar research. However the practical success will have to stand behind the scientific profit.” Ten 
years after Hasserts’s death ideas may have changed. 
 
The second volume with the results of the “Schwabenland” expedition of 1938/39 and Kosack’s 
final revision of the Neu-Schabenland map was published in 1958 and considered to be a 
“German contribution” to the IGY 1957-195851. Besides, geologist and geographer of the 
“Schwabenland” expedition Ernst Herrmann (1895-1970) contributed a popular book about “The 
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Poles of the Earth” in terms of science, military and transport policy52. After a discussion of 
geographical aspects and a short history of polar exploration, he devoted a whole chapter to the 
discovery of Neu-Schwabenland and its role after World War II. The growing general interest in 
Antarctica since WW II was obvious, because this area would perhaps become the “deployment 
zone of the next world war”.53 Despite the Cold War the “largest trans-national co-operation of 
scientists of all civilised nations of the earth would take place during the IGY”54. Dealing with 
both Polar Regions Herrmann emphasised the contrast between the American station at 
McMurdo (Ross Sea) and the Russian drift station North Pole 6 in the Arctic Ocean. Finally 
Herrmann included the start of the first satellites highlighting the technical and scientific 
achievements of the IGY. He also mentioned the newly establish commercial flights of the 
Scandinavian Airline SAS from Copenhagen via Søndre Strømfjord in Southwest Greenland and 
Winnipeg to Los Angeles. Finally 24 February 1957 marked the opening of the regular airline 
Copenhagen - North Pole - Tokyo. Herrmann cited a participant of the first flight, the Danish 
prime minister Hans Christian Svane Hansen (1906-1960), who recognised the new airline as a 
means to improve the contact between nations and to serve the universal peace and human 
progress55. 
 
East German Books on Polar Research 
 
In the German Democratic Republic (GDR) a chronological account of the most important 
expeditions to Antarctica and an outlook upon the upcoming IGY was published under the title 
“The High Pole - The History of Exploration of the Terra Australis” in 195656. Starting with a 
report of a modern Russian whaling cruise the author directed attention to the discovery of the 
“terra australis incognita”, which had been driven by economic ideas. Exciting reports of Cook’s 
and Bellingshausen’s journeys (1772-1775 and 1819-1821 respectively) triggered whaling and 
the ‘magnetic crusade’ of the 1840‘s. Descriptions of the following eras of the international co-
operation at the turn of the century including Erich von Drygalski’s 1901-1903 expedition, which 
discovered Wilhelm II Land, and the race to the South Pole in 1911-1912, including Filchner’s 
1911-1912 expedition to the Weddell Sea, as well as how the new era starting with Byrd’s flights 
in Antarctica (1928-1930) led to the announcement of the IGY. Very interesting maps of two to 
five expedition routes of special periods illustrate the book. A map of Neu-Schwabenland, 
discovered by the 3rd German Antarctic expedition under the National Socialist regime in 
1938/39 was given also, but no report about the expedition itself, which conducted the first 
extensive aerial photogrammetric survey of the mountains in Dronning Maud Land, which the 
Germans called Neu-Schwabenland. The book ended with the expectation that according to the 
Soviet occupying forces “the results achieved under the guidance of Soviet science will 
contribute to the peaceful advance and welfare of all mankind.”57  
 
A regional organised account of the discovery of the different regions of the Arctic prior to 1938 
was published by the same author under the title “The White Way - Researchers Conquer the 
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Arctic”58. The book was organised thematically starting with a chronological description of 
single steps towards the discovery of the Northwest Passage, the investigation of Greenland 
ending with Alfred Wegener’s death on the interior ice cap in 1930, Inuit living in the North 
American Arctic, the description of the discovery of the Northeast Passage and Nansen’s drift on 
his ship “Fram” before discussing modern flights over the Arctic. This was in line with the 
general importance of aviation within to Soviet propaganda about the Arctic in the 1930s59. There 
was neither a chapter on the conquest of the North Pole or Cook and Peary nor a special chapter 
describing native people living in the Russian Arctic (Siberia). Instead the author focused on the 
drift of the Russian ship “Sedow” in 1937/38 and on recent Russian achievements in Arctic 
settlements, which might strengthen the Russian advantage in the exploration of Antarctica60. 
The book ends with a praise of Russian Arctic aviation. A description of the equipment used by 
the discoverers, a natural history of the Arctic, various maps showing the most important 
expedition routes were presented and like in his first book on Antarctica he added a chronological 
table of most important expeditions.  
 
Finally another book came out in the GDR in 1959 titled “Under the spell of the White 
Magnet”61. The chronological description started with the ideas of the old Greeks and passed by 
the usual scientific and personal achievements of the discoverer like Vitus Bering (1681-1741) 
and Adam Johann von Krusenstern (1770-1846) in the north and James Cook (1728-1779) or 
Fabian Gottlieb von Bellingshausen (1778-1852) in the south. It acknowledged the international 
co-operation of 1901-1904, which had been initiated in Germany, and described the first flights 
in Antarctica and sovereignty claims of the 1940s. The map of most important expeditions of the 
period 1898-1912 included also Drygalski’s and Filchner’s expeditions. In the chapter on “Fight 
for the no-man‘s land” “an apple cake was distributed” - a German metaphor connecting the 
single Antarctic sectors of national claims to slices of a sweet apple cake62. Then the author gave 
a critical account of the “Schwabenland” expedition from the East German point of view using 
military terms under the subtitle “Göring‘s pledge”. The IGY was described in terms such as the 
“general offensive of science” and the “mobilisation of an army”. For the investigation of the 
“retreat” of the southern ice an “initial position” was taken at the Russian station “Mirny”. The 
unchanged presence of military terms may have reflected the daily presence of Soviet military in 
East Germany.  
 
It is possible that the enormous size of Operation Highjump in 1946/47, which was designed to 
train the US Navy in polar operations in the event of a possible war in the Arctic, may have been 
the origin for using military terms in connection with research and interest in Antarctica. This had 
not been the case with the German “Schwabenland” expedition of 1938/39, which had been 
organised by the Four Year Plan under Field Marshal Hermann Göring. 
 
Given the ongoing Cold War it is not entirely surprising that German newspapers or popular 
books focused on adventure, on mineral resources, and on the possible significance of Antarctica 
from the military perspective. However, East German books seem to give more accounts of 
adventure stories than West German books, which are more like textbooks and provide analyses. 
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The differences in the character of the debate about Antarctica may be have been influenced by 
the different actual background situations of the two German parts east and west of the “iron 
curtain”, which was replaced by “the wall” from 1961-1989: The traditional science oriented 
FRG on one side contrasted to the then Soviet oriented GDR on the other side looking for 
socialist heroes to strengthen the young state of East Germany. 
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BRITISH ANTARCTIC SCIENCE, 1939-1959 
 
Adrian Howkins 
 
Abstract 
 
This paper explores the relationship between British Antarctic science and British Antarctic 
policy between 1939 and 1959. During this period, Britain was engaged in an active dispute with 
Argentina and Chile over the sovereignty of the Antarctic Peninsula region. This paper identifies 
three phases in the relationship between British Antarctic science and British Antarctic politics 
over this time. For most of the period 1939-1959, British officials drew on the established idea of 
“environmental authority,” and used the self-proclaimed superiority of their “pure science” 
research in Antarctica to justify their sovereignty claims. During the International Geophysical 
Year (IGY) of 1957-58, however, the actual results of scientific investigations in Antarctica 
helped to bring about a shift in British Antarctic policy: with the continent looking increasingly 
less likely to be of economic value the British came to favor a limited internationalization of the 
continent. Having taken this decision, the British, in conjunction with other countries, exploited 
the rhetoric of scientific internationalism to push for the signature of the 1959 Antarctic Treaty. 
Implicit to this overview of British Antarctic policy between 1939-1959 is the argument that 
Antarctic science was both a flexible rhetorical device, and a genuine attempt to understand the 
Antarctic environment.  
 
Introduction 
 
In seeking to explain Captain Scott’s tragic failure to beat Roald Amundsen to the South Pole 
during the heroic era of Antarctic exploration, the British often resorted to the claim that the 
Scott’s party had been conducting useful scientific research in contrast to the Norwegians’ 
simple “dash for the pole.” During this early period of continental exploration, the British saw 
science as justifying their polar expeditions: heroism facilitated science at the same time as 
science justified British activities in the southern continent.1 Throughout the heroic era, British 
took pride in their Antarctic scientific achievements alongside their manly accomplishments. The 
romantic notion of “conquering nature” by walking across it complemented the modernist notion 
of “conquering nature” through scientific understanding.  
 
This paper will focus on the period from 1939-1959, more than two decades after the end of the 
heroic era. By this time, British Antarctic science already had a long and complicated history, 
encompassing the heroic era and dating back to Captain Cook’s maritime expeditions of the late 
eighteenth century. Britain’s polar experience also drew upon extensive scientific work and 
exploration of the Arctic throughout the nineteenth century.2 The 1940s and 1950s, however, 
marked a new era for British Antarctic Science. During this period, Great Britain was involved in 
an active dispute with Argentina and Chile over the sovereignty of the Antarctic Peninsula, and 
scientific activity took place within the context of this dispute. An examination of British 
Antarctic Science from 1939-1959 therefore offers an excellent opportunity to study the 
relationship between Antarctic science and imperial sovereignty claims.  
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The British Empire had formally claimed the Antarctic Peninsula region in 1908, in an effort to 
tax and regulate the nascent whaling industry.3 Although the exact area of the land within this 
region was not known at the time, the provocatively named “Falkland Islands Dependencies” 
would turn out to be the largest territory under the jurisdiction of the British Colonial Office. In 
the early years of the Second World War, both Argentina and Chile formally asserted their own 
overlapping claims to sovereignty in the Antarctic Peninsula, citing rights to the region dating 
back to the Treaty of Tordesillas of 1492.4  The dispute over Antarctic sovereignty quickly 
became caught up in wider nationalist struggles against European imperialism, and on several 
occasions threatened to turn violent. The active period of the dispute would last for the next 
twenty years, until the disputing countries effectively agreed to disagree about sovereignty as 
part of the signature of the Antarctic Treaty in 1959. 
 
Scientific research played a central role in the active phase of the dispute from 1939-1959. Both 
Argentina and Chile sought to incorporate the results of scientific research into their respective 
cases for Antarctic sovereignty.5 The two South American countries argued, for example, that the 
apparent geological continuation of the Andes Mountains into the “Antarcandes” of the Antarctic 
Peninsula, gave them political rights to “South American Antarctica.” The Argentines could also 
draw upon the longest continuous series of meteorological records from Antarctica, obtained at 
their meteorological station in the South Orkney Islands. In opposition to these claims, the 
British asserted that they could better understand, and better use, the natural environment. British 
claims to Antarctica epitomized much wider claims to “environmental authority,” an idea that 
was encapsulated in the idea of improvement.6 By conducting more scientific research of a 
greater quality than their South American rivals the British hoped to convince the world of their 
rights to govern the southern continent, so they claimed, “for the good of humanity.”  
 
There is little remarkable in the simple claim that Britain used science to support their claims to 
Antarctic sovereignty: this was a strategy that the British employed throughout their empire, and 
their South American rivals were doing the same. Just as with studies of Argentine Antarctic 
Science and Chilean Antarctic Science over the same period, the interest lies in the precise nature 
of the interaction of science and politics, the differences between the three rivals, and the way in 
which this interaction changed over time. Until the IGY of the 1957-1958, the British used the 
rhetoric of science and in particular their self-proclaimed superiority of their scientific 
achievements, to back their claims to exclusive sovereignty in the Antarctic Peninsula. But 
British scientific research in Antarctica was more than just a rhetorical strategy. During the IGY, 
the results of scientific research in Antarctica, influenced decision making towards the continent 
and contributed to Britain’s decision to push for the signature of the Antarctic Treaty in 1959. 
The British then flipped their scientific rhetoric on its head, and rather than using science to back 
their claims to exclusive sovereignty, they used the ideal of scientific internationalism to push 
successfully for a partial internationalization of the Antarctic continent. The central argument of 
this paper is that science used for political purposes does not stop being science, and that the 
scientific results of politically motivated science had political consequences.  
                                                 
3 Tønnessen and Johnsen (1982) 
4 The Treaty of Tordesillas divided the world from pole to pole into spheres of Spanish and Portuguese interest 
5 Howkins (2006); Howkins (2007) 
6 Drayton (2000) 
73
This paper will be divided into four sections. The first section will introduce the idea of 
“environmental authority” and discuss the broad relationship between science and the British 
Empire into the middle of the twentieth century, especially as it related to Antarctica. The second 
section will examine Britain’s reaction to Argentine and Chilean sovereignty claims, and the 
ways in which the British responded to this challenge to British scientific authority by increasing 
their scientific activities in the Antarctic continent. The third section will switch the question 
around and look at the impact of developing scientific understanding on British policy making. 
This was especially important during the IGY of 1957-58. The final section will investigate the 
ways in which Britain used science to push for a limited internationalization of Antarctica 
through the Antarctic Treaty in order to preserve British political influence in the continent. 
 
British “Environmental Authority” 
 
In September 1946, in a conversation with Gordon Howkins, the head of the Falkland Islands 
Meteorological Service, Brian Roberts, speaking as a member of the Foreign Office Research 
Department, explained the political reasoning behind meteorological work in the Falkland 
Islands Dependencies: “It is the wish of HMG to emphasize that the occupation of the FID 
should be such as to afford evidence of the exercise of sovereignty and that the programme of 
research and exploration should keep this in view. An active programme of research, which can 
be justified on scientific grounds alone, is an essential part of the preparation of a case which can 
be used if necessary to demonstrate to Foreign Governments of a Tribunal that HMG is taking all 
reasonable steps to develop and exercise sovereignty over the area, and is not merely attempting 
to prevent foreign encroachments. There is no doubt that both the Chilean and Argentine 
Governments would like to set up meteorological stations in the Dependencies for political 
reasons. It is essential therefore that while we have to exclude them from doing so we must take 
every possible step to ensure that we do not lay ourselves open to the same charge. Whilst FIDS 
was political in origin, it is important to maintain it as far as possible as a normal administrative 
activity in which motives of research, exploration and development predominate.7” By the mid-
1940s, British Antarctic science had distinctly political purposes. An active program of scientific 
research helped to demonstrate Britain’s “effective occupation” of the region, a legal principle 
for demonstrating sovereignty. A genuine scientific program also set the British apart from their 
South American rivals, who, the British implied held baser motives for their competing claims. 
In order to serve these political purposes, British Antarctic science had to be seen as non-
political. Or, put another way, science that could be portrayed as “politically neutral” was more 
politically useful than science that had obvious political intentions.  
 
Building upon Francis Bacon’s early-modern assertion that knowledge of the natural world 
brings with it political power, historians of the British Empire have explored the broader 
connections between science, the environment, and imperialism. Authors such as Richard 
Drayton, David Arnold, and Richard Grove have shown how the British Empire used claims to 
scientific superiority both to facilitate and legitimate their empire.8 Science provided some of the 
practical tools needed to govern and develop an empire, while at the same time providing a 
moral justification for doing so through the seminal idea of “improvement.” Sometimes entire 
                                                 
7 Roberts (13 September 1946) Emphasis in original  
8 Grove (1995); Arnold (1996); Drayton (2000) 
74
academic disciplines, such as geography and anthropology, developed to serve imperial needs.9 
The term “environmental authority” offers a succinct way of describing this complex 
relationship: by claiming to be able to understand and control the natural environment, the 
British asserted political authority over large parts of the globe.  
 
Antarctica offers historians an excellent location to explore the relationships between political 
power, scientific knowledge, and the natural environment, due to the relative simplicity of 
human-nature interactions in the continent. British claims to environmental authority in 
Antarctica arguably began with the voyages of Captain Cook in the late eighteenth century. But 
it wasn’t until the so-called heroic era of Antarctic exploration at the turn of the twentieth 
century, that Antarctica began to capture the British scientific and popular imaginations. At the 
Sixth International Geographical Congress, held in London in 1895, delegates resolved that “the 
exploration of the Antarctic Regions is the greatest piece of geographical exploration still to be 
undertaken,” and that “scientific societies throughout the world should urge, in whatever way 
seems to them most effective, that this work should be undertaken before the close of the 
century.”10 For imperial powers making assertions of environmental authority around the world, 
humanity’s lack of knowledge about Antarctica was a cause of embarrassment.  
 
During the heroic era, British scientists made significant contributions to the developing 
understanding of the southern continent. In this early stage of continental exploration, one of the 
first tasks was to survey the landscape. Alongside their more eye-catching attempts to get to the 
South Pole, British scientists did much valuable work around the continent’s margins. The 
discovery of the McMurdo Dry Valleys on Scott’s Discovery expedition (1901-04), is just one 
example of Britain’s geographical contribution. On the other side of the continent, the Scottish 
National Expedition of William Speirs Bruce conducted valuable scientific work, including the 
establishment of a meteorological station on Laurie Island, which would produce the longest 
series of Antarctic weather data in existence following its hand-over to the Argentine 
government. There was, however, a feeling that the British could have done more purely 
scientific work. Figures such as Bruce, and the Australian Douglas Mawson felt that the 
fascination with the South Pole distracted from more useful work that could be done elsewhere. 
An official British report published in 1920 suggested that the British could have made a greater 
contribution to the scientific understanding of the Antarctic Peninsula region, where foreign 
expeditions were significantly more numerous than British ones.11  
 
Perhaps most famously during this period, the British used the rhetoric of science to explain 
Captain Scott’s tragic failure to beat the Norwegian Roald Amundsen to the South Pole in the 
austral summer of 1911-12. The British polar party, this argument went, had been conducting 
genuine scientific research en route, in contrast to the Norwegian’s simple “dash for the pole.” 
The arguments for and against this claim have been well documented in the extensive literature 
on Scott and Amundsen.12 The case for the scientific defense of Scott often begins with the fact 
that the party was still man-hauling 35lbs of geological specimens when they died.13 The case 
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against argues that since Scott followed the route to the pole pioneered by Ernest Shackleton, he 
did little to further geographical knowledge. Since there are strong arguments on both sides, it is 
unlikely that this debate will ever be resolved. But what is important is that the British explicitly 
turned to the rhetoric of scientific superiority in defending their fallen heroes.  
 
In 1908, midway through the heroic era, the British made a formal sovereignty claim to the 
Antarctic Peninsula region. After making this claim, the British drew upon the rhetoric of science 
to justify their possession of the “Falkland Islands Dependencies.” In the 1940s, Sir Miles 
Clifford, governor of the Falkland Islands would boast that Britain had taken possession of the 
Falkland Islands for the good of humanity. “The only true wealth that this area contains, so far as 
we know today, is still as in the past its marine wealth – its whales and seals; these, as we have 
noted earlier, could readily be exterminated by indiscriminate killing and it was the recognition 
of this danger which decided His Majesty’s Government to bring there industries under control 
and lead to the establishment of British sovereignty over the area now known as the Falkland 
Islands Dependencies. The motive was a purely unselfish one, to conserve the harvest of these 
seas for the benefit of mankind as a whole.”14 Such claims were not uncommon, and would be 
echoed, for example, in Britain’s unilateral submission of the sovereignty dispute to the 
International Court of Justice in 1955.15 In order to demonstrate their scientific authority between 
the two world wars, the British instituted a program of oceanographic research known as the 
Discovery Expeditions. Other British scientific expeditions to Antarctica, such as that of John 
Rymill, can be seen from within a similar context. By the time of the beginning of the active 
dispute in Antarctica in the late 1930s, Great Britain already had an established tradition of using 
science to support its political claims.  
 
Scientific Response to Argentine and Chilean Claims 
 
In the early years of the Second World War, Argentina and Chile – both of which remained 
neutral throughout most of the conflict – actively asserted their sovereignty claims to the 
Antarctic Peninsula region. In November 1940, the Chilean Government issued decree 1747, 
which formalized its claim to the Antarctic Peninsula region. In the 1941-42 and 1942-43 
seasons, the Argentine government sent expeditions to Antarctica, where landing parties planted 
flags in the ice and conducted ceremonies of possession. South American arguments for 
sovereignty that were based on geological continuity, geographical proximity, and shared 
weather and climate, can be thought of as a form of “environmental nationalism,” which asserted 
shared geography as an argument for sovereignty. Additionally, Argentina in particular sought to 
beat the British at their own imperial game of environmental authority, drawing on the work of 
the Laurie Island meteorological station and other scientific research, in order to claim that they 
better understood the Antarctic environment. These various challenges posed an implicit 
challenge to Britain’s imperialistic claims to environmental authority.  
 
Initially, Britain’s response to the South American claims was severely restricted by its 
participation in the Second World War. By 1943, however, the British government found itself in 
a position to send a secret expedition of “effective occupation” to the Antarctic Peninsula region. 
Known as Operation Tabarin, this Admiralty-led expedition would mark the beginning of a 
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continuous human presence on the Antarctic continent that has lasted until today. From its outset, 
Operation Tabarin perpetuated the connection between science and politics, if in a slightly 
amateurish fashion. When government officials were looking for advice from people with 
Antarctic experience they inevitably turned to scientists such as J.M. Wordie and N.A. 
Mackintosh.16 Despite the ongoing war, these scientists saw Operation Tabarin as a valuable 
opportunity to continue their scientific investigation of the southern continent, and they helped to 
put together a basic program of scientific research. Activities such as meteorological readings, 
mapping, and rudimentary “geologizing” in no way hampered the strategic objectives of the 
mission, and in fact offered a way of keeping the men, most of who were not scientists, occupied 
during the long polar winters. 
 
In the immediate postwar years, Britain faced a renewed challenge to its claims to Antarctic 
sovereignty. In what might be termed a “Scramble for Antarctica,” Argentina, Chile, and the 
United States all established bases in the Peninsula region.17 Although the reoccupation of the 
United States East base by Finn Ronne proved to be temporary, the two South American 
countries sought to reinforce their earlier assertions of sovereignty with permanent 
demonstrations of their rights. These assertions of Antarctic sovereignty were closely connected 
with the nationalist agendas of Juan Domingo Perón in Argentina and Gabriel González Videla 
in Chile. In February 1948, President Videla became the first head of state ever to visit 
Antarctica, thereby demonstrating the importance of the Antarctic Question to the domestic 
politics of his country, at least as a distraction. During this period there was also a renewed 
emphasis on the idea of a “South American” Antarctica, through which Argentina and Chile 
covered over their differences to declare that the Peninsula region belonged to them and not to 
any distant imperial power.18  
 
Once again, Britain responded not by surrendering its claims to the Falkland Islands 
Dependencies, but by redoubling its scientific activity in the region. Operation Tabarin came 
under civilian control and changed its name to the Falkland Islands Dependencies Survey, known 
colloquially as FIDS.19 Funding for FIDS came predominantly from taxation of the Antarctic 
whaling industry, and there was a real attempt to make the Falkland Islands Dependencies 
economically self sufficient.20 Though this scientific institution, the British sought to implement 
a systematic and well-publicized program of scientific research that would demonstrate to the 
world why they should be acknowledged as owners of the Antarctic Peninsula.21 Although there 
were some problems with the work of FIDS, both organizationally in Britain and logistically in 
Antarctica, this research successfully maintained Britain’s scientific presence in the Falkland 
Islands Dependencies. At the same time, Britain reminded the world of its long history of polar 
science and exploration. The 1948 Ealing Studios movie Scott of Antarctic, directed by Charles 
Frend and starring John Mills as Captain Scott, was one such effort to draw upon the legacy of 
the heroic era at the height of the Antarctic sovereignty dispute.22  
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One of the most ardent proponents for politically useful scientific research in the Falkland 
Islands Dependencies during this period was Sir Miles Clifford, the governor of the Falkland 
Islands.23 As a colonial administrator in Africa, Clifford was steeped in the informal doctrine of 
the British Empire that colonies should pay for themselves. He also understood the notion of an 
economic quid pro quo, and believed that since the whaling industry was paying for British 
science in and around the Antarctic Peninsula, they should receive some of the benefits. 
Clifford’s solution was to focus on the science of meteorology, which could provide useful 
weather forecasts to the whaling fleets at the same time as occupying various more accessible 
parts of the Antarctic Peninsula region. Despite internal opposition to this meteorological focus 
from some British scientists, and despite the numerous problems associated with weather 
forecasting in such a remote location, by the early 1950s, the Falkland Islands Dependencies had 
a functioning network of meteorological observatories. 
 
Another example of Britain’s use of disinterested science to promote their political agenda can 
be found in their participation in the Norwegian, British, Swedish Expedition to Queen Maud 
Land. The fact that this expedition explored an area outside that claimed by Britain added to the 
idea that this was a “genuine” scientific project. Under the guidance of Hans Ahlmann, this was 
certainly one of the most sophisticated scientific expeditions ever to conduct research in 
Antarctica.24 But just as the Norwegians and Swedes had clear political motives for participation 
in this expedition, so too did the British.25 There was no better way for the British to appear 
genuinely committed to Antarctic Science than to participate in an expedition outside the 
territory that they claimed. But such an appearance of “pure science” could not help but 
strengthen Britain’s hand in the Antarctic Peninsula dispute with Argentina and Chile. The 
Norwegian, British, Swedish, expedition would provide a model for the international scientific 
co-operation that would follow. But it also offers a reminder that international co-operation 
around purely scientific research is often far from politically neutral.  
 
The International Geophysical Year  
 
Despite the best efforts of Sir Miles Clifford and others, from the early 1950s Argentina began to 
pull ahead in the competition to conduct scientific research in Antarctica.26 President Perón 
embraced his “Antarctic Dream,” famously promising to “saturate” the southern continent with 
Argentine bases. Hernán Pujato, Perón’s right-hand man in polar affairs, instituted an ambitious 
program of Antarctic activity, which he hoped would culminate in an overland expedition to the 
South Pole.27 Argentina had two distinct advantages over their British rivals: geographical 
proximity and the ability to concentrate money and scientific resources on the Antarctic dispute. 
Britain’s claims to “environmental authority” around the world were becoming increasingly 
thinly spread as nationalist movements surged throughout the British Empire. On a global scale, 
both the United States and the Soviet Union overshadowed Britain’s assertions of scientific and 
technological leadership.  
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Britain’s assertions of environmental authority in Antarctica were given a reprieve by two 
events. Firstly, the overthrow of President Perón by a military coup in September 1955 threw 
Argentina’s Antarctic policy into chaos.28 Secondly, plans for an International Geophysical Year 
(IGY) offered the British an ideal stage on which to demonstrate to the world their assertions of 
environmental authority. British scientists, most notably, Sydney Chapman, had been involved in 
the planning and organization of this international scientific research program since its genesis at 
the beginning of the decade.29 The IGY was to be a worldwide endeavor to measure and 
understand the earth’s geophysical processes. But with echoes of the famous 1895 Geographical 
Congress resolution, Antarctica was to be a major focus of the IGY, due to the continued scarcity 
of knowledge about the continent. The enterprise was ideally suited to British and their rhetoric 
of “pure science,” and it offered the country an excellent opportunity to highlight the quality of 
their Antarctic Scientific Program.  
 
Britain’s plans for Antarctic Research as part of the International Geophysical Year (IGY) of 
1957-58 can be seen, at least to some extent, as a response to Argentina’s initiative.30 Three 
programs in particular came to be associated with Britain’s contribution to the IGY: the Fuchs-
Hilary “Crossing of Antarctica”, Peter Mott’s aerial survey of the Antarctic Peninsula, and the 
Royal Society’s Halley Base on the Weddell Sea. Of these, only the Royal Society expedition 
was officially part of the IGY, although some of the scientific activities of the Trans-Antarctic 
Expedition also had “official” status. Barely hidden political objectives underlay each of these 
ostensibly scientific activities. Perhaps most blatant was the British Prime Minister’s boast that 
Vivian Fuchs would cross the Antarctic continent never once stepping outside the British 
Empire, since New Zealand claimed the Ross Sea region that would be the destination of the 
expedition.31  
 
Scientific and political bravado, however, was only one half of the story of Britain’s contribution 
to the IGY. Britain’s active response to Perón’s “Antarctic Dream” had already raised the 
economic costs of retaining British sovereignty in Antarctica. Crucially, from the late 1940s, 
British activity in the Falkland Islands Dependencies had ceased to pay for itself: in addition to 
revenue gained from the whaling industry, taxpayer money was required to finance the expanded 
work of FIDS. Certain officials in the British Government, most notably in the Treasury, 
questioned the rationale for retaining exclusive sovereignty over the Antarctic Peninsula 
region.32 In defense of the status quo, Colonial Office officials pointed to the possibility of 
finding valuable mineral resources in the Falkland Islands Dependencies. It would be rash, they 
argued, to give up Britain’s Antarctic claims without knowing exactly what they were worth. 
 
As a consequence of this Colonial Office reasoning, the British government conceived of the 
IGY as something of an “economic survey.” In the wake of the Suez Crisis of 1956, the British 
were re-thinking their strategic priorities throughout their colonial empire. The initial results of 
this re-evaluation were published in a report entitled Future Constitutional Developments of the 
Colonies (1957), more commonly known as part of Prime Minister Harold Macmillan’s “Audit 
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of Empire.” The section on the Falkland Islands Dependencies explicitly stated the importance of 
the results of the IGY on the decision whether or not to retain sovereignty in the Falkland Islands 
Dependencies: “Our withdrawal from Antarctica would mean a loss of UK prestige and 
influence, especially in scientific circles. It might also involve the loss of strategic minerals, but 
this will be easier to evaluate when the results have been assessed of the work done during the 
International Geophysical Year. Argentina and/or Chile, which have claims (partly competing) to 
the Dependencies, would probably step in if the UK withdrew.33”  
 
As well as highlighting the centrality of “strategic minerals” to British thinking towards 
Antarctica, this document is also interesting for its emphasis on scientific prestige. Even as late 
as 1957, the British continued to associate scientific activity with imperial prestige and influence.  
 
There was no single point either before, during, or after the IGY when scientists declared that 
there was little of immediate economic value to be found in Antarctica. Instead, there was a 
dawning realization among both scientists and politicians that Antarctica was not the frozen El 
Dorado of popular imagination. The ice was too thick, the climate too hostile, and, most 
importantly, no major valuable mineral deposits were found. Combined with the rapid decline of 
the Antarctic whaling industry, this growing awareness of the “reality” of the Antarctic 
environment served to undermine any case for retention of exclusive sovereignty based on 
economic potential.34 In fact, from a political perspective, the failure to find valuable minerals 
would turn out to be the most important scientific result of the IGY.  
 
Britain’s response to the diminishing economic potential of Antarctica differed from that of 
Argentina and Chile. The claims of the two South American nations had become somewhat 
detached from the material reality of the continent: the Antarctic Peninsula region, they argued, 
belonged to Argentina or Chile simply because it was an “integral part” of their respective 
national territories. In Britain, however, there was an economic bottom line: if any part of the 
empire could not pay for itself, then its feasibility would be questioned. The re-evaluation of 
Britain’s claim to the Falkland Islands Dependencies did not come solely as a result of the IGY: 
much broader changes were taking place in the British Empire that would lead to the accelerated 
decolonization of much of the colonial empire.35 But the results of the IGY undoubtedly had an 
influence. British politicians and officials reassessed the worth of maintaining exclusive political 
sovereignty in the Falkland Islands Dependencies, especially given the economic and diplomatic 
costs of the on-going dispute with Argentina and Chile. They did not, however, want to abandon 
their political influence entirely. Some form of limited internationalization, they reasoned, 
offered the best means of diffusing political tensions in Antarctica while retaining political 
influence in the region.  
 
Scientific Internationalism 
 
Having decided that some form of limited internationalization would be the best option for 
British interests in Antarctica, British officials set about making this happen. In this process they 
worked closely with the United States, Australia, and New Zealand. The rhetoric of scientific 
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internationalism provided one of the principal tools for achieving Britain’s political goals. 
Science in general, and the goodwill generated by the IGY in particular, offered a non-
threatening way to bring political rivals together to discuss political questions. This use of 
science to support limited internationalization rather than exclusive science ostensibly 
represented an 180º turn in British policy. But the focus of British policy continued to be the 
retention of political influence in Antarctica; however this could best be achieved. The use of 
scientific rhetoric to bring about the internationalization of Antarctica demonstrates the 
malleability of the relationship between science and politics, as well as the pragmatism of British 
officials.  
 
Despite its obvious competitive features (such as the competition between the United States and 
the Soviet Union to locate a base at the South Pole), the cooperative elements of the IGY offered 
the negotiators an ideal foundation for partially internationalizing the Antarctic continent. During 
this eighteen-month enterprise, the twelve nations participating in Antarctic research worked 
together to further scientific understanding of the southern continent. The centralization of 
meteorological data at Weather Central, where it was processed by an international team of 
meteorologists, was one example of such cooperation.36 Another example was the exchange of 
scientific personal, which took place despite political rivalries. Perhaps most importantly, the 
IGY offered a model for the temporary suspension of sovereignty claims that would shortly be 
incorporated into the Antarctic Treaty.37  
 
A series of secret meetings between Britain, the United States, Australia and New Zealand in the 
second half of 1957 and into 1958 set in motion the process that would lead to the signature of 
the Antarctic Treaty of 1959.38 The British government was not the only government that had 
come to favor an international solution to the Antarctic problem, but it was among the keenest 
and most pro-active. During the early quadripartite negotiations, British officials took a notably 
realist position, for example arguing against the United States that the Soviet Union should be 
included in the Antarctic conference. In May 1958, the United States issued an invitation to the 
other eleven nations that had participated in IGY research to a meeting in Washington in order to 
discuss the political future of Antarctica. The explicit connection between science and 
sovereignty offered a neat justification for the exclusion of potential “troublemakers,” including 
both Soviet satellites and the newly independent states of the “Third World” bristling with anti-
imperialism.39  
 
After months of preliminary negotiations, the Washington conference of October-December 
1959 led to the signature of the Antarctic Treaty. Article IV of this treaty, suspended all existing 
sovereignty claims, neither recognizing them nor rejecting them. In many ways this was exactly 
what Britain had come to want: the signature of the Treaty diffused political tensions, while 
British claims remained in a state of suspended animation, to be brought out again if ever the 
occasion should demand. The Antarctic Treaty can be seen as a treaty of decolonization: its 
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signatories voluntarily suspended their rights to the normal attributes of sovereignty. But it was a 
treaty of decolonization that preserved imperial interests, since sovereignty claims remained in a 
state of suspended animation.   
 
Not only did science provide a rhetorical device to bring countries together to sign the Antarctic 
Treaty, but it also provided the British, and other signatories, with a means of retaining their 
political influence into the Antarctic Treaty System. By the terms of the Antarctic Treaty, only 
those countries with “substantial scientific interest” in Antarctica – usually meaning the 
ownership or maintenance of a scientific station – would have a place at the political negotiating 
table. This offered a convenient way of keeping potential “trouble makers” on the outside the 
politics of Antarctica. For the first twenty years of the Antarctic Treaty System, the Scientific 
Committee for Antarctic Research (SCAR), with its headquarters in Cambridge, England, 
enjoyed an inordinate influence on Antarctic policy making. The British Empire also benefited 
from the location of the Glaciology World Data Center in Cambridge, and the relocation of the 
Antarctic Weather Center to Melbourne.40  
 
Scientific research continues to dominate the politics of Antarctica up to the present, possibly 
enjoying a greater hegemony today than at any time in the continent’s history. Although the full 
membership of the Antarctic Treaty System has more than doubled from its original twelve 
members, it remains a system of ins and outs. Disinterested science continues to bring political 
advantages to those countries that can afford it. In the 1980s, for example, the British Prime 
Minister Margaret Thatcher, used the “discovery” of a hole in the ozone layer over Antarctica by 
a team of British scientists, as a justification for Britain’s ongoing presence in the South Atlantic: 
“In the aftermath of the Falklands conflict we were able to strengthen Britain’s presence in the 
South Atlantic by increasing our scientific effort. This paid off remarkably quickly in a totally 
unexpected way with the discovery by the British Antarctic Survey of the ozone “hole” over 
Antarctica in the austral spring. This brought home to the whole world the potentially dangerous 
changes in the environment which mankind’s activities are bringing about and led to the first 
measures to control pollution on a global scale.”41 Less than three years after the bitter war 
between Britain and Argentina over the sovereignty of the Falkland Islands/Islas Malvinas, 
British Antarctic science “for the good of humanity” was again being used for distinctly political 
purposes.   
 
Conclusions 
 
The performance of Antarctic science played a central role on all sides of the Antarctic 
sovereignty dispute between Britain, Argentina, and Chile. The British believed that for science 
to serve a useful political purpose, it had to appear to be politically neutral. At least until the IGY 
of 1957-58, British officials used science to give a veneer of disinterested altruism to Britain’s 
claims to Antarctica. There was an element of Kipling’s “white man’s burden” to British 
Antarctic policy: Britain made its claims, British officials argued, not for imperial prestige, but 
for the good of humanity. Ultimately, both politicians and scientists benefited from this 
relationship. Through the Discovery Investigations, Operation Tabarin, and the Falkland Islands 
Dependencies Survey, British scientists received support and funding that they almost certainly 
                                                 
40 For details of the politics of Antarctica after the signature of the Antarctic Treaty, see Beck (1986). 
41 Margaret Thatcher, writing in the Foreward to Fogg (1992:xv). 
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would not have received without the impetus of the sovereignty dispute. As a consequence, 
scientific understanding of Antarctica developed substantially over the twenty-year period of the 
active dispute.  
 
Towards the end of the 1950s, the results of Antarctic science began decisively to influence 
British Antarctic policy making. In particular, the research associated with the IGY of 1957-58 
revealed that there were no economically valuable mineral resources in Antarctica, at least in the 
short-to-medium term. On the contrary, IGY research confirmed a continent with difficult 
accessibility, deep ice and a hostile climate. Since the British went into the IGY treating it as 
something of an economic survey, this realization shaped their political attitudes to the continent. 
With the growing awareness that the Falkland Islands Dependencies could not pay for 
themselves, British policy makers came to favor the partial internationalization of the continent. 
This shift in British attitudes helped to lay the foundations for the Antarctic Treaty of 1959, 
which the British made sure would preserve, rather than end, their political influence in the 
continent.  
 
In pushing for the 1959 Antarctic Treaty, the British continued to exploit the idea of 
environmental authority. But rather than using scientific prestige to support their claim to 
exclusive sovereignty, they now used it to support calls for a limited internationalization of the 
continent, on their terms. The Antarctic Treaty, the British argued, would be the best framework 
for continued scientific research in the southern continent. In this way, the British effectively 
transferred the concept of environmental authority to the Antarctic Treaty System, a system in 
which they would play a leading role. Just as the British Empire had used “politically neutral” 
science to serve their political interests, the Antarctic Treaty System continues to use politically 
neutral science to serve its members’ political interests. 
 
This study of British Antarctic Science from 1939-1959 reveals the complexity of the 
relationship between imperial power, scientific research, and the Antarctic environment. The 
performance of science was clearly used as a rhetorical strategy by all three countries involved in 
the dispute over the Antarctic Peninsula, in order to support their competing agendas. The 
British, lacking the advantage of proximity, consistently stressed the quality of their research as a 
justification for sovereignty. This scientific rhetoric was highly malleable, and could be used to 
support internationalization when the political circumstances demanded. But Antarctic science 
was never just rhetoric. Even though science was politically motivated, it generated results that 
added to understanding of the Antarctic environment. These scientific results in turn had political 
implications, often leading to new rhetorical uses for science. This study clearly reveals that 
there is no clear line between actual scientific work and the rhetorical use of science.   
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SOME ASPECTS IN THE HISTORY OF ICE CORE DRILLING 
AND SCIENCE FROM IGY TO EPICA 
 
Aant Elzinga 
 
Abstract 
 
Ice core drilling technology has made important new advances in Europe during the past few 
decades, which has now placed Europe among the leaders in this field of polar research. Less 
well known is how ice core drilling and its technology has its roots in the Cold War of the 1950’s 
into the 60’s, and particularly, with a covert US agreement with Denmark over the placement of 
nuclear weapons on Greenland. Later geopolitical and scientific disagreements also influenced 
developments. The vision of an all-European ice-core drilling venture in Antarctica, for example, 
matured in Greenland during difficulties that cropped up in US-European collaboration with 
Denmark and Switzerland in the mid-1980’s. Historically it coincided with the Reagan 
administration’s Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), popularly called Star Wars, a weapons-
related Research & Development program that introduced a certain amount of suspiciousness 
and hostility vis a vis scientists in other countries. Although this did not seem to have affected 
support from the Division of Polar Programs (DPP, the funding agency of the US National 
Science Foundation, in Washington, D.C.), other factors like different concepts of ice core 
drilling techniques and strategies, as well as incongruence between rules for funding research at 
US and European universities, respectively, combined to rupture US-European collaboration in 
ice core drilling in Greenland. The transatlantic disagreement in turn precipitated formation of a 
successful all-European consortium in Greenland that fortuitously became the incubator for 
EPICA, the European Program for Ice Core Drilling in Antarctica that started in 1995.  
 
Introduction 
 
The vision of an all-European effort can be traced back to the Greenland Ice Core Project (GRIP) 
in 1992, which evolved after the original US-Danish-Swiss Greenland Ice Sheet Program (GISP) 
was completed in 1981; and even before that, in an attempt in the early 1970s to launch a 
European Antarctic Project (EAP), one that never made it. The difficulties in the Greenland 
research planning in the mid-1980’s were turned around and became new opportunities for the 
Europeans, scientifically, technologically and geopolitically. This paper focuses on the Cold War 
phases as well as the converging and diverging international co-development of ice core drilling. 
It traces a long line of research that goes back to the International Geophysical Year (IGY) 
activities by SIPRE and CRREL (see below) starting at Site 2, NW Greenland in 1956-1957; and 
Byrd station, and the Ross Ice Shelf Antarctica, during 1957-1959, and climax with the 
successful bed-rock drillings that were accomplished in northern Greenland at the US military 
research station Camp Century in 1966, and Byrd station, Antarctica in 1968. It was both at Site 
2 and Camp Century and Byrd Station that the first intermediate depth and bedrock depth ice 
cores were retrieved, thanks to the foresight of US scientists and engineers who were able to 
devise basic research efforts that successfully “piggy-backed” on the ongoing US military 
operations. This paper also analyses how this early work inspired later polar ice core research, 
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and the interpretation of data, which has had an important bearing on understanding the climate 
change phenomena that now, some forty years later, so definitely dominates the present scientific 
scene. In addition a number of conclusions are drawn concerning the character of institutional 
arrangements and policy measures that were needed in Europe to facilitate a big project like 
EPICA. This paper thus addresses the question some of necessary conditions for large-scale 
institutionalization of Antarctic collaborative research, factors like the scientific prowess of 
scientific communities in particular nations, technological resources, economics but also 
diplomacy and (micro- and macro-) politics.  
  
In 1996 a European consortium of ten countries, the European Project for Ice Coring in 
Antarctica (EPICA) went into operation, leading within a decade to the recovery of very deep ice 
cores at two main sites. These are the French-Italian Concordia station and the German Kohnen 
station situated at the Dome C area and on Dronning Maud Land, respectively, two points far 
away from each other on the East Antarctic ice sheet. Project results are many and they have had 
a direct bearing on current discussions concerning global climate change.  
 
A distinction must be made between, first of all, ice core science and interpretation, secondly 
drilling technology needed to recover ice cores, and thirdly the publication of scientific results. 
The latter form the basis for periodic assessments made by the Intergovernmental Panel for 
Climate Change (IPCC) in its efforts within the UN framework to provide national governments 
with scientific evidence for policy. An important factor in this context is that reconstructions of 
climate in polar regions from water isotopes in ice from either deuterium or oxygen O18 gases 
concentrations have become successively more sophisticated as researchers build on the earlier 
discovery of a link between greenhouse gases and climate in the past, and the characterization of 
rapid climate changes.1  
 
Parallel to ice core science and interpretation, on the side of the tools needed, drilling technology 
has made important advances and the Europeans are among the current leaders in this research. 
The present European prowess in the field owes much to the experience gained by the Danes and 
Swiss in the course of collaboration with US scientists and drilling experts in the 1960’s and 
1970’s. In this paper attention is on this transatlantic collaboration as a background to the 
emergence of EPICA. It is noted how the vision of an all-European ice-core drilling venture in 
Antarctica matured in Greenland during differences of opinion that cropped up between 
                         
1 Hans Oeschger in Bern Switzerland who early on did radiocarbon dating of ice was the first to identify this link; he 
and his team were pioneers in unraveling the greenhouse gas/climate relationship and measure the glacial-
interglacial change of atmospheric CO2  (Oeschger et al. 1968, Oeschger et al. 1982, 1985, Oeschger et al. 1984, 
Neftel et al. 1982, Stauffer & Oeschger 1985, Dansgaard & Oeschger 1989). Dansgaard et al. (1969, 1970, and 
1971) constitute the first definitive publications on paleoclimates and deep ice cores. See also Oeschger and 
Sigentaler (1988) and Stocker (1999). Later a more general treatment was forthcoming from Claude Lorius and Jean 
Jouzel in France - cf. Jean Jouzel and Claude Lorius, “Paleoclimate from ice cores”, 
http://www.brgm.fr/dcnewsFile?ID=269 accessed 16/1/08. For a broader historical overview of  “the discovery of 
global warming”, including the roles particularly of meteorologists and oceanographers, as well as climate-change 
simulation models, see Spencer Weart (2003). Weart, who is the Director of the Center for History of Physics of the 
American Institute of Physics, has also made his text available in digital form at 
<http://www.aip.org/history/climate/>. 
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European and US partners in the mid-1980’s. The transatlantic tensions that emerged after the 
completion of the joint Greenland Ice Sheet Project (GISP) in turn precipitated formation of a 
successful all-European consortium in Greenland (Greenland Ice Core Project GRIP - see below) 
that fortuitously became an incubator for EPICA. Difficulties were turned around and became 
new opportunities, scientifically and technologically. In what follows some aspects of this 
history are traced. 
 
Snow and Ice Studies Driven by the Cold War 
 
Just as the Korea crisis was expanding in 1951 the US established the Thule Airforce Base on 
northern Greenland. It was placed about 1100 km above the Arctic Circle on a meridian midway 
between New York and Moscow as an operations base and refueling point for long-range 
bombers potentially directed at the Soviet Union. In this connection the US Army Corps of 
Engineer’s Snow, Ice and Permafrost Research Establishment (SIPRE), which was formed in 
1949, started a series of snow and ice studies on the Greenland ice sheet. When a decision was 
taken 1955 to construct a Distant Early Warning (DEW) line of polar region radar stations 
stretching from western Alaska, over northern Canada and Greenland to Iceland, glaciological 
research increased in the US to more fully understand the nature and environmental conditions 
existing in the polar latitudes, for potential future operational requirements. The main 
engineering research done by SIPRE in Greenland was in studies of structures above, on and 
under the permafrost and snow ice/surfaces, trafficability and transport problems in cold regions, 
living conditions, survival difficulties, communications etc. 
 
SIPRE’s Chief Scientist, Henri Bader had a personal long-term interest in basic ice physics and 
core drilling, as well as the acquisition of ancient snowfall records, and their relationship to the 
climate of the past. He was able to persuade the military to tack on ice core drilling research, 
with the understanding that the research would be partly funded and supported by the National 
Science Foundation (NSF). The NSF for its part realized that SIPRE (renamed CRREL in 1961)2 
was the only research organization in the US at that time capable of combining the broad 
experience (Bader) and organization as well as operational ability (piggy-backing into the field, 
free room and board and much other logistical support from the Corps of Engineers) to conduct a 
deep ice coring project, thus boosting one of the NSF’s many contributions to the IGY.3    
 
The DEW line was completed when the International Physical Year (IGY) was just into its 
second month. The Greenland section of the DEW line included four radar stations in Greenland, 
Dye 1, Dye 2, Dye 3 and Dye 4 (see map in the Appendix below). Later Dye 3 became an 
important site of deep ice-core drilling for scientific reasons articulated during pioneering work 
already undertaken at Camp Century by CRREL. Located some 120 km east of the Thule 
                         
2 CRREL = Cold Regions Research and Engineering Laboratory 
3 Henri Bader was a US citizen born in Switzerland. Under his leadership SIPRE initiated ice trials and core drilling 
under the auspices of the IGY, in 1956 (305 m) and 1957 (411 m) cores in northwestern Greenland – Bader (1958), 
p. 177. This was followed by IGY drillings in Antarctica at Byrd station 1957/58 (309 m) and on the Ross Ice Shelf 
by Little America V 1958/59 (258 m, reaching sea water). In the Antarctic it was the US Navy that provided 
logistical support. See Langway (2008), p. 2-3 and 15. 
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airbase, this military research station was set up (just as the IGY was ending) as an experimental 
facility for possible defense against an attack by a hostile opponent. The US Army required 
knowledge about building and operating in the harsh climate, which required fundamental 
information on the properties of snow and firn (compressed snow) for military purposes. The 
Century camp comprised a little subsurface village built into the ice sheet. It had 32 buildings 
including laboratories; all dug into the firn, driven on a year round basis from 1960 until 1966. In 
the polar summer the population was about 200 men, including a contingent of scientists and 
technicians. Heat and power came from a nuclear reactor (1.5 MW) also located in a subsurface 
chamber in the firn.4 
 
In 1957 a covert agreement was struck between the Danish government and Washington to 
possibly allow nuclear weapons to be installed in Greenland.5 Within this framework the US 
military came up with a top-secret project called Iceworm, a plan to create a network of tunnels 
10 meters below the surface in the Greenland icecap to hide 600 middle-distance rockets with 
nuclear warheads on a line from Narsarsuag in the south to Thule in the north.6 Envisioned was a 
maze of subsurface tunnels covering about 4000 km with railway-type tracks to move missiles 
around, invisible to spying eyes in the skies.  
 
Pilot core drilling trials were made in 1956 at Site 2 which was an early inland site near the 
Thule base (see map in Appendix), with a recovery of an ice core to 305 m; in the following year 
a second core was recovered reaching to a depth of 411 m (Langway 1958). In 1960 at Camp 
Century (Greenland) a special chamber housed a deep ice core thermal rig designed by Lyle B. 
Hansen and built at the SIPRE and CRREL laboratories in the US. Later an electromechanical 
drill was modified and developed to core drill deeper. In glaciological circles this drill later 
became famous because of its success in 1966 in recovering the world’s first really deep ice core, 
one measuring 1390 m long. Chester Langway Jr. participated in and was responsible for 
developing the SIPRE/CRREL field and laboratory ice core program from late 1956 to 1975;7 
later he occupied the same responsibilities at the University at Buffalo, New York state, from 
1975 to 1994. His tasks included scientific redistribution of ice core samples for the NSF to 
external investigators.8 The logistics and field support for Site 2 and Camp Century was 
provided by the US Army Corps of Engineers; later support fro GISP was arranged mainly by 
the Polar Ice Coring Office (PICO) that was managed by James Zumberge and Robert Rutford 
from the University of Nebraska-Lincoln, where Zumberge was serving as university president.9 
                         
4 It was removed in 1964, replaced by diesel generators. 
5 Dansk Uderigespolitisk Institut (1997), pp. 319 ff. Lolck (2004), pp. 92 ff. & Lolck (2006), pp. 37 ff.  
6 Dansgaard (2000), pp. 135-136; Dansgaard (2004), pp. 52-53; Lolck (2004), pp. 91-94, and Lolck (2006). 
7 Along the way he earned his PhD, with a dissertation, Stratigraphic Analysis of a Deep Ice Core from Greenland 
(Langway 1967).  
8 Until 1992 Langway was on contract with CRREL and authorized by the NSF he was the chief custodian for all 
deep ice cores recovered by the U.S. deep ice core drilling program - Langway (2006). 
9 Splettstoesser 1976; Langway (personal communication 18 Feb 2008) also recalls that in the early days PICO had 
no expertise in drilling technology. Hansen retired from CRREL and went to work for PICO half way through the 
GISP research program, around 1974-1975 and continued drill work he originated at CRREL. With GISP, the PICO 
team only handled the logistics, after GISP (about 1982, with the Filchner-Ronne Iceshelf Project – FRISP - in 
Antarctica) they began to work on ice sheet core drilling and logistics.  
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Afterwards early ice core analysts like Langway, Oeschger, Dansgaard and many others were 
kept busy for many years.10 In a recent richly illustrated historical overview of early ice core 
drillings from the IGY onward to GISP,11 Langway delineates the scientific importance of US 
work in intermediate depth ice core drilling during the IGY that opened up entirely new 
prospects for glaciologists. The Camp Century drilling is shown to represent a continuation of a 
scientific line of investigation from IGY onward through the international GISP research 
program from 1971-1981.  
 
Walter Wager the first journalist ever to visit Camp Century (on assignment for the Saturday 
Evening Post) in his detailed book of 1962, Camp Century. City under the Ice, hints at 
discussions relating to the Iceworm project but dismisses them as unrealistic. The book contains 
a map of the “city under the ice” showing the location of the drill tower but is silent on the deep 
drilling experiment going on underneath the snow cover.12 When Dansgaard first visited Camp 
Century in 1964 he was not invited to see the drill setup. A few years ago in an autobiographic 
account of his experiences and Danish contributions to the exploration of the Greenland ice cap 
Dansgaard remarked: “It is likely that Camp Century was meant as a test experiment for 
Iceworm. The nuclear reactor, the railway, and the heavy Swings, as well as the broad scientific 
studies of the properties of snow, firn and ice all involved problems that had to be solved before 
Iceworm could be realized.”13 As it turned out the project had to be abandoned as not suitable for 
the intended purposes. Tunnels in the firn were soon found to collapse and piping and iron rails 
twisted. The pressure of accumulating snow loads over Camp Century itself caused the ceilings 
and walls of rooms of the subsurface research station to deform and finally crash. By 1969 what 
was left of Camp Century was largely inaccessible, hidden under a vast mound of snow. Only the 
old bore hole, found again seventeen years later, remained scientifically interesting since it 
afforded an opportunity to measure ice movements at various depths.14 However it was not until 
1997, when the Institute of Danish Foreign Policy published an 1100 page historical report in 
which the secret of the original military plan and the broader perspective  (the Iceworm scheme) 
that was part of the scene of the first deep ice core drilling site were officially affirmed.15 
                         
10 See Langway (2008) and Oeschger and Langway (1989). Dansgaard and his team in Copenhagen used their mass 
spectography laboratory to measure oxygen isotope ratios on thousands of samples from the Camp Century core and 
after that more on the Byrd station core. 
11 Langway’s (2008) overview reviews ice core drillings during the IGY at Site 2, Greenland and in Antarctica, 
1956-1959; and Camp Century, Greenland, and Byrd Station, Antarctica, in 1960-1968, over to GISP, in Greenland 
1971-1978.  
12 Wager (1962), see especially the third photograph after p. 22. 
13 Dansgaard (2004), p. 52. ”Swings” are long trains of big wagons and sledges linked together and pulled by 
enormous tractors; they were used to transport equipment, fuel, building material and people slowly across the ice 
sheet from Thule. Later they were replaced by the large Hercules C-130 aircraft as the nucleus of logistics in both 
Arctic and Antarctic.   
14 In 1986, 1988 and again in 1992 the old drilling site, by then deep under the snow, was revisited. In the latter year 
the temperature and geometry of the old bore hole was measured down to 30 m above the bedrock (Dansgaard 2004: 
60-63).  
15 Dansk Uderigespolitisk Institut (1997), pp. 319 ff.; Lolck, 2004: 92 ff. & Lolck (2006), pp. 73 ff.  
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Although opinions differ regarding the role of the Cold War as a context,16 everyone concerned 
agrees that the Camp Century effort had a significant impact on international glaciology.17 
CRREL pioneered important developments in ice core drilling technology. Equally important 
was the cooperation that developed with European scientists, around the mid-1960s onward, 
particularly with teams at the universities of Copenhagen and Bern. CRREL continued SIPRE’s 
custom of seeking available and experienced theoretical and laboratory oriented foreign 
scientists preferentially with background in snow and ice research who could make contributions 
to the study and analysis of the paleo-environmental records in ice core research.18 An early 
example was Valter Schytt the Swedish glaciologist at Stockholm University who had drilled 
and interpreted a 100 meter deep core already in 1950/51 during the Norwegian-British-Swedish 
Expedition to Maudheim, Antarctica.19 Schytt spent some field time on contract with SIPRE 
studying the sloping edge of the ice sheet near Thule.20 Another, of course, was Willi Dansgaard 
who in 1960 together with colleagues published a paper that drew international attention; it 
appeared in Nature on the topic of oxygen isotopes.21  
 
Dansgaard had developed an expertise in isotope-meteorology, separating heavy water molecule 
components from more commonly occurring lighter ones in water samples and by extension 
from icebergs calved from glaciers in Greenland. It is a technique applicable to ice cores in order 
to determine changes in 2H O18 concentrations as a proxy for past changes of temperature far into 
the past. Dansgaard’s interest in extending his analytical technique to ancient ice, and thus the 
ice sheet, was an idea that provided a platform for cooperation. In his recent historical account 
Chester Langway observes how “Dansgaard’s laboratory, coupled with the technical ingenuity of 
Sigfús Johnsen and Niels Gundestrup, was capable of automatically measuring 250 melted ice 
core samples for O18/O16 ratios – a remarkable feat then and now.”22 Hans Oeschger of the 
Physics Department of the University of Bern in Switzerland had already in 1962 become a 
                         
16 Langway (personal communication 18 Feb 2008) explains that the deep ice drilling had nothing to do with the 
Iceworm project and that Dansgaard’s “limitations” had nothing to do with secrecy. Camp Century’s military 
existence except as a drill site location, was unrelated and had nothing to do with the drilling. Scientists were lucky 
to work there, with all the established support facilities available to the deep drilling research project. 
17 Langway (2006). 
18 Langway (personal communication 18 Feb. 2008) recalls how Bader (see above) because of his deep interest in 
basic research and his earlier background in Swiss glacier studies and experience in ice core drilling in Alaska he 
sought to advance the field in the U.S. Having made an evaluation of the limited knowledge available in the US at 
that time of the physical, meteorological and environmental conditions in the high north he made a point of 
recruiting consultants and hiring foreign research (on contract or actually employed) on a world-wide basis. Thus he 
was able to draw researchers from Argentina, Greece, Germany, England, Switzerland and more later. Langway 
himself followed the same policy of locating the best US or foreign researchers for laboratory analyses, noting that 
Dansgaard and Oeschger were two of at least 29 such persons (19 in the US and 9 in Europe/Asia) - cf. Langway 
(2008), p. 24.  
19 Schytt (1958). 
20 Schytt (1955). Schytt was at the time working out of the Geography Department at Northwestern University, 
Evanston Illinois. where he was a guest researcher on contract with SIPRE.  
21 Dansgaard et al. (1960).; a much earlier paper (in Tellus) on the analysis of stable oxygen isotopes in precipitation 
and relating their concentrations to cloud temperatures was path-breaking in this line of research and is still cited in 
the literature – see Dansgaard (1953).; Tellus  was at the time a fairly new journal edited by Bert Bolin of the 
Meteorological Institute at Stockholm University.  
22 Langway (2008), p. 25. 
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primary collaborator in the CRREL ice core program. He ran an internationally recognized low-
level carbon dating laboratory that was one of the first to develop techniques for extracting 
atmospheric gases entrapped in polar ice cores to measure the variability of CO2 concentration 
levels as a function of depth and age of the ice of the core.  
 
Apart from nascent collaboration another lasting effect of CRREL’s activities in Greenland was 
the development of a unique snow/ice property field-study kit for international use, helping to 
standardize measurement procedures. Many young scientists, both Americans and Europeans, 
were drawn into glaciology thanks to a tradition of research training schools and seminars begun 
by SIPRE before the IGY.23 Expertise in drilling technology and logistics, as already mentioned, 
was developed by PICO (see above). 
 
Independent European Interests and Eforts  
 
Europeans also had their own scientific heritage to build upon. Scandinavian but also German 
and British researchers had worked in Greenland during various expeditions in the early 20th 
century.24 The Expedition Polaires Francaises to Greenland with ice core recovery and J-C 
Heuberger’s depth-density curves in the mid-50s precipitated a lively discussion regarding 
interpretation of ice core results.25 Around the time of the IGY a large European expedition to 
Greenland was mounted, the Expédition Glaciologique International au Groenlande (EGIG), 
involving a consortium of five European countries, France, Germany, Switzerland, Austria and 
Denmark.26 Started in 1957 - at the initiative of Switzerland - this institutionalized effort ran 
until 1960 and then continued with several follow up projects thereafter. It was the first large-
scale European joint venture in the polar regions. Since it was largely inspired by the polar 
experiences of French researchers, particularly the explorer Paul-Emile Victor, France assumed a 
leading role. Denmark participated largely by virtue of its sovereignty over Greenland, which 
meant that Danish scientists had a statutory right, and therefore the opportunity, for access to 
collected materials. Thus Dansgaard was able to obtain samples from 10-20 meter deep snow 
and firn cores augered on a traverse west to east across the middle of Greenland. The data 
obtained appeared to confirm a global warming tendency from 1920 to 1945.27 Within the EGIG 
Dansgaard also became intimately acquainted and with Hans Oerschger’s and Bernhard 
Stauffer’s work in Bern on the dating the age of old ice and developing analysis of CO2 contents 
over time of air bubbles in the ice.  
 
                         
23 In August 1956 Bader and others from SIPRE held a pre-IGY “Polar Glaciology Study Course” on the edge of the 
Greenland ice sheet to acquaint 17 international researchers with the snow-study kits (devised at SIPRE) before their 
departure for Antarctic research projects the following season; see Langway (2008), p. 8.  
24 J.P. Koch and Alfred Wegener 1912-1913 and Wegener 1929-1930, Ernst Sorge at station Eismitte 1930-1931, 
and the Oxford University Greenland Expedition 1938; H. W:son Ahlmann’s expedition to Nordaustlandet, Svalbard 
1931, with snow pit studies, and his next expedition to Spitsbergen together with H.U. Sverdrup to study ice layer 
formation were also a significant scientific background factor – for an overview see Schytt (1958), pp. 15-16.  
25 Heuberger (1954), and Schytt (1958), pp. 123-125. 
26 Fleischmann (2005), pp. 51-52; Dansgaard (2004), pp. 30-32. 
27 Dansgaard (2004), p. 36. 
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In the scientific context at hand isotope analysis of the Camp Century core by Dansgaard’s group 
in Copenhagen with the first reconstruction of temperature variations in Greenland back 120,000 
years fired the imagination.28  Results published in a couple of papers made a big stir. First 
Dansgaard together with Chester Langway Jr., who was responsible for all ice cores recovered 
by SIPRE and CRREL, presented a preliminary picture at a symposium arranged by CRREL, in 
Hanover, New Hampshire, in September 1968, the International Symposium on Antarctic 
Glaciological Exploration (ISAGE). The name of the symposium indicates the other context 
where new efforts rapidly developed at that time as glaciologists also increased Antarctic 
endeavors. 
 
In May 1969 the US, USSR, Australia and France joined together in the International Antarctic 
Glaciological Programme (IAGP, with the UK joining 1972), focusing on East Antarctica, e.g., 
the Vostok ice dome.29 In 1970 an ad hoc group led by J.H. Zumberge within SCAR set up the 
Ross Ice Shelf Project (RISP), and later a Filchner-Ronne Ice Shelf Project (FRISP) was set up, 
involving Germany, UK, USSR and USA. A further project, Glaciology of the Antarctic 
Peninsula (GAP) involving the UK, Argentina, Chile and the USA later emerged in 1973 out of a 
symposium at the Scott Polar Research Institute (SPR) in Cambridge where airborne radio echo 
sounding and isotope analysis of ice cores were discussed. Throughout there were significant 
efforts to standardize methods in glaciology, with the IAGP producing comprehensive 
standardization guidelines endorsed by SCAR in 1972: measurement methods along traverse 
lines, geophysical measurements, i.e., radar echo surveying, seismic refraction profiles, magnetic 
profiling, physical and chemical properties of ice, analysis of traces of radioactivity from atomic 
bomb tests on other parts of the globe, etc. Although SCAR was largely an old-boys network that 
did not meet all that often, its role in the landscape of international scientific NGOs was 
authoritative. Its task was, apart from the hybrid scientific one of science advice to the Antarctic 
Treaty Organization, to “coordinate” Antarctic research by reviewing plans and cheering on 
initiatives of individual member countries. It served as an important platform for members of 
various informal and formal networks (like the SCAR glaciology work group)30 to meet and 
keep in touch. The impetus behind many glaciological ventures, as already noted, however lay 
elsewhere. 
 
Before returning to the chronological chain of events in Greenland it is relevant at this point to 
first consider the motives for a pan-European project in Antarctica that emerged in the early 
1970s, and to consider its failure because these are also relevant factors in the vision of EPICA 
that matured in Greenland about fifteen years later. 
 
Motives for a European Antarctic Project (EAP) 
 
Extensive radio-echoing surveying took place in Antarctica over a period of 12 successive years 
(1967-1979). First out were researchers at the Scott Polar Research Institute (SPRI), Cambridge, 
                         
28 Dansgaard et al. (1968), pp. 93-94; and Dansgaard et al. (1969).  
29 See further Elzinga (forthcoming) for more detail on SCAR’s role and the EAP. 
30It is interesting to note that Langway was the first Convener of the glaciology group in pre-1968. 
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who on the basis of genial British technical and scientific expertise, successful diplomacy, NSF 
funding from Washington and US naval fleet air arm logistical support for airborne glaciology 
were able to develop an extensive program that eventually came to provide 40% of our 
knowledge of the Antarctic ice sheet.31 It was mostly concentrated to the Antarctic Peninsula and 
aerial sorties from British and American research stations on the continent, but very little to 
cover the vast expanse of Dronning Maud Land. In the case of the latter area Belgian and Soviet 
airborne “radioglaciology” surveys did occur, but these were much more limited and 
technologically less successful. Australian efforts were also afoot but these were similarly 
limited and did not extend into DML.  
 
The Belgian case is a telling example of the significance of geopolitics and the right alliances, or 
the lack thereof. During the austral summer season 1969/70 a Belgian research team in 
Antarctica did some fieldwork in western DML.32 A commercially available prototype ice-radar 
instrument had been purchased and mounted on a ski-equipped Otter plane. The equipment had 
been tested in Norway, and the Belgians piggy-backed on the South African expedition to get 
carried by ship from Cape Town to DML where the South Africans had their SANAE base not 
far from a Norwegian summer station. The collaboration with the South Africans permitted the 
Belgian team (led by Tony van Autenboer) to make maps of ice-sheet thickness and subglacial 
reliefs in the region, with good results. The next austral summer season the radioglaciological 
survey was to continue, at least that was the intention. Unfortunately a rough landing in poor 
visibility caused the strut of one ski of the Otter to pierce the radio equipment and a reservoir of 
hydraulic oil. The fire that resulted destroyed the plane, including the RES equipment.  
 
In the meantime back in Belgium, due to political opposition to the South African apartheid 
regime, officials decided to stop further research collaboration with SANAE. Given this situation 
a new urgency attended a proposal by Belgian scientists upon their return from Antarctica in 
1970. The proposal involved the setting up of a glaciologically focused project on the basis of 
broad European cooperation (involving 8 nations) under the auspices of the Council of Europe 
(Strasbourg). A series of 16 meetings were held (1970-1975) in various European cities, 
gathering researchers in order to develop a plan for what was called the “European Antarctic 
Project” (EAP).33  
 
The plan, worked out 1971/72 was detailed and of good scientific quality. Its centerpiece was 
deep ice core drilling in a spot not so far from the present Dome Fuji where the Japanese are 
operating today. Envisioned also was a series of traverses with snow pits and shallow drilling 
into the ice sheet along the routes, as well as airborne radio echo surveying to extend the Belgian 
results. The entry point was to be near the Soviet Novolazerevskaya station using a ski-equipped 
Hercules plane. Smaller planes were to provide support to the various parties in the field. The 
plan was particularly attractive because IGY traverses had hardly touched DML. Two of SCAR’s 
working groups reviewed the plan. Praise was received from the glaciology group and critique 
came from the geology group (for insufficient geophysical components). SCAR furthermore 
                         
31 Turchetti et al. (forthcoming). 
32 van Autenboer (2001). 
33 See Elzinga (forthcoming). 
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stated that if an EAP effort did develop, the non AT-nations that might participate should apply 
to become Consultative Parties to the Antarctic Treaty.34  
 
Failure of the EAP and Lessons Learned for the Future 
 
Smaller nations like Belgium, Norway and the Netherlands were interested in the EAP, as was 
France, but the UK fell away, preferring to put its eggs in an Anglo-American collaborative 
basket. France on the other hand was interested in expanding research activities in the Antarctic. 
Heavy investments with a traverse across “its” Terre Adélie territory in 1971/72 and the 
launching of a new research vessel, the Marion Dufresne to serve the area was probably a motive 
for Europeanization so as to share the burden of further costs in the future. Tripartite French-
Soviet-US collaboration in ice core drilling at Vostok in Antarctica also began in the early 1970s 
(the Vostok operations continued in a second phase in the 1980’s).35 West Germany (and to 
some extent Switzerland) in the early 1970’s was more interested in pursuing further 
collaboration along the lines of the EGIG on the Greenland ice sheet, which was geographically 
much closer, associated with the honorable tradition of Alfred Wegener (who perished in 
Greenland 1930), and where it was logistically possible to gain from the military presence of the 
US as well as the Danish connection and the type of expertise represented by Dansgaard and 
colleagues in Copenhagen.  
 
The cost of obtaining a Hercules plane and equipping it with skis for Antarctic work in any case 
turned out to be prohibitive. The combination of the steep cost of logistics, the differences in 
geopolitical agendas amongst European countries, particularly the negativism of the German 
delegate (who insisted on an expansion of activities on Greenland as an absolute first priority), 
and a failure to prepare the ground politically meant that the EAP never made it. The fact that the 
scientists involved did a poor job of anchoring the project at the political level was a useful 
negative lesson they made up for twenty years later in Brussels on the road to EPICA.  The EAP 
window of opportunity was essentially closed in 1974, and that was the end also of Belgian plans 
for joint efforts in radio echo sound (RES) surveying over significant areas of DML. The 
scientific interest was there, the technology was available, but politics closed a chapter on a plan 
that was not to be realized until the late-90s when Germany took the lead in the DML leg of 
EPICA. As already indicated, however, EPICA as a vision only gained its wings in the course of 
prior European experience on Greenland, particularly in the form of a project that came after 
Danish-Swiss-US collaboration in GISP, a topic to which I now return.  
 
 
 
 
                         
34 In practice however neither the AT (being outside the United Nations) nor SCAR today have the legal teeth to 
prevent any country from undertaking scientific research in Antarctica – however peer pressure for the most part 
does make for compliance.  
35 A considerable part of the logistical support for Vostok came from the US, with the NSF providing abundant US 
C-130 aircraft for early supply missions. During one flight out of Vostok there was a crash and loss of a C-130 
aircraft during the early drilling phase (Langway, personal communication 20 April 2008). 
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Stepping up American-European Collaboration in Greenland 
 
Soon after Hansen’s drill had penetrated to bedrock at Camp Century (1390 m.) in 1966, it was 
taken to Byrd station in Antarctica.36 This went back to earlier US identification and 
establishment of Antarctica as an important polar core drilling location in 1955. At the Byrd 
station the drill set a new record in 1968, going down to bedrock at 2164 m. (see map in 
Appendix). But there it got stuck due to freezing of melt-water at the bottom of the drill hole and 
had to be left there. The cost of constructing a new drill was estimated to be in the order of 2 
million US dollars, so that option was not immediately pursued. The recovery of a long core at 
Byrd Station provided the planned comparisons of obtaining climate records from both 
hemispheres, furthering a bi-polar perspective on global climate change. However the loss of the 
heavy-duty drill delayed further progress in deep ice coring for more than a decade.37 This was 
most immediately evident in Greenland where plans had been developed for joint ventures in 
deep drilling involving both US and European teams. 
 
An initial US-Danish-Swiss collaboration was established in Greenland around glaciological 
research started in the mid-1960s with a coordinated science study of the Camp Century ice core 
and progressed to planning together the Greenland Ice Sheet Project (GISP). Its purpose was to 
drill several intermediate depth, and three bedrock very deep ice cores. An airborne radio echo 
surveying of the ice sheet was conducted to assist in locating optimal drilling sites. Three 
preliminary 400 m shallow cores, surface geophysical studies, airborne depth soundings and 
numerous 100 m cores and pit studies were made or conducted and data analyzed during the 
period 1971-1978. Radar surveys of the topography utilized the remote sensing capability for ice 
sheet soundings developed at the Danish Technical University (DTU) at Copenhagen by Preben 
Gudmansen and his team. With a good map of the subsurface topology of the ice sheet in hand 
the Danes in particular were keen to move onto the highest part of the ice cap somewhere near 
Summit in the middle of central Greenland. Frustrations developed as further work was 
contingent on US Air Force support and anxiety at the NSF in Washington regarding costly 
budgets and some amount of uncertainty regarding the outcome. In the end logistics determinants 
dominated over scientific criteria. Several new hitches attended efforts to devise new drilling 
equipment together with the vast costs involved in the logistics of such an operation led the NSF 
Division of Polar Programs (DPP) to force the consortium to settle on a site of convenience, next 
door to the American DEW line radar station Dye 3, a six story high 7000 ton steel construction 
on adjustable stilts that had been completed in 1960.38  There one had the advantage of ready 
access with routine flights by US Air Force C-130 supply planes, as well as housing facilities 
and the use of a mechanical workshop for repairs and servicing of the drill.  
 
Alongside Dansgaard, a person who played a key role in GISP, making the logistics function and 
seeing to it that analysts got deep ice cores for their science, was Niels Gundestrup of the 
Oerstedt laboratory at the University of Copenhagen. His dynamic personality, innovative ideas 
and high visibility helped shape the creative Danish glaciological group, making it an attractive 
                         
36 Gow (1970); Langway (2008), p. 23; Dansgaard (2004), p. 63. 
37 Dansgaard (2004), p. 63. 
38 Dansgaard (2004), p. 64 ff.; the USAF did not abandon Dye 3 until 1990. 
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partner for financially better endowed institutions in the US, Europe and Japan. He was initially 
an electronic engineer working in Preben Gudmansen’s laboratory on the development of ice 
radar instruments at DTU, and later in the early 1970s worked on automating the mass 
spectrometer at the University of Copenhagen. After he was recruited as electronic technician to 
the glaciology group he built the electronic parts of the Danish Shallow Drill as well as of the 
ISTUK drill while Sigfús Johnsen elaborated the mechanics. The drill was called ISTUK, a name 
that combines the Danish word for ice (“IS”) with the Greenlandic word for spear, awl or drill 
(“TUK”).39 It built on experience and ideas gained in connection with the first shallow fast light-
weight electromechanical core drill in 1974-1975. When Lyle Hansen’s 1977 test at Dye 2 of a 
new wireline system intended for the GISP deep drilling at Dye 3 partly failed it was Johnsen 
and Gundestrup that took on the challenge to construct a new deep drill.40 The Danish 
electromechanical design was thus extended and a Swiss drill head incorporated. Henri Rufli at 
the Physics Department of the University of Bern constructed the drill head, cutters and shoes for 
this new lighter technology that emerged in broad consultation within the network centered in 
Copenhagen. Johnsen essentially took over Lyle Hansen’s role in GISP. Originally from Iceland 
but now with the Ice and Climate Group in Copenhagen, Johnsen recalls how Gundestrup “was 
the master behind the electronic parts of the drills besides being our logistic expert.”41  
 
The ISTUK drill system was tested in the CRREL ice well at Hanover, NH in 1978.42 For 
Dansgaard and his colleagues in Copenhagen the exercise proved to be an entirely new field of 
endeavour since they initially had no hands on experience neither in constructing a deep coring 
drill nor in the actual drilling operation. However the venture was successful, in the long run 
giving the Europeans a greater degree of independence.  Bedrock core drilling at Dye 3, 
Greenland, began July 1979 with Niels Gundestrup and especially Sigfús Johnsen as primary 
drillers.43 Bottom ice was reached at 2037 m in August 1981. After four seasons bedrock was 
reached, yielding a core more than 2 km long, providing important new data to compare with the 
Camp Century core results. An under-the-snow research laboratory was used on site to catalogue 
the cores and data on physical, mechanical and optical properties. A new electrical conductivity 
method (ECM) invented by Claus Hammer of the Copenhagen University glaciology group was 
used to continuously measure micro-particle concentrations and eruptive volcanic-acid horizons, 
an invaluable method for precise determination of the time scale for the Dye 3 core.44 Initial 
results could already be presented less than one year after completion of the drilling.45 The next 
plan of the GISP consortium was to proceed to Summit to recover an even longer ice core from 
an optimum site. However this met many new difficulties that in the end led to a breakdown of 
formal cooperation and the Europeans and Americans (GRIP was after GISP) each doing their 
                         
39 Dansgaard (2004), p. 84f. (where one can also find pictures); and Lolck (2004), p. 137 ff. (also with pictures). 
40 Sigfús J. Johnsen (personal communication 22 January 2008). 
41 Ibid. 
42 It was this drill that was used to recover the Dye 3 core from 1978 to 1981 as well as the GRIP core from 1990 to 
1992. 
43 GISP concept and action plan was presented and reviewed by officials of NSF’s DPP already in the fall of 1970. 
The entire GISP operation thus stretched out over an 11-year field period; see Langway (2008), pp. 27-28. 
44 Langway (2008), p. 32; Dansgaard (2004), pp. 78-82. 
45 At a special GISP science symposium in Philadelphia, June 1982 (Langway et al. 1985).  
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own thing. Consequently by 1990 there were two rival deep coring projects in the Summit area 
28 km apart in central Greenland. 
  
The Culmination of the American-European Joint Effort in Greenland 
 
After GISP views of US and European scientists differed regarding how to continue after its 
completion. Two opposing concepts of how to organize further deep core drilling on Greenland; 
this combined with changes in the directorship at the NSF Division of Polar programs in 1983 
that seriously complicated matters. At the highest political level the changes coincidentally 
followed on the heels of Ronald Reagan’s victory in the presidential elections. The new Reagan 
Administration was very concerned about the threat to American interests posed by the Soviet 
Union. National security thus became a major issue (albeit not for the drilling project). The most 
dramatic manifestation of this was the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), popularly known as 
Star Wars, introduced in 1983, a mega-scale military project for setting up an anti-missile 
defense system on platforms orbiting around the Earth. The spending by the fiscal year 1987 was 
already in the order of 3.5 US billion dollars within an overall anticipated spending of 30 billion 
dollars 1985-1993 when a decision for deployment had to be in hand.46 5% of the Star Wars 
budget was for “mission oriented basic research” in universities and small business firms. In 
Europe the SDI program was seen as a covert industrial policy program, prompting Mitterand in 
France to launch his proposal for a European Eureka program, a civilian IT-oriented program for 
civil and industrial high tech development than in part covered the same areas of technology and 
science investments found in SDI. The motivation for the French initiative was SDI itself, which 
was understood as a threat, creating a potential for a widening technological gap between Europe 
and the US. Although these developments did not directly affect the drilling project, indirectly 
however they may have created a political situation in Europe that was more conducive than 
before when it came to independent action and research funding at a supra-national level even in 
the field at hand. Within the US itself SDI evoked strong opposition at various universities, and 
in some cases a bit of mistrust and cynicism. Leading research administrators were coming out 
saying, “people go where the bucks are”.47 
 
The experience of leading European researchers is that animosity did not spill over into the 
glaciological community.48  As long as Edward Todd was director of the Division of Polar 
Programs (DPP) and Duwayne Andersson, DDP was Chief Scientist at the NSF in Washington 
relations with foreign scientists like Willi Dansgaard ran smoothly. However, in late 1984 a new 
director came in,49 leading to some reshuffling and sharpened controls. Dansgaard recalls how 
the “new director of NSF-DPP felt that the U.S.A. had gained too little from Dye 3. He claimed 
cryptically that ‘the scientific community in the States is not ready for a new deep drilling’, 
which had to await ‘a series of ramp-up projects with the aim of defining exactly where to drill’. 
Hans Oeschger expressed concern that ‘ramp-up projects’ could very well turn out to be ‘ramp-
down projects’, since the present experienced staff might leave for other tasks, if the big one 
                         
46 Aviation Week and Space Technology, April 13, 1987. 
47 James Ionson, cited in Physics and Society, Vol. 15, No. 2 (April 1986), p. 3.   
48 Bernhard Stauffer, personal communication 25 January 2008. 
49 Peter Wilkniss, director of DPP, 1984-1993. 
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faded out of sight. I claimed that the radar survey and the shallow intermediate drillings had 
already defined the best locality, Summit, with sufficient accuracy. Furthermore we had proven 
that ISTUK could do the job. However, the new DPP director created the myth that the Danes 
got ‘a free ride’. He asked for a review of direct Danish and Swiss financial contributions to 
GISP for comparison with the Americans, and did not accept ‘internal means’ being included, 
which simply revealed lack of knowledge about how things worked abroad.”50 In some circles 
the rumor emerged that earlier DPP officers allegedly had been passing CRREL money on to pay 
Danish salaries. They were said to be “laundering money” via NSF to the benefit of foreign 
researchers.51 The main question at issue here was not one of foreign policy, nor of animosity 
between American and European scientists, but rather a combination of two research policy 
factors. First of all, until the success of the Dye 3 deep drilling Chester Langway was in principle 
in the US more or less a one-laboratory endeavor working with European partners. As Bernhard 
Stauffer recalls, the success at Dye 3 made the front page of the New York Times and increasing 
numbers of scientists in the US became jealous and insisted they wanted to participate in a new 
deep drilling project. Chester Langway dropped out of preparations and the NSF/DPP was faced 
with orchestrating a much broader and less experienced American constituency of researchers, 
making it difficult to come to an agreement with the Europeans.      
 
The other problem that complicated the situation was the difference in accounting systems for 
R&D funding in the U.S. compared to that at most European universities. The system applied at 
the University of Copenhagen was one where the salaries for professors and lab technicians were 
absorbed in block grants and did not show in the budget of an ice drilling campaign in 
Greenland. In the U.S. on the other hand such costs were included in project budgets and there 
was a more complicated system of overheads. With Peter Wilkniss as new director at DPP the 
two different systems of R&D resource accounting came into open conflict with each other. 
Dansgaard was furthermore upset by the fact that in this connection the Danes were not given 
due credit for all the costs associated with the time used to design and construct the new drill, 
ISTUK, which finally did the job at Dye 3. Chester Langway’s reading of the situation was 
obviously quite different from Wilkniss’ at the DPP.52 He stated that in his view the Danes had 
certainly pulled their weight, not only in terms of costs but also by virtue of their superior 
scientific contributions in GISP. In an interview in 1992 he clarified how by 1981 two contrary 
conceptions of future work had emerged. “/The program was getting too big /and with/ so many 
people in the United States getting interested in ice cores…there was a necessity of getting more 
samples. The Europeans (and I agreed with them) were willing to go forward and drill where 
they are drilling now…. And interact with any American who had something to contribute, but 
not as a kind of training program….The Europeans didn’t need the support of the U.S. in terms 
                         
50 Dansgaard (2004), pp. 96-97. 
51 Anthony Gow in an interview with Brian Shoemaker 26 October 02, p. 80 of the transcript: “TG: Well they were 
laundering money from NSF actually, which is what actually happened, which is actually illegal. You can’t fund 
salaries to foreign researchers and this is what NSF was doing. BS: Is that right? Was this the Office /sic/ of Polar 
Programs? TG: Yeah, this was under Todd….the original GISP. They took money from CRREL budgets and gave it 
to the Danes and they were paying goddam salaries on it.” 
<https://kb.osu.edu/dspace/bitstream/1811/6520/1/Gow,AnthonyTranscript.pdf> Accessed 15/11/07. 
52 Compare, for example, Langway (2008), p. 25. 
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of science….There weren’t that many [American] people [to extract and study ice cores]  at that 
time.”53  
 
The Europeans wanted a slim and focused project up at Summit to rapidly obtain new results for 
comparative analysis of deep cores. The NSF on the other hand was under pressure to take into 
account a wide range of disciplinary interests and university researchers that wanted to obtain ice 
samples as well as use a new Greenland site as a training ground for young researchers. This 
meant a broad “democratic” program that would allow many more U.S. universities to get a 
piece of the future action. In all about 90 institutions were waiting in the wings hoping to 
participate (some15 projects were later funded under GISP2).54 Such a scenario called for a 
much heavier drill that would recover ice cores that were larger in diameter than those obtained 
by the Danish ISTUK, and it meant the decision process would take much longer. At DPP the 
presumption seems to have been that the Europeans would come around since they were in 
American hands after all when it came to logistic support. By the mid-80s however some senior 
researchers in the U.S. began to react, criticizing the DPP’s chauvinistic approach and the fact 
that the NSF and Wilkniss were dragging their feet.55  
 
New European Initiatives 
 
The third surface-to-bedrock ice core drilled on Greenland was the intermediate depth (324m) 
Renland peninsula core in 1988, the result of a joint Danish-Icelandic-Swedish effort. The ice 
core was transported to Copenhagen where laboratory analyses were done.56  The background 
                         
53 Chester Langway, in interview on 29 October 1992: <http://www.aip.org/history/sloan/icedrill/euro-
amer.htm#a4> Accessed 12/1/08. 
54 The Greenland Ice Sheet Project Two (GISP2) was carried out by scientists from: the U. S. Army Cold Regions 
Research and Engineering Laboratory in Hanover, NH, Carnegie Mellon University the Desert Research Institute in 
Reno, Nevada, The Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Ohio State University, Pennsylvania State University, 
the New York State Department of Health, the State University of New York at Albany, the State University of New 
York at Buffalo, Lamont-Doherty Geological Observatory of Columbia University, University of Arizona, 
University of Colorado, University of Miami, University of New Hampshire, University of Rhode Island, University 
of Washington, the U. S. Geological Survey in Tacoma, Washington, and the University of Wisconsin; GISP2 was 
funded by the United States National Science Foundation Division of Polar Programs as a part of the Arctic System 
Science Initiative 
(ARCSS). The University of New Hampshire coordinated GISP2 scientific activities. Logistical and drilling support 
was provided by the Polar Ice Coring Office (PICO) at the University of Alaska in Fairbanks. The 109th TAG Air 
National Guard, Schenectady, NY, and the U. S. Air Force Military Airlift Command from McGuire Air Force Base 
in New Jersey provide air transport. Support at Sondrestrom Air Base in Greenland is provide by the U.S. Air Force 
Space Command. 
55 Dansgaard (2000, p. 215) has argued that, “in American circles also there was dissatisfaction with Peter Wilkniss 
– some called him a catastrophe for American glaciology – but for one or another reason the Reagan Administration 
had honored him with an award for ‘excellent management’ (!), so he was difficult to topple from the throne (that 
happened only seven years later when he was kicked upwards /in the science-bureaucracy/)”. This perhaps 
speculative interpretation is challenged by some of the American researchers who were involved at the time (Chester 
Langway) and more archival studies in Washington are needed to grasp the context and detail of the situation 
1983/84, a task that is one of the focal points of Maiken Lolck’s further historiographical studies at the University of 
Aarhus in Denmark.  
56 Johnsen et al. (1992), Hansson (1994).  
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was as follows: after Dye 3 Danish and Icelandic researchers began, in 1985, a search for a 
shallow drill site where they might deploy the small fast flexible drill that had been developed 
halfway on the road to ISTUK.57 The idea was to launch a small-scale technical operation so that 
long-term paleo-climatic information might be gained at a modest cost, utilizing small ski-
equipped airplanes or helicopters. The site selected was a small isolated ice cap, only a few 
hundred meters thick on a high elevation plateau in Scoresbysund Fjord, East Greenland. After a 
couple of pre-site surveys (1985 and 1987) a small field party plus supplies were deposited on 
the Constable Pynt airstrip in 1988 by a chartered Royal Swedish Air Force C-130 Hercules 
aircraft. Thereafter a Greenlander Twin Otter took over to fly the party and equipment to a site 
near the summit of the Renland ice cap. Swedish radar echo equipment was used to map the 
bedrock topography. In about three weeks the whole surface-to-bedrock drilling operation was 
finished and everything was flown out again. The depth was more than twice the greatest depth 
previously reached by a shallow core drill. Despite its shortness (324 m) compared to deep cores, 
this ice core covers a full glacial cycle from Holocene into the previous Eem interglacial, giving 
a good δ18O profile and a record of aerosol composition that can be interpreted back to 120,000 
years BP, adding important new information to the discussion of past climate change and the 
Greenland coastal environment, a valuable complement to data later obtained in central 
Greenland. Among other it provided the first Northern Hemisphere record of methane-sulfanate 
and non-sea salt sulfate over a full glacial cycle.58 Further payoff from this joint Nordic effort 
was the reinforcement of Sweden’s revitalization in the early 1980s of its involvement in polar 
research. With the Renland operation Swedish researchers were drawn more tightly into an 
expanding European network, laying the groundwork for later participation in GRIP and 
EPICA.59   
 
Dansgaard and Oeschger in the meantime were also looking around for new partners in 
continental Europe. Oeschger had good contacts with Claude Lorius and his glaciological 
laboratory in Grenoble (France). Lorius expressed considerable interest and was important for 
the implementation of a new project in Greenland. Important too was the decision of Germany to 
become more active, with scientists at the Alfred Wegener Institute (AWI) gearing up to carry 
out the kind of analysis of physical and chemical properties of ice cores that researchers under 
Chester Langway conducted at the SUNY-Buffalo during GISP.60 Oeschger and Langway 
convened an international symposium in Dahlem, West Berlin (March 1988, sponsored by the 
city of Berlin). It was important for reviewing the then current state of the art regarding ice 
coring for paleoclimatology. The symposium brought together contributions on the way glaciers 
record environmental processes, and how to preserve such information, secondly, on how an ice 
core chronology can be established, thirdly, what anthropogenic impacts are recorded in glaciers 
                         
57 Johnsen et al. (1980). 
58 Hansson and  Saltzman (1993). 
59 For example Margareta Hansson (Stockholm University) who has been centrally involved in EPICA (both at 
Dome C and DML sites), participated in the field and developed her early expertise in laboratory analysis on the 
Renland core at the Geophysics Department of Copenhagen University and later utilized GRIP results in 
comparative studies and interpretation of material from several deep cores. Swedish revitalization of its polar 
research began in the Arctic with the Ymer-expedition led by Valter Schytt in 1980 –  Elzinga (2007), p. 143. 
60 Interview with Hans Oerter, AWI, Germany (Carsten Krueck, 28 October 1998, 13.00-15.00). 
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and, finally, a summary of what the long-term ice core record hitherto told about the global 
changes in the environment.61  Scientific opinion-building and lobbying paid off. In the Autumn 
of 1988 the ESF general assembly agreed to fund the European Glaciological Programme.  Field 
work under the auspices of GRIP began at the Summit Camp in 1989 with the erection of three 
dome-shaped buildings each two stories high. At the same time the GRIP Steering Committee 
(chaired by Bernhard Stauffer) applied for financial support from the EU (under the EPOCH 
programme) to cover 20% of the total costs, which was granted, making it possible for the 
project to proceed without delay.62 ESF and EU backing also meant that Belgium, Italy and the 
UK as well as Iceland came on board.    
 
Prior to this on the other side of the Atlantic Wallace Broecker, a leading American 
oceanographer, apparently fed up with the NSF/DPP’s inertia took matters into his own hands 
and organized a two-day ad hoc meeting in Boston (January 1987) to see if earlier plans for 
European-US collaboration might be resurrected, but by then it was too late.63 Dansgaard felt 
that too much time had already had been lost and surprised several American colleagues by 
suggesting that each party should drill their own core, and so it was decided. In the end it turned 
out to be fortuitous, facilitating comparison between two sites in Central Greenland not far apart 
from each other.   
 
A Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) was suggested to regulate exchange between the two 
operations, including cost sharing of Hercules transport to Sdr. Strømfjord, Greenland on the 
basis of separate mission tasking and counting actual flight coordinated by PICO. The first draft 
of the MOU reflected Wilkniss’ demand for a high degree of integration of the two projects, an 
approach rejected by the Europeans. They questioned the appropriateness of a formally 
cooperative agreement.64  The differences were later ironed out at a new meeting (October 1988) 
where a looser and more flexible agreement was reached with side-letters to coordinate 
scheduling of logistics needs, compatibility and sharing of certain resources, including 
paramedic services, in the field.65      
 
In the long run the difficulties that hindered further US-European collaboration within a single 
ice core-drilling project in Greenland were turned to advantage. European scientists found they 
did not have to rely primarily on the good will of the NSF in Washington if they wanted to 
realize their own plans. They got wind under their wings to go it alone. GISP had shown that 
they could develop their own drilling technology and that their scientific capabilities in some 
respects outmatched those of their American colleagues. Thus they pooled their resources in an 
all-European consortium instead in order to recover a deep ice core in central Greenland. In the 
                         
61 Oeschger and Langway (1989). 
62 Bernhard Stauffer, “Introduction” in ESF (1996), pp. 3-5. This was affiliated with EPOCH = European 
Programme on Climatology and Natural Hazard. 
63 Wallace Broecker, from Interview on 2 July 1992: http://www.aip.org/history/sloan/icedrill/gisp2.htm. Accessed 
13/1/08. 
64 This was at a meeting in Copenhagen early 1988, see Herman Zimmerman’s letter to Peter Wilkniss:  
<http:www.aip.org/history/sloan/icedrill/euro-amer.htm#a4>. Accessed 13 January 2008. 
65 At a meeting in Grenoble October 1988: see foregoing note. 
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course of what turned out to be the successful Greenland Ice Core Project (GRIP) the vision of a 
joint all-European effort in Antarctica (a realization of the old idea of the EAP – see above) also 
began to materialize.  
 
Two Parallel Projects, GRIP and GISP2 
 
The Europeans started drilling early 1989 under the auspices of a new, this time all-European 
consortium consisting of eight countries, with Denmark (carrying 25% of the cost), Switzerland 
(23%), France (14%) and Germany (14%) taking the lead. Bernhard Stauffer from Bern was 
Chairman of the project. The Danes, apart from making the project politically possible (having 
jurisdiction over Greenland), provided the drilling expertise; the director of operations was Niels 
Gundestrup who had contributed to developing ice radar and the electronics for the 
electromechanical Danish ISTUK drill.66 The British Antarctic Survey supplied one of its Twin 
Otter aircraft with pilot and mechanic for four field seasons.   
 
The ESF-associated program was simply called the Greenland Ice Core Project (GRIP). The fact 
that the GRIP proposal was introduced to the European Commission (EC) in Brussels in the 
name of the ESF was unusual, but it helped avoid the kind of political rivalry that had torpedoed 
the EAP back in the early 1970’s. Within the ESF an informal polar network that eventually 
emerged had taken on a more definite form as the ESF Network on Polar Science in 1986. Apart 
from GRIP it also spawned two other major co-operative projects for which funds were provided 
by the EC.67 Thus the groundwork was established for channels and a common meeting ground 
between science and politics, more concretely in the establishment of a joint EC-ESF scientific 
advisory committee on ocean and polar sciences, ECOPS.  Therewith the EU emerged onto the 
scene as an active player.  
 
The US, with funding from the NSF, started drilling their parallel project GISP2 half a year after 
GRIP. GRIP reached bedrock August 1992, recovering a core of 3028.8 meters, while GISP2 hit 
bedrock July 1993 at 3054.44 meters, thus lagging behind by roughly a year but beating the 
competitive project in terms of core length. Thence two cores were available for analysis going 
                         
66 Principal Investigators were as follows: Denmark – W. Dansgaard, C. Hammer, H.B. Clausen and N. Gundestrup; 
Switzerland – H. Oeschger and B. Stauffer, Physikalische Institut, Universität Bern, Bern; France – C. Lorius, R. & 
Delmas of the Laboratoire de Glaciologie et Géophysique de l’Environment, St. Martin-d’Hères and J. Jouzel, 
Laboratoire de Modélisation de Climat et de l’Environment, CEA/Saclay, Gif-sur-Yvette; Germany – H. Miller, 
AWI, Bremerhaven; UK – D. Peel, British Antarctic Survey, Cambridge; Itally – G. Orombelli, Dip. Scienze 
dell’Ambiente del Territorio, Milan; Iceland – S. J. Johnsen, Department of Geophysics, University of Iceland, 
Reykjavik; Belgium – R. Souchez, Dépt. Des Sciences de la Terre et de l’Environment, Université Libre de 
Bruxelles, Brussels. 
67 The European Polarstern Study (EPOS) in the Wedell Sea 1988/89 involving three expeditions carrying altogether 
150 scientists from 11 countries in West and Central Europe, and the Polar North Atlantic Margin, Late Cenozoic 
Evolution (PONAM) with Norway, Sweden and Germany as the most active partners. Information from interview 
with Professor Gotthilf Hempel, Centre for Marine Tropical Ecology (ZMT), University of Bremen, Germany 
(Carsten 
Krueck, 18/9/98); and interview with Dr. Carol A. Williams (Secretary to the EMaPS Polar Board) and Dr. Annette 
Moth Wiklund (Senior Scientific Secretary for Life and Environmental Sciences), both at the European Science 
Foundation, Strasbourg, France (Carsten Krueck, 16/12/98) 
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back 250,000 years. There was excellent agreement between the two records for the first 90,000 
years BP; after that, and especially beyond 100,000 years BP there was discrepancy attributed to 
stratigraphic disturbances on one or both cores. The GISP2 core in particular showed strong 
indications of rheological disturbances close to bedrock. Both projects ended officially 1995 
whence a new Danish led European consortium moved north and west of the old site on a new 
project, North-GRIP (1999-2003) setting a new record with the recovery of a 3930 meter long 
core. In terms of logistics Gundestrup was again the driving force in the field, both in GRIP and 
the NGRIP operation. When the EPICA and NGRIP projects came up Johnsen led the design of 
a new drill (Hans Tausen/NGRIP/EPICA drill) together with Steffen Bo Hansen; it is more 
suitable for cold Antarctic temperatures than the intricately designed ISTUK drill. When EPICA 
was initiated the Danish group was assigned the task of providing the drilling capacity for the 
project. The drill that was evolved now exists in several copies (long and short) and has also 
been used to recover the British drilled Berkner Island core and the Italian drilled Talos Dome 
core.68 With Gundestrup chairing the EPICA drilling group the Danes naturally helped train most 
of the drillers that used the same drill design to recover the EPICA deep cores at Dome C and the 
DML Kohnen station. 
 
Throughout the decade, despite the demise of formalized collaboration in the earlier US-
European consortium, the European and American drilling teams at their two different sites by 
Summit enjoyed good relations with each other. Also, as it turned out two parallel ice cores so 
close to each other in the end facilitated better mutual calibration of chronologies and 
temperature curves. An important outcome was the identification of the Dansgaard-Oeschger 
events, rapid climate fluctuations during and at the end of the last ice age. These events were 
confirmed by a re-examination in the original GISP Dye 3 and Camp Century cores where they 
had been visible but not yet interpreted. This in turn prompted a re-examination also of the 
Vostok core taken in Antarctica. 
 
Scientific and Political Groundwork for EPICA 
 
In Antarctica Soviet-French collaboration that started in the early 1970’s at Vostok (see above) 
proceeded in two phases, a first one 1970-1974, when a core of 950 meters was recovered, and a 
second one 1982-1983, when a section going from 950-2083 meters in depth was taken.69 
Vostok drilling finished in 1988 when the drillers took the last part of a further section down to 
3623 meters. Ice core isotope analysis in this case was largely carried out at Claude Lorius’ 
glaciology and geophysics laboratory in Grenoble leading to the famous paper in 1985 by Lorius 
and colleagues on a climate record in Antarctica going back 150,000 years.70 In subsequent 
publications the analysis over then one climate cycle was confirmed and it was later pressed back 
to 420,000 years covering four glacial-interglacial cycles.71 The core provided the first really 
dramatic evidence of a variation in tandem of temperature and atmospheric carbon dioxide over 
                         
68 Johnsen et al., (forthcoming). 
69 Support came from the Arctic and Antarctic Institute of Leningrad, the Geographic Institute of Moscow, and the 
NSF in Washington. 
70 Lorius et al. (1985).  
71 Jouzel et al. (1987); Legrand et al. (1988).  
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this entire period. Here the work in Grenoble of Jean Robert Petit, first author on a now classical 
and highly cited paper was important.72 In addition, Jean Jouzel, originally a chemical engineer 
who started ice core research in the mid 1970s in close collaboration with Lorius, was 
instrumental at the climate-modeling laboratory in Saclay (France) in developing complex 
isotopic models.73 These were based on the use of models of general atmospheric circulation as 
well as their application in correctly interpreting the isotopic measurements obtained in polar ice. 
His analysis of the Vostok core helped make it a gold standard in the discussion of transitions 
between glacial and interglacial periods in the paleoclimate. Like Lorius he was also involved in 
Greenland where the GRIP and GISP2 cores similarly have given unprecedented detail of 
climate change over the past 100,000 years.  
 
Taken together the Antarctic and Greenland core results were found to coincide when it comes to 
abrupt warming events at least for the last 60,000 years. Such findings served as an alarm clock 
in an emerging debate on future climate warming. Sigfús Johnsen, a veteran of ice core drilling 
in Greenland since 1969 and analyst of stable oxygen isotope records, in a comment 2001 
summarizing findings from the GRIP core, emphasized how the ice cores “changed our image of 
climate…Before we had thought that climate needed 10,000 years to change. We found it could 
change in 10 to 20 years; it could switch from very cold to very warm. This shook everyone”.74 
 
The experience in ice core drilling accumulated by European scientists by the early 1990s 
warranted a return to the old idea of an all-European joint venture in Antarctica. The situation 
was completely different now compared to that in the early 1970s when the plan for an EAP had 
to be abandoned.  As Heinz Miller told it, a new Antarctic project “was already there in our 
heads before we started drilling in Greenland.”75 The scientific arguments for a major Antarctic 
ice coring programme were strong. To avoid the mistake made with the EAP in the early 1970s 
leading scientists worked hard to anchor the idea politically. A number of contemporary events 
converged to make it easier. Within the International Council of Scientific Unions (ICSU) the 
International Geosphere-Biosphere Programme (IGBP) was initiated in 1986, and soon identified 
as one of its themes, “documenting and predicting climate change”. 
 
Within the UN framework the idea of an Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) 
was implemented in 1988. European scientists were centrally involved in both of these 
developments. Paleoclimatology based on data from ice cores was important. GRIP (and Vostok) 
demonstrated that European expertise in ice core studies was excellent, logistics efficient and 
collaboration good. According to reliable assessments GRIP with its smaller drill and (4 inch) 
core gave a much better scientific payback per unit cost investment than the (6 inch) core 
                         
72 Petit et al. (1999).  
73 The Laboratoire des science du climat et de l’environment (LSCE) at Saclay is part of the CEA-complex; CEA 
stands for Commisariat à l’Energie Atomique. 
74 Jack Williams, “Greenland should hold answers to climate puzzles”, USA Today, 07/05/01; 
<http://www.ustoday.com.news/science/cold-science/greenland-2001/latest-reports.htm> Accessed 25/1/08; also see   
Johnsen, S. J., et al. Tellus (1992), B41, 452−468; Johnsen (1997).  
75 Interview with Prof. Heinz Miller, AWI, Germany (Carsten Krueck, 2/11/98) 
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brought up by the U.S. group with its larger and much heavier drill within GISP2.76 SCAR’s 
conference Antarctic Science – Global Concerns in Bremen 1991 helped bring polar researchers 
more closely into harmony with the international research programmes on global climate 
change.77 The linkages with pertinent international programmes helped the paleoclimatic 
community establish credentials when they made their case in their respective countries’ for a 
new collaborative ice coring effort on a grander scale. 
 
Generally, some form of institutionalization is invaluable for large-scale projects in order to gain 
network stability, ensuring better continuity over time. At the European level this occurred in the 
creation of the European Committee for Ocean and Polar Science (ECOPS) in 1990 as a liaison 
(existing for five years) between the ESF and the EC’s Directorate General XII (for Science) 
(EC/DG XII) constituted an ad hoc joint scientific advisory body at arms-length from politics.78 
Two important functions were served. First, as a hybrid forum of scientists-cum policy makers 
this became a vehicle for science diplomacy at national and intergovernmental levels. Secondly, 
the hybrid forum provided a neutral space where visions and project ideas could be articulated, 
tested and gain anchorage in the worlds of science and politics simultaneously, allowing for a co-
production of new scientific and political orders. ECOPS’s influence lay in suggesting and 
promoting Big Science projects. This was immensely helped by the fact that it was an ad hoc 
committee and had a very dynamic chairman, Gotthilf Hempel who knew how to cut red tape 
and lobby politicians. Being ad hoc, Hempel himself had the mandate to select the other nine 
members of the committee, thus circumventing the bureaucratic problems of appointing 
committee members via national representative bodies in different countries. ECOPS could 
operate quite freely and flexibly as a group of “wise men”. It acted top down in identifying 
themes and sketching possible approaches to large-scale European projects and then elicited 
bottom-up input from scientific communities by broad consultations through workshops to 
develop special programs and networks around them. The very first workshop (1990) related to 
the ECOPS Grand Challenges thrust was on Antarctic ice cores.79  
 
Still, EC politicians and bureaucrats were not immediately won over. In the very first round 
when a first phase for the European Project for Ice Coring in Antarctica (EPICA) was proposed 
                         
76 Interview with Professor Bernhard Stauffer, Climate and Environment Physics, Physics Institute, University of 
Bern, Bern, Switzerland (Aant Elzinga, 26/8/98); the assessment may be quantified by counting and comparing the 
number of quality scientific papers (and their impact factors) coming out of the two projects. 
77 Hempel (1994). An important outcome of the conference was creation of the Group of Specialists on Global 
Change and the Antarctic (GLOCHANT) which in turn spawned a long-term project with six core projects, one of 
them on paleo-environmental records from ice sheets and marine and land sediments. The idea behind GLOCHANT 
was articulated during deliberations at a SCAR-sponsored workshop that took place at the Alfred Wegener Institute 
in Bremerhaven, 18-21 September 1991. At that workshop a regional programme of global research in Antarctica 
was defined, listing priorities, ongoing and planned international projects and other needs. The programme was 
summarized in a document that was accepted in principle by delegates at the XXII SCAR Meeting during July 1992 
in San Carlos de Bariloche, Argentina – cf. SCAR (1993).  
78 Interview with Dr. Ibb Troen and Dr. Klaus Bruening, European Commission/Directorate-General XII, Brussels, 
Belgium (Carsten Krueck and Jutta Borchers, 9 June 1998). 
79 It was organized by Claude Lorius and held in Grenoble, France, 29-31 October 1990; Modelling of dynamics of 
large polar ice sheets was the name of another workshop, one organized by David Drewry and C. Doake in 
Cambridge, 29 April – 1 May 1991. 
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in January 1992 to the EC/DG XII, it was rejected. It was met with the argument that Europe is 
far away from and has nothing to do with Antarctica. Resistance hinged particularly on the 
extreme cost of the project, 8 million Ecu which at the time might have amounted to about 6 
million US dollars, which was a large chunk and would eat into the potential budgets of other 
areas of European science, for example oceanography where there were also plans for new 
projects. The oceanographic research community was older, better established and strong in 
Europe. Thus EPICA had quite a number of opponents and doubtful friends in the beginning, at 
least when it came to proceeding from vision to action.  
 
Hempel himself, being an ocean scientist, was at first not in favor of EPICA, but once he swung 
around he became a strong supporter. Although more or less neutral concerning the four 
suggested grand challenge projects his response to the bureaucratic inertia within the EU was 
important. Further lobbying occurred during the course of a symposium he organized in Obernai, 
France in October 1992, European Ocean and Polar Science. Here ECOPS met with about 50 
chief administrators and scientists of national funding bodies, and a new draft proposal for 
EPICA was also presented to the EC. The timing was good. It followed upon the UN conference 
in Rio that marked an important turning point at the political level. The idea of global change 
began to take hold of politicians and countries needed to show that they took it seriously. The 
GRIP results were coming in, research in Antarctica gained media coverage and it became clear 
that uncertainties pertaining to climate change might be reduced by further work on ice cores. 
EPICA promised a much longer time series than what was available from Greenland. A new 
deep core was needed because the old Vostok one had a different resolution, it was different and 
lower, making it risky business to compare with the Greenland ice cores. In fact two new 
Antarctic cores were projected, one from Dome C where the bottom ice would be very old, and 
one with a higher resolution and reflecting the influence of the Atlantic environment, obtainable 
in the Dronning Maud Land sector where snow accumulation is much higher than at Dome C.  
 
For the implementation of EPICA a conference (under the auspices of the European Science 
Foundation), Ice-Sheet-Climate Interaction in 1993 was very important, laying the groundwork 
for a breakthrough a year later in Bremen.80 
 
ECOPS continued to flesh out four major projects. When summarized at the Grand Challenge 
Conference 1994 (Bremen) organized by the Alfred Wegener Institute (AWI) EPICA stood out 
as an absolute winner, a model project, well anchored in relevant scientific communities and 
politically opportune for Europe on the road after Rio. The enthusiasm, scientific prowess, 
personal persistence and diplomatic skills of a few leading scientists had paid off: Claude Lorius, 
the eminent glaciologist of Antarctic Vostok-core fame, David Drewry, a leading personality at 
the British Antarctic Survey (BAS) and Gotthilf Hempel, then head of AWI, the man with 
political acumen. Resistance still came from the oceanographic community that had their own 
grand challenge project competing for extraordinary funding. Years of networking activities 
orchestrated by the troika however now revealed itself to have been instrumental in fostering the 
bottom-up process of enrollment through the earlier series of European workshops and 
                         
80 Bernhard Stauffer, personal communication 25 January 2008; Hempel (1996), pp. 9-24.  
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conferences. The relevant research communities stood sufficiently united, and policy support 
was forthcoming around a long-term commitment to deep coring in Antarctica. Coincidence with 
specific conjunctures in the upsurge of the global change issue together with integration with 
existing international research programmes, among other ones stemming from activities under 
the auspices of SCAR,81 helped the process. 
 
EPICA Established and Running 
 
In 1995 finally EPICA was established as a joint ESF-European Commission (EC) scientific 
program funded by the Commission and ten national agencies.82 Together with other initiatives it 
has propelled Europe into the position of a world leader in ice coring technology, research and 
analysis. During the past decade a multitude of publications have entered prestigious 
international journals, providing an increasingly rich picture of natural climate variations in 
Greenland and Antarctica, as well as intriguing linkages between the hemispheric records. Pilot 
drilling at Dome C (see map in Appendix below) started in the season of 1996/97 and after some 
technical setbacks and logistical difficulties came close to bedrock in January 2004 at 3260 
meters. Even though the core is shorter than the Vostok one, the annual layers of ice are thinner 
and therefore the climate record from Dome C is twice as long. In the Dronning Maud Land 
sector, after four years of pre-site surveys, deep drilling started in 2000 at what is now called the 
Kohnen station (Appendix), reaching a depth of 2565 meters six years later. This corresponds to 
over 220,000 years of high-resolution temperature and greenhouse gas variation, thereby adding 
detail to the “younger” record. At both sites cores have been obtained with two similar 
electromagnetic drills. Their design drives from the experience accumulated with the drill 
developed by Danish scientists and engineers in the earlier Greenland enterprise already 
described above. 
 
The ice core science and drilling efforts in Antarctica constitute a form of Big Science. More 
particularly they are a form of “distributive Big Science” different from the concentrated form of 
Big Science one usually associates with CERN or the European Southern Observatory (ESO). 
The following “Box” is intended in condensed form to highlight the division of scientific labour 
between countries in the EPICA effort.     
 
The distribution of expertise across countries that are joined in different ways to implement EPICA include 
Denmark (Copenhagen University: gas analysis, ice core dating and the temperature record), Switzerland 
(Physics Department of Berne University: sophisticated gas analysis, reconstructing the life cycle of a gas 
and its interaction with other gases, interpretation, drilling technology), France (Deuterium analysis, stable 
isotope analysis, chemical analysis for Dome C), Germany (physical properties, and developing chemical 
analysis, logistics DML), UK (glaciology, chemical measurements), Netherlands (meteorological aspects 
and laboratory analysis), Sweden (glaciology and laboratory analysis of atmospheric parameters of the ice).  
 
EPICA – a case of distributive Big Science 
                         
81 Cf., for example, SCAR (1993). 
82 The participating countries’ scientists publish under the collective name “EPICA Community”. The consortium 
countries are: Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, and the UK. 
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In the Dome C case the major players are France and Italy, at DML/Kohnen it is Germany that 
dominates and organizes the logistics. Currently both stations are central points in a couple of 
ongoing traverses that are part of an international program (ITASE)83 involving several nations 
during the Fourth International Polar Year (2007-2008) with the purpose of doing shallow and 
intermediate level drilling plus other activities along at least seven traverse lines, mostly across 
East Antarctica. Deep ice core drilling has become a mark of distinction signaling political 
power, logistical capacity and scientific prowess. Competition and cooperation include 
Europe/EPICA84, Japan/Dome Fuji (the second highest dome)85, and the U.S./Waiscore (see map 
in Appendix),86 in the front rank, while China has recently joined the club with a new initiative 
at Dome A (see map), a site at the highest elevation yet where it is expected that a deep core may 
press the paleo-climatological ice annals back over one million years.87   
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for-ice-coring-in-antarctica-epica-page-1/more-information.html#c2252. Accessed 16 January 2008 
85 http://www.nipr.ac.jp/~ipy/sympo/proc-files/46-Fujita.pdf Accessed 16 January 2008. 
86 http://waisdivide.unh.edu/ Accessed 16 January 2008. 
87 Jones (2007). 
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APPENDIX 
 
Map 1.  Greenland, the sites mentioned in the text (modified after Dansgaard, Frozen Annals 
2004: 69) 
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TOWARDS THE GREAT UNKNOWN: 
THE SOVIETS PREPARE FOR THEIR THRUST INTO THE ANTARCTIC INTERIOR 
 
Irina Gan 
 
Abstract 
 
National prestige and the desire to reap a rich scientific harvest were the forces driving both the 
Soviet and American expeditions in their quest to establish stations deep in the Antarctic interior 
in preparation for research to be carried out during the International Geophysical Year (IGY) of 
1957 – 1958. While American historians and expedition members have left a record of the 
American IGY exploits, little is known in the English speaking world of the men of the first 
Soviet Antarctic expedition who landed on the coast of the Antarctic continent in January 1956.  
They quickly built their main base, Mirny, and as a result gained a firm foothold from which to 
launch out into the icy interior towards the South Geomagnetic Pole and the Pole of 
Inaccessibility. This paper uses Russian sources to trace the preparatory steps taken by these 
pioneers in their attempt to reach and establish scientific bases in those remote locations. 
 
Introduction 
 
In the history of Antarctic exploration, the quest to reach the South Pole was a singularly potent 
force impelling individual explorers to undergo extreme privations, endure hardship and risk 
death for the honour of being the first to attain that almost mythical goal. ‘There was danger in it 
– and glory if the South Pole were reached. There was also a lot of scientific work to be 
accomplished... But even the most scholarly scientist could not resist the romance of the dream 
of reaching the South Pole, the uttermost part of the earth’.1  For some, like Robert F. Scott, it 
was the desire to ‘secure for the British nation the honour of that achievement’ as well as to 
‘bring back a rich harvest of scientific results’.2  For others, like Roald Amundsen, it was the 
aspiration to uphold his own prestige as a polar explorer3 and scientific investigator. This 
endeavour in the name of science and personal or national prestige is the leitmotif running 
through the history of Antarctic exploration (if one puts aside the specific commercial incentives 
of the sealers and whalers), starting from Cook’s second voyage through to the International 
Geophysical Year (IGY) of 1957 – 1958 when sixty seven nations of the world joined in a 
collaborative effort to study the globe with a special emphasis on Outer Space and the Antarctic. 
It was certainly manifest in the apparently somber scientific efforts of the IGY. In fact, it was a 
critical factor driving the programs of the two most powerful participants: the USA and the 
USSR, with their Cold War rivalries and competing political ideologies.  
 
While discussing the American IGY Antarctic program, the veteran American Polar explorer and 
Officer in charge of the US Antarctic Program Admiral Richard E. Byrd, who burned with ‘a 
fierce national pride’, stressed his belief that ‘[t]o put down a base at the Pole and keep men 
living there will tax all our ingenuity and will in itself be a great national achievement’.4  His 
                                                 
1 Bixby (1961: 7) 
2 Mountevans (1958: 1) 
3 Amundsen (1959: 50) 
4 Siple (1959: 16) 
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interest in the Antarctic went far beyond the scientific interests of the IGY: Byrd was intensely 
keen for the Americans to establish a research base on the Geographic South Pole because he 
wanted it said that ‘the US had done the impossible’.5  Notwithstanding Byrd’s desideratum, the 
scientists planning the American IGY program understood the immense difficulties involved in 
such a project and were not about to make a firm commitment to build a base on the South Pole 
without the full support of their government, which at that point demonstrated no particular 
interest in the idea.6  However, a speech delivered by the Soviet delegate, Vladimir Belousov, at 
the First Antarctic conference of the Comité Spécial de l’Année Géophysique Internationale 
(CSAGI), the international planning body for the IGY held in Paris on 6-10 July 19557, was a 
defining moment for both the American and the Soviet Antarctic program. The American 
scientist Paul Siple recalls that Belousov ‘dropped a bombshell’ when he stated that the Soviets 
were planning to erect a station at the Geographic South Pole. ‘[A]ll eyes turned to the 
Americans for argument’, but no argument ensued since ‘the American delegation realized that 
the attitude of the American Government had not changed essentially’ from its previous 
noncommittal stance.8  
 
It was left to the conference chairman, Georges Laclavère to relieve the tension by telling the 
Soviets that the conference had ‘accepted the offer of the US to erect and man a South Pole 
station’, although Siple points out that ‘we had not gone anywhere near that far, but now we 
were committed’.9  Siple seems unaware that, according to New York Times journalist Walter 
Sullivan, the White House ‘on the preceding March 28… had announced that there would be 
three American bases, including one at or near the South Pole’.10  Sullivan also differs from 
Siple in that he considers that everyone at the meeting ‘knew that this was where the US planned 
to go and suspected that Belousov knew it too. It looked as though Soviet – American rivalry… 
was now inevitable’.11  In order to deflect and guide this rivalry to the benefit of the international 
scientific program, Laclavére astutely recommended that the USSR consider an alternative site 
towards the centre of the continent (at the Pole of Inaccessibility) where no station has yet been 
proposed, and an intermediate station in the vicinity of the South Geomagnetic Pole. The 
question as to whether the Americans had already decided on a base at the Geographic South 
Pole or whether the Soviets knew about it if they had remains a moot point; what is obvious is 
that the Americans were now committed to the idea. Belousov did not insist on the South Pole, 
but promised to bring back to Moscow the alternative recommendations proposed at the 
conference.12  He was in no way confounded by Laclavère’s suggestion, although the proposal to 
build and man a station at the most inaccessible point not only of the Antarctic continent, but of 
the entire planet, was an even more “impossible” task than the American commitment to the 
Geographic South Pole.  
 
                                                 
5 Siple (1959: 16) 
6 Siple (1959: 98) 
7 Gan 2006, 2009 
8 Siple (1959: 99) 
9 ibid 
10 Sullivan (1961: 435 in Notes: Chapter 18, footnote 2) 
11 Sullivan (1961: 292) 
12 Sullivan (1961: 293) 
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When leaving the conference, Siple remarked that now there could be no backing away now 
from ‘doing the impossible’.13  This was also true for the Soviets, since many conference 
delegates considered their plans to be ‘in the realm of fantasy’.14  The chief of the Directorate of 
the Northern Sea Route (Glavsevmorput) Vasily Burhanov, who was one of the Soviet delegates 
at the Paris conference, recalled that a delegate from another nation showed him a map of 
Antarctica with the Soviet bases deleted. When Burhanov questioned his colleague as to why this 
was done, he was told that the harsh climatic conditions at the proposed sites could not support 
life. It was considered impossible for the USSR to establish bases in such a hostile 
environment.15  However, like the Americans, the Soviets also felt that there could be no backing 
away from “doing the impossible’; national pride served to strengthen their resolve to embark on 
the scientific conquest of their own Poles: the South Geomagnetic Pole and the Pole of 
Inaccessibility.  
 
Objective 
 
While there is ample literature in English outlining the American attempt at conquering the 
South Geographic Pole16, literature in both English and Russian outlining the Soviet effort has 
not been coherently organized and remains rather scattered. The aim of this paper is to construct 
a comprehensive record of the steps taken by the Soviet scientists in their attempt at conquering 
their Poles. Initial steps involved exploring the immediate vicinity of their coastal base Mirny, 
gradually extending further afield in order to observe and experience the conditions that would 
be encountered towards the interior of the icy continent. These preliminary exploratory steps 
resulted in an unplanned fortuitous outcome which was a significant achievement for the USSR: 
it became the first IGY participant to establish a manned inner continental station in the 
Antarctic. The Soviet Antarctic Expedition (SAE) also learnt some valuable lessons and drew 
conclusions from these observations and experiences which stimulated the development of new 
technology and tactics required to further advance the ultimate Soviet goal of building and 
manning bases on the South Geomagnetic Pole and the Pole of Inaccessibility. 
 
This paper utilizes the written and oral recollections of several participants of the first and 
second SAE (Gusev, Dolgushin, Kapitsa, Kochetkov, Ruban and Tryoshnikov), documents from 
the Russian State Economics Archive (RGAE) and Russian State Archives of Contemporary History 
(RGANI) in Moscow; Arctic and Antarctic Research Institute (AARI) Fondi in St Petersburg, and 
secondary sources (Belov, Nudelman and Savatyugin) to construct the record of the beginning of 
the Soviet attempt at conquering their Poles. It traces how the Soviets established the first ever 
manned inner continental base on the Antarctic continent in which four men wintered during the 
austral winter of 1956.   
 
Richard Byrd has the distinction of being the first to spend the winter alone at the American 
Advance Base on the Ross Ice Shelf located 175 km from the American coastal base Little 
America II (altitude 130 m) in 1934.17  The Soviet party consisting of Station leader Alexandr 
                                                 
13 Siple (1959: 99) 
14 Tryoshnikov (1963: 260) 
15 Cherevichniy (1963: 84) 
16 See Siple 1959; Belanger 2006; Dufek 1957;  Dufek 1960 
17 See: Byrd 1938; Savatyugin 2007; Tryoshnikov 1963 
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Gusev (geophysicist) (Fig. 1), Leonid Dolgushin (glaciologist) (Fig. 2), Evgeny Vetrov (radio 
operator) (Fig. 3) and Nikolai Kudryashov (tractor driver/mechanic) (Fig. 4) has the distinction 
of being the first to winter over at the initially unplanned Pionerskaya station 375 km from the 
Soviet coastal station Mirny at an altitude of 2741 m on the Antarctic ice cap.18  The lowest 
temperature that these men experienced on 20th August was -66.7o and a wind velocity of 10 
m/sec.19  Although Byrd spent most of the winter of 1934 about 10o farther south, he was almost at 
sea level and therefore at a much warmer temperature. At the latitude of Pionerskaya (69 o, 44' S) 
there are a few hours of daylight most of the winter; Richard Byrd was mostly in the dark all 
"day".20  The exploratory steps and experience gained by the Soviets in establishing Pionerskaya 
station were vital for future Soviet progress in their push towards the South Geomagnetic Pole 
and the Pole of Inaccessibility and deserves to be examined in detail, which is the purpose of this 
paper.                  
 
Figure 1.  Alexandr Gusev.       Figure 2.  Leonid Dolgushin. 
(http://www.aari.aq/default_en.html)                           (Personal collection Leonid Dolgushin) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Evgeny Vetrov. 
(Personal collection Leonid Dolgushin)                   Figure 4. Nikolai Kudryashov . 
    (Personal collection Leonid Dolgushin) 
 
Exploratory Steps 
 
The primary task of the first SAE was to commence preparations for the Soviet IGY program by 
building a main base on the coast of Antarctica (Mirny) from which to launch their drive into the 
                                                 
18 Lukin (2006: 435) 
19 Tryoshnikov (1963: 277) 
20 Behrendt. Private communication 30.01.2008 
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interior of the continent.21  The operation was well thought out and organized as a series of 
exploratory forays, with each step expanding and building on the knowledge gained from the 
previous one. An integral role was dedicated to the aviation team led by Ivan Cherevichny (1909 
– 1971) (Fig. 5), a veteran Arctic aviator who had flown in the North Polar region since the 
1930s and had led an aircraft expedition to the Arctic Pole of Inaccessibility in 1941.22  The SAE 
was supplied with six aircraft specially outfitted for polar conditions: four airplanes consisting of 
one Ilyushin 12 (Il-12), one Antonov 2 (An-2), two Lisunov 2 (Li-2) (Fig. 6) and two Mil’ 4 (Mi-
4) helicopters23 which were to be utilized initially for reconnaissance and later for supply of the 
planned inner continental bases.  
 
 
 
Figure 6. Left-Right (Li-2, Il-
12, An-2 airplanes). (Personal 
collection Leonid Dolgushin) 
Figure 5. Ivan  
Cherevichniy 
 
After officially opening the coastal base named Mirny on 13 February 1956, the expedition 
leader Mikhail Somov set out on 24 February to search for a suitable site for the station to be 
built on the South Geomagnetic Pole  on the Li-12 airplane crewed by Cherevichniy, Gury 
Sorokin and Dmitry Morozov. The round trip flight from Mirny to 78° S 106° E covered a 
distance of 2800 km and lasted 9 hours 40 min.24  When flying over the first 500 km, it was 
noted that the sastrugi covered surface of the icecap rose steeply, while over the next 1000 km it 
flattened and gradually increased in altitude to the south to an estimated height of 3500 m.25 
Byrd had previously flown over the South Geomagnetic Pole and informed Somov that it 
appeared that it would be very difficult to build a base on the proposed site and offered him the 
best of luck.26   
 
A triangular reconnaissance flight in the direction of the Pole of Inaccessibility (Mirny – 76° S, 
79° E – 76° S, 98° E – Mirny) was made on 3 March27 on the Il-12 airplane with the same 
contingent (except Sorokin whose place was taken by Aleksei Kash) and the surface of the ice 
cap was found to be similar to that noted on the previous flight.  The Soviets used American 
maps based on US flights over the area in 1947 which indicated mountains situated 300 km from 
the coast. However, the Soviet party saw no sign of any mountains and decided that the 
Americans had mistaken a distant cloud bank for a mountain range.28  Perhaps the Americans did 
see a cloud bank, but air navigation in 1947 and well into the 1960s was notoriously bad and errors 
                                                 
21 Gan 2006, Gan 2009a, 2009b 
22 http://www.aari.aq/default_en.html Cherevichniy 
23 Cherevichnniy (1959: 140) 
24 Denisov & Bregman (1959: 440) 
25 Tryoshnikov (1963:  271) 
26 Stennogramma (10 April 1956) 
27 Denisov & Bregman (1959: 441) 
28 Tryoshnikov (1963: 271 -272) 
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of greater than 100 km in the reported location of mountain peaks actually seen and photographed 
were not uncommon.29   
 
These exploratory flights provided useful information about the interior of the continent, but the 
scientific committee of the expedition decided that this information was still insufficient to fully 
understand the ground conditions where it was intended to build the bases. The committee 
determined that the next step was to actually try to land a party onto the sastrugi covered ice 
dome about 400 km from Mirny at an altitude of 3000m. The party was to spend several days 
studying the ice surface and the climatic conditions30, especially the degree of air-cooling, radio 
reception and magnetic deviation. The implications of the results of these studies would have a 
direct bearing on the next planning stage.  
 
On 5 March, the flight crew (Mikhail Chagin, Aleksey Chelyshev, Kash, Mikhail Kirillov) led by 
Gusev, who was an experienced alpinist31, set out from Mirny on the An-2 ski plane 
(affectionately called Annoushka) and after two hours reached their proposed destination 400 km 
from Mirny where they attempted a landing and take-off maneuver.32  The sastrugi were like 
‘frozen waves of an ocean’33 and a lack of oxygen at 3000 m led to loss of  aircraft engine 
power, which made landing and take-off an incredibly bumpy and protracted affair, though not a 
total impossibility.  
 
At the location 70° 10’ S, 95° 40’ E, the party set up a hemispherical tent developed for use by 
the Soviet Arctic drifting stations and  spent five days conducting observations in temperatures 
as low as -45 to -50° C, while the temperature at Mirny was -5° C.34  Gusev relates that the 
temperature inside the tent never climbed higher than -30° C, even with the use of a 
propane/butane gas heater, due to the fact that the cold from the three kilometre thick ice dome 
penetrated through the tent floor which was covered with deer skins (Fig. 7). This was the 
opposite effect to what happened in the Arctic, where the tent floor in winter tended to conduct 
the warmth from the underlying ocean, which is 
always above freezing point.35  The first taste of 
inner continental conditions: lack of oxygen due 
to the low air pressure at high altitude, extremely 
low temperatures and snow drifts which kept 
burying the aircraft indicated that the future work 
of the expedition would turn out to be unlike 
anything that these Arctic veterans had ever 
experienced.  
 
Figure 7. Soviet Arctic tents. 
(http://www.vokrugsveta.ru/vs/article/2797/) 
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Preparatory Traverses 
 
Initially, it was envisaged that the inner continental stations were to be built utilizing primarily 
the aircraft fleet for supplying building materials and labour.36  However, after Gusev’s short 
foray into the interior, it became obvious that this plan would need to be reassessed. The 
scientific committee of the expedition, after discussing the first experience of the  interior work 
done by Gusev and the aviators, decided  to send a traverse ‘at least a small distance from  
Mirny’ to do further research of the interior.37  This was conveyed to the Minister of the 
Merchant Fleet responsible for the expedition, Victor Bakaev, who reported to the Council of 
Ministers of the USSR on 21st March 1956 that ‘due to the immense difficulties of establishing 
the stations with the aid of aviation alone, a plan was prepared to use tractor trains which were to 
be supported by the aircraft. Having this aim in mind, the first 50-km long trial traverse into the 
interior to an altitude 900 m on two full-track all terrain vehicles was organized’.38  
 
 Prior to the traverse setting out, the area around Mirny was carefully explored, since it was 
known that the station was surrounded by a semicircular zone of crevasses. In order to find a safe 
route through the zone, glaciologists first flew over the area, after which they continued their 
observations on foot while roped together in case one of them fell into an unseen crevasse. They 
managed to locate a narrow passage between the crevasses 3 km west of Mirny suitable for the 
tractor sleds to pass.39 
 
On 14 March 1956, a trial traverse using two red Gorky Automotive Plant all-terrain vehicles 
(GAZ 67) (Fig. 8) driven by Valentin Korsak and Konstantin Italiantsev and led by glaciologist 
Dolgushin accompanied by geophysicist Andrei Kapitsa, geologist Oleg Vyalov and journalist 
Evgeniy Ryabchikov left Mirny on their fifty kilometre journey. Every kilometre the vehicles 
stopped to put up a bamboo marker pole and take altitude readings. It was found that the ice 
dome rose fairly steeply to 400 metres over the 
first ten kilometres and then more gradually to 700 
metres at the 50 kilometre mark.40  The trial 
traverse had successfully negotiated the dangerous 
zone of crevasses and found and marked the exit 
to the plateau, proving that it was possible for the 
tractors to get through towards the interior.41  
 
Figure 8. GAZ 67 all terrain vehicle. (Personal 
collection Leonid Dolgushin) 
 
With the exit to the plateau marked, an improvised traverse with eleven men led by Mikhail 
Somov using two S-80 tractors which were originally intended only for unloading the ship, set 
out in late autumn on 2 April 1956 towards the point where the An-2 had landed a month before 
400 km from Mirny at an altitude of 3000m. Three sledges carrying living quarters, scientific 
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equipment, kitchen and food stores and 96 drums of fuel were attached to each tractor.42  The 
traverse aimed to reach the planned destination and return to Mirny within 20 to 30 days.43 
Progress was very slow and treacherous: two men roped together walked ahead of their machines 
to look out for crevasses find a safe route44 (Fig. 9), since men on foot could hear a hollow sound 
of a crevasse beneath their feet, whereas a ‘tractor was deaf and blind’.45  After travelling some 
20 km, it became obvious that the weight of the cargo was too much for the tractors to handle 
and one sledge with a supply of fuel was uncoupled 
and left behind. This was to have repercussions for the 
future of the traverse.46  Every 50 km, pyramid-shaped 
markers were placed on the ice to designate their 
route47 and were later used to calculate the movement 
of the continental ice cover.48  
 
Figure 9.  Leonid Dolgushin and Mikhail Somov 
walking in front of the tractor train. (Personal 
collection Leonid Dolgushin) 
 
On 11 April, 150 km from Mirny, weather conditions deteriorated rapidly and the traverse was 
almost buried by snowdrift caused by a blizzard which lasted for eight days (Fig. 10). On 19 
April the wind died down enough for the men to dig out the snow-covered tractors and sledges 
and continue the journey.49  For the next two days the 
traverse was on a 24 hour per day regimen, crossing 
an area of tall sastrugi until another blizzard again 
brought it to a halt. The fuel supply was becoming 
rapidly depleted and it became obvious that the 
traverse would be unable to reach the 400 km mark 
and return to Mirny as had been planned.  
 
Figure 10.  Snow-covered traverse. (Personal 
collection Leonid Dolgushin) 
 
A Change in Plans 
 
Somov recognized that the lack of fuel demanded a change in plans. He consulted with his 
colleagues and after further radio discussions with headquarters in Moscow decided not to turn 
the traverse back to Mirny, but to continue on as far as the fuel supply would allow. The tractors 
and sledges would be modified and reconfigured, further building and food supplies would be 
flown in from the main base and a temporary scientific observatory established in the interior of 
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the continent.50  This was to be the first manned inner continental station built in the Antarctic 
interior and it would provide valuable knowledge about winter conditions at a location at such a 
distance from the coast. It was believed that these conditions would be similar to those to be 
encountered at their final destinations - the South Geomagnetic Pole and Pole of Inaccessibility, 
and that the experience and knowledge thus gained would be of benefit when  planning for the 
more onerous task of reaching these ultimate goals. Considering the lateness of the season, the 
approaching Polar night and plummeting temperatures, the spontaneous idea of establishing a 
new base was quite a logistic challenge. It required 
immediate attention and necessitated Somov’s 
presence back at Mirny, where he and Dolgushin 
returned on 22 April on one of the two airplanes that 
had flown in 700 kg of supplies51, leaving Gusev in 
charge of the traverse (Fig. 11).  
 
Figure 11. An-2 supplies the traverse. (Personal 
collection Leonid Dolgushin) 
 
Every time the traverse stopped, snowdrifts covered the tractors and sledges and would need to 
be cleared away before the traverse could continue. Over the next three days it managed to cover 
about 75 km when the air temperature dropped to -60° C, causing the metal steering rods to 
become brittle and break. An attempt to replace them with metal cables was unsuccessful, since 
the cables ‘snapped like cotton thread’52 in the frigid temperatures. With the approaching Polar 
night, daylight hours dwindled rapidly and the men were forced to walk ahead in the beam of the 
tractor headlights looking out for crevasses (Fig. 12). A Li - 2 reconnaissance aircraft sent from 
Mirny on the 25 April advised that the traverse had 
successfully negotiated the crevasse zone and that 
there were no more crevasses to be encountered.53  
They pushed on and from 2 May began searching 
for a relatively level site suitable to build a base 
and a landing strip for an airplane to bring in 
supplies from Mirny.  
 
Figure 12. Igor Ruban. Into the heart of 
Antarctica.  (http://www.polarpost.ru/Library/  
Litinskiy/main-drifingrossiya.html)  
 
 
On 4 May Gusev received a telegram from Somov advising him to halt the traverse. The traverse 
made a final stop at a position with the co-ordinates 69° 44’ S; 95° 30’ E, elevation 2,700 m 375 
km from Mirny (Fig. 13). Provisions, building materials and carpenter Petr Firsov arrived from 
Mirny on the An-2 airplane and building commenced using the existing superstructure of the 
sledges and the newly delivered materials. After unloading, the aircraft attempted to take-off, but 
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unluckily hit one of the surrounding sastrugi and sustained damage to its skis, which left it 
grounded until the damage could be repaired. Spare parts were sent from Mirny on 6 May and a 
1300 m landing strip was prepared to allow the larger Li-2 airplane to land. While the strip was 
long enough for the plane to land and deliver its cargo, it was found to be not quite long enough 
for take-off and the Li-2 also damaged its landing gear, though not badly enough to prevent it 
from leaving the same day with Boris Vtyurin, Mikhail Komarov and Pavel Senko on board.54  
 
Figure 13.  Map of Antarctica showing traverse route Mirny-Pionerskaya. (Adapted from ‘Map 
of Antarctic research during the IGY 1956 – 1959’. Moscow: Ministry of the Merchant Fleet of 
the USSR, 1959.) 
 
The An-2 was repaired over the next eight days and on 14 May was able to finally return to 
Mirny with aerologist Aleksandr Shchekin on board, leaving six people to continue 
construction.55   Supplies, however, were once again running out but the combination of foul 
weather and the darkness of the Polar night prevented any new deliveries. Only by the end of 
May did an aircraft manage to drop food supplies for the future station and Gusev became almost 
poetic when he described the sky opening up like a ‘horn of plenty and many wonderful things… 
falling out’: crates containing   cans of meat, cocoa, condensed milk, sugar, sausages, packets of 
meat, chicken, bread and many other foodstuffs.56  Unfortunately, the wind scattered the 
parachutes with attached crates over a wide area and considerable effort was expended in 
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retrieving them. Building works continued and were at long last completed by 27 May 1956, 
when the first Soviet Antarctic inner continental research station was officially opened (Fig. 14). 
It was named Pionerskaya as a dual tribute to the pioneering achievement of the Soviet 
expedition in the Antarctic and to the communist 
children’s’ organization, the ‘Pionery’ (Pioneers). 
The first step to the Poles was symbolically likened 
to the child’s first step towards becoming a fully 
fledged member of the Communist Party.    
 
Figure 14.  Igor Ruban.  Pionerskaya station.   
(http://www.polarpost.ru/Library/Litinskiy/main-
drifingrossiya.html)  
 
 
On 6 June, pilot Cherevichniy flew in on the Li -2 aircraft with supplies and exchange personnel, 
but the landing strip was obliterated by a blizzard which covered it with sastrugi. He was unable 
to make a landing and returned to Mirny. The men at the station worked on the strip over the next 
24 hours and succeeded in preparing the surface for another attempt at landing on 7 June, which 
this time was successful. More supplies and equipment were delivered, as well as two men who 
were to stay the winter: radio operator Vetrov and glaciologist Dolgushin. The An-2 plane, 
which was expected to bring two barrels of fuel and a tractor driver/mechanic to replace 
Kudryashov was unable to locate the new station and barely made it back to Mirny. Vitaly 
Babarykin, German Malikov, Kapitsa and Firsov returned to Mirny on the Li-257, leaving four 
people to winter in the Antarctic interior: station leader Aleksandr Gusev, tractor 
driver/mechanic Nikolai Kudryashov, glaciologist Leonid Dolgushin and radio operator Evgeny 
Vetrov. These Antarctic pioneers were to spend the next five winter months with no other human 
contact until 17 November 1956 when the An-2 arrived with a relieving party, although air drops 
of provisions and fuel were effected on 22 June (1 ton of provisions), 28 August (Li-2 provisions 
and fuel) and 5 October (Il-12 1.8 ton cargo).58  Meteorological, magnetic, astronomical, 
glaciological, aerological and other scientific observations were constantly conducted both while 
the traverse was travelling and after it was transformed into a base and settled in for the winter. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Back in Moscow, at a meeting on 10 April 1956, Glavsevmorput was most impressed with the 
progress of the traverse. The push south with winter rapidly approaching was acknowledged to 
be ‘an unprecedented undertaking... which was undoubtedly worth the whole expedition’.59 
Somov also appreciated the importance of this first foray into the interior: he understood that 
‘observations conducted in Mirny and Pionerskaya will shed light on the possibility of a lengthy 
stay of men in the regions situated still closer to the centre of the continent, and help to solve the 
question of whether future plans for advancing to the south... are practicable’.60  Many lessons 
were learnt with regard to inner continental Antarctic topography, temperature, climate, human 
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endurance and about the limitations of the equipment required to operate in such extreme 
conditions. These lessons were invaluable in future planning, design and development of new 
more suitable equipment, clothing and selection of personnel.  
The significance of the Soviet achievement not lost on the neighboring IGY national Antarctic 
expeditions which would also benefit from the Soviet experience.  Bill Bewsher, the Officer in 
Charge of the Australian Mawson station, sent a radiogramme to the newly opened station 
expressing his ‘hearty congratulations on the successful establishment of Pioneer [, a] fine 
accomplishment soon after the establishment of Mirny’.61  The Australians were thankful that 
they were able ‘to draw on Russian experience with long-distance heavy tractor transport on the 
Antarctic plateau. The information gained proved useful when we undertook our inland 
journey’.62  The French base on Terre Adélie also sent congratulations and asked the Soviets to 
share with them the ‘conditions and with which means you could success in the building of your 
station (sic)’.63  Commander Herbert Whitney, the American naval officer responsible for all 
Antarctic naval station construction wrote in Russian that ‘we consider your operations to be 
very interesting’ and wished them all the best from the US expedition.64  
 
The first SAE had not reached either the South Geomagnetic Pole or the Pole of Inaccessibility, 
but a promising start had been made. A ‘large and elaborate’ coastal base Mirny 65 had been 
established from which to launch their assault on the interior. Their airplanes had made a 
reconnaissance flight to the proposed station site 
at the South Geomagnetic Pole and another 
towards the Pole of Inaccessibility. A small party 
had landed on the Polar plateau and spent several 
days conducting observations. The area around 
Mirny was explored, a way through the 
surrounding crevasses was found and a short trial 
traverse had marked an exit to the plateau. A 
larger traverse had used the exit to the plateau to 
travel 375 km into the Antarctic interior and build 
the first inner continental Antarctic station which 
was to be manned year round till the end of the 
IGY (Fig.15).    
 
Figure 15. Postal stamp on the occasion of 
closing Pionerskaya station. 
(http://www.philately.h14.ru/antarkt.html#a11) 
 
This unplanned station, Pionerskaya had given the SAE a head start in preparing for its national 
IGY programme and had provided vital experience which was critical for successfully reaching 
its goal of building bases on the South Geomagnetic Pole and the Pole of Inaccessibility. But it 
was the men of the SAE who strived to secure for their homeland the honour of achieving their 
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goal and to ‘bring back a rich harvest of scientific results’.66  Like Scott, Amundsen, Byrd and 
others who went before them, they displayed the same distinctive ‘courage and endurance’67 in 
their attempt at ‘doing the impossible’.68  And although Pionerskaya station no longer appears 
on contemporary maps of Antarctica, the route travelled by the first Soviet explorers is still used 
by the annual Russian traverses to this day. Their story deserves to be told. 
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 THE AESTHETICS OF RISK IN POLAR EXPLORATION 
 
Lisbeth Lewander 
 
Introduction 
 
Most people can easily conjure up the risks involved in doing science in distant polar areas. 
Would it not be safer, cheaper and more convenient simply to avoid situations that involve 
possible hazards, such as polar exploration? Thus, is there any logic whatsoever in consciously 
exposing oneself to such relatively large risks? In general, people are inclined to downplay the 
hazards and hardly hesitate to answer the latter question in the affirmative. Historically, several 
visitors to polar areas have stressed the heroism involved, thereby indirectly acknowledging the 
risks. At the same time, their risk propensity has been an issue in the travel reports. A related 
theme is the still frequent notion of polar areas as a reserve for ‘real’ men. 
 
However, regardless of the temporal aspects and the various understandings of ideals of 
manliness and masculinity, most persons would agree that without a certain amount of risk-
taking, little would happen in the way of scientific, societal or personal development. Future 
benefits, although not always clearly defined as to scale and scope, do require some degree of 
risk-taking. So why dwell on risks? Why not simply continue to improve risk calculations, assess 
the probabilities of hazards and/or casualties and get down to business – safe logistics and 
transportation in support of science? As for polar exploration, polar history is laden with more or 
less thoughtful risk and crisis management regardless of the existence or content of previous 
planning for risks and uncertainties. 
 
The understanding and conceptualisation of risk assessment is therefore a crucial aspect of polar 
research, both its past and its future history. My somewhat explorative understanding is that it is 
plausible to present the subject in terms of the ideas held by individual explorers. The extent to 
which uncertainties and fears are spoken of and in what terms, may be treated analytically as the 
Aesthetics of Risk, reflecting a general level of actual security cultures in communities 
undergoing constant social change. These cultures of securities are there to be studied 
empirically, though that is not the task for this paper. 
 
My argument is that risk assessments have been a crucial issue since the very beginning of polar 
research, although their wording and conceptualization have changed over time and space. 
However, due to hierarchies within the scientific communities and the logistic operators, risk 
communication used to be much more reticent than it is today. I have chosen to focus on some 
examples of the polar travel report story – telling with regard to risks. Most of my examples are 
from IGY participants from 1950 onwards; others date from the early 20th century, from 
expeditions that preceded this huge research effort in Antarctica. The paper will highlight brief 
descriptions of risk assessment situations, mainly from a single level of analysis, the individual. 
Other levels of interest would be the organisational and symbolical but they are outside the scope 
of this paper. As a healthy reminder of the links between today and previous eras, security and 
issues of risk seem to have been strengthening their positions vis-à-vis other issues on the agenda 
of scientific communities and Antarctic operators connected with the Scientific Committee of 
Antarctic Research (SCAR), since a new working group on these issues was set up as recently as 
July 2006. 
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 Risk, Uncertainty or Fear – Changing Views on Risk Assessment  
 
The social and political concerns with regard to risk assessment are caught by Jasanoff (1999), 
who describes the issue of risk in research as developing over time, from risks as hard, physical 
and difficult but still possible to calculate (by probabilistic methods used by experts) to risks seen 
and studied as historically constructed. Further, risk nowadays is a matter for laymen as well as 
experts and risks have specific cultural meanings for various social groups and individuals. 
Research on the implications of risk for modern society entered a new era with Ulrich Beck’s 
(1986) Risk Society and Richard Luhmann’s (1986) Ecological Communications.  
 
At the time when the scale of polar research operations became increasingly large, Ortwin Renns 
(2006) commented that risks were an issue mainly for experts and politicians. Views on risks 
were rather mechanistic and probabilities concerned damage or loss of life and health as well as 
capital. Uncertainties were disregarded because they were alien to the statistical models of 
calculable causes and effects. Appraisals of risk resembled qualified guesses and risk 
communication was used to modify models in relation to dominant perceptions of risks. 
Opposition was regarded as irrational or biased. In contrast, recent general understanding of risk 
suggests that risk must be understood as relational between the source of potential harm/hazard, 
the objects/persons at risk and the evaluation of consequences. Today, the representation of risk 
is not just a matter for experts addressing other experts. Instead, the general public, through 
NGOs and media, participates in representing the objects of risk as well as the objects at risk. 
 
Traditional views on risk communication from the late Fifties onwards also included a one-
dimensional sender-receiver model. The notion behind this model was that the sender transmits a 
message through a particular channel and the receiver picks it up. If the message failed to elicit 
the expected response that was due to an unequal distribution of knowledge between sender and 
receiver; allegedly the receiver was less well informed than the sender. Another factor was the 
occurrence of distrust. However, recent understandings of risk communication pay more respect 
to “receivers”. The general public is ascribed a greater amount of knowledge and seen as more 
worth listening to. Risk communication has ceased to be a matter of pure learning and become an 
issue of risk producers operating in more active cooperation with stakeholders of various kinds. 
Mutual learning and listening, as well as the political dimensions of risk communication, have 
come to the fore. 
 
Another, still largely ignored, issue in risk research is the notion of gender’s importance. Gender 
and risk issues (perception, assessment, management, communication, etc.) make up a growing 
research area, whereas the notions and understandings of masculinity/ies and femininities are part 
and parcel of the actual construction of risk. For gender aspects in polar research, see Berg (2007) 
and Lewander (2004).  
 
Risk is not the same as uncertainty, which is harder to come to terms with and should therefore be 
handled by being prudent. Fear may be elicited by assumed risks as well as uncertainties but 
pertains largely to the emotional sphere. However, received notions of rational decision-making 
do view emotions as a limiting factor (Douglas 1994, Eldh 2004). Thus risk, although socially 
constructed, is connected to some kind of event that can be, at least partially, foreseen. So in 
theory, risks can be both calculated and managed. However, as this is often neglected, I find it 
important to proceed with the argument for an aesthetics of risk. 
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 Fragments on Risk Assessments Prior to the IGY 
 
In my first example of the portrayal of early 20th century risk assessment, from the Swedish 
South Pole Expedition, we find that contingency plans actually were elaborated, though not fully 
developed. This section, which is a partial excerpt (Lewander 2007), illustrates the mode of 
considering risks: 
 
Otto Nordenskjöld’s Swedish Antarctic Expedition 1901-03 
 
In a letter of January 25th 1948 to Eric Ljungner, expedition member José Maria Sobral was very 
upset and referred to another member of the expedition, Johan Gunnar Andersson, as “this weird 
mahatma, Andersson and his hardly less significant idol Carl Anton Larsen were close to causing 
a disastrous end to the Nordenskjöld expedition. Of course, he does not write anything about 
this.”  
 
Sobral is referring to the official travel account by Nordenskjöld, Andersson and others (pages 
190-204), in which Andersson describes what happened when Andersson, Duse and Grunden 
were put ashore at Hope Bay on December 29th, 1902 (Nordenskjöld 1905, 203). 
 
1) Only the Antarctic reaches the winter station: If the land party has not reached the winter 
station before January 25th, one has to assume that the land party had not managed to cross and 
should therefore looked for on the site of the depot (Hope Bay). 
2) Only the land party reaches the winter station. If the Antarctic by February 10th has not 
reached the winter station, all persons present at Snow Hill would walk by land, heading for the 
site of the depot, Hope Bay. 
 
Antarctic would then have to visit the depot site during the period between February 25th and 
March 10th and would not cease its search before this date without imperative reasons. “These 
were our prerequisites when we went over the ice to reach Snow Hill.” 
 
Sobral now proceeded to question the relevance of this plan. Sobral wrote that these two “genial 
gentlemen” had not foreseen that the Antarctic could be shipwrecked – which in fact happened.   
 
With hindsight it is not difficult to agree with Sobral’s assessment of possible outcomes for the 
expedition (Lewander 2004). In my interpretation, Sobral’s scenario must be considered valid 
and therefore adds an important dimension to the earlier historiography presented by Andersson 
in relation to hazards. Risk assessments were made but the array of possible risks was not fully 
developed, either by scientist Andersson or by any involved institution. The unthinkable was not 
an issue in this particular aesthetics of risk. 
 
Byrd’s 2nd Antarctic Expedition, 1933-35 
 
On this expedition, Richard Byrd undertook an excursion all by himself for several months, far 
away from the base camp. From his diary it is clear that the basic arguments for this were not 
about the necessities of science so much as Byrd’s personal development (Goerler 1998, Byrd 
1927). On this particular expedition the leader suppressed the perceptions of possible hazards, 
while his men, who realised how serious the situation became when Byrd fell ill, were forced to 
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 arrange a rescue. Hazards with regard to heating equipment, as well as the lack of plans for 
rescue operations, highlight the issue of inadequate risk assessments by parties involved. 
Although the possibility of carbon-monoxide poisoning was known, it was not included in the 
overall planning. It seems to me that the heroic “lone man in the universe” was a dominant force 
in the actual aesthetics of risk. 
 
The NBSX expedition 1949-52 
 
As reported by Charles Swithinbank, a lethal accident occurred at the Maudheim base when a 
weasel was used for non-scientific purposes in the evening (Swithinbank 1999). Planning had 
been done for various hazards – but not for the ill-fated and presumably irresponsible actions 
involving the “human factor”. Although the expedition was the outcome of an international effort 
involving several political, military and scientific institutions, there was no common denominator 
for risk assessments. Individual initiatives were crucial, which left scope for varying degrees of 
caution. 
 
IGY – A Non-Risky Scientific Event? 
 
Much of the history of the IGY remains to be produced. This was a large-scale collective, 
international enterprise within the framework of “scientists for the advancement of science and 
societal progress”. It lasted from July 1957 to December 1958 and 68 countries took part with 
research programmes involving some 60,000 participants. The manpower involved in polar areas 
was just that: mainly men from the western hemisphere, although every continent had some 
degree of representation in the IGY. Some individuals in the Indian administration under Nehru 
had propagated the notion of Antarctica as a continent for peace. Meanwhile, President 
Eisenhower and the Soviet leaders were enmeshed in the Cold War. An American scientist, 
Lloyd Berkner, persuaded Norway and other western allies to participate in the IGY. Norway was 
unsure of both US and Soviet intentions as regards territorial rights, for instance Norway’s claims 
to Queen Maud Land? Another issue was the long-standing conflict between Chile, Argentina 
and Great Britain with regard to the Antarctic Peninsula (Beck 1986, Lewander 2004). 
 
Besides the internationally coordinated scientific effort, the IGY embodied competing objectives 
such as testing equipment for both civilian and military purposes; doing science not only for an 
increased level of world peace but for national armament; demonstrating technological and 
scientific capability on a world scale as part of the Cold War; establishing the right to existing or 
future territorial claims. These equally important objectives underpinned the entire IGY effort, 
alongside the quest for knowledge in fields such as geophysics, glaciology and geology. 
Interesting accounts of the political objectives are to be found in recent work on Swedish and 
Norwegian pre-IGY history (Elzinga 2006, Friedman 2004). 
 
A contemporary commentator described the IGY as initiating the era of technological 
competition, where the Antarctic served as an arena for the demonstration of scientific and 
technological skills. Meanwhile, the Cold War build-up was causing great concern (Law 1959). 
Thus, the IGY was so much more than an Assault on the Unknown (Sullivan 1961), quite apart 
from the gender symbolism embedded in this title. Most accounts from the IGY, regardless of 
country of origin, present very specific demands on the type of person who was considered to be 
suitable for science in polar areas: white, heterosexual he-men is a concise but adequate label for 
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 the construction of maleness and masculinity (Lewander 2004, Chipman 1986). Apart from 
arguments such as the lack of bathroom facilities, women’s physical weakness and women as a 
psychological distress phenomenon in scientific stations, the resistance to female scientists and 
crew members was a symptom of the gendered structural imbalance in western scientific 
communities at the time. The United Kingdom and the United States were both slow to include 
women in the station teams. In my opinion, the US commander of Operation Deep Freeze, 
Admiral George Dufek, gave an accurate representation with his statement that women would 
“wreck the illusion of being frontiersmen going into a new land and the illusion of being a hero” 
(Dufek in Sydney Morning Herald,May 3, 1959, quoted in Robin Burns’ article for the 
Encyclopedia of the Antarctic, 2007). Thus, risk assessments were based on notions of gender 
rather than on any empirical evidence of the actual risks involved in having men and women 
working side by side at scientific stations. 
 
As for the occurrence of risk awareness, hindsight suggests that this was at least partially and/or 
occasionally absent in IGY planning. In modern terms, this absence may be labelled “epistemic 
risks” (Sahlin & Persson 1994). If the decision-maker is unaware of a risk, no further information 
will be sought and no alternative courses of action will be considered. This situation may occur in 
the absence of well-defined goals and clearly expressed values in relation to aims and internal 
priorities.  
 
One of the members of the Swedish Arctic expedition to Kinnvika, Svalbard, in 1957-58 reported 
that no prefabricated plans existed aboard ship except in relation to the large transports. It was 
assumed that any other difficulties would be solved by “common sense”. Instead of a planned 
preventive approach, there was a built-in reliance on the capacity and the propensity to act as the 
occasion required. 
 
Another example was provided by Sir Edmund Hillary with reference to the preparations for 
establishing the Scott Base. Although planners had foreseen certain types of difficulty with 
regard to weather conditions, the impact of this prior knowledge on the operative stages 
seemingly was ignored. When serious inconveniences and setbacks led to the re-location of the 
base from Butter Point to Pram Point, the reader gets the impression that pure luck made this 
possible. On the other hand, some “mishaps” were foreseen. Some of the equipment had been 
tested in the course of training in 1956. Expedition members had learned to take care of the dogs 
and manage the tractors. Aircraft with ski-wheels were tested and found to be wrongly 
constructed. This had the positive effect that the men got practice in repair work in a cold climate 
(Fuchs & Hillary 1958).  
 
The Post-IGY Portrayal of Possible Risks and Hazards  
 
The textual aftermath of the IGY is somewhat piecemeal. Readers of the “full story” of the 
various expeditions that took place during the IGY are served a trial and error approach.  
 
One example is the account, cited above, by the leader of the Commonwealth Trans-Antarctic 
Expedition. Four governments were involved, so issues of leadership were salient. The selection 
procedures for participants introduced a further element of coincidental effects. Besides having 
skills, previous experience and personal suitability, the expedition needed an acceptable 
composition of nationalities. Later, the selected persons were gradually made responsible for 
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 choosing material and equipment and this had to be combined with the administration of gifts 
from private companies and industries. My proposition is that safety issues were of necessity a 
minor concern compared with the problems involved in actually obtaining the proper equipment 
and material. There is some explicit mention of the actual hazards created by the long lines of 
communication between isolated bases and population centres during the IGY, as well as the 
difficulties in supplying the stations, but it is notable that this was only after the successful 
completion of the IGY (Law 1967).  
 
With regard to the issue of resource exploitation in distant areas, Frank Illingworth’s report in 
1953 admitted that commercial exploration of natural resources does indeed entail tremendous 
difficulties, for example non-existent harbours and moving ice, though the harsh weather per se 
would not stop rich mining ventures. In 1956 his view of the future was even brighter: Who can 
say categorically that in time the vast resources of the Far South will not be broached by 
automation and atomic power? If they are, this great step forward will be due in part to the IGY 
(Illingworth 1956, 582). This attitude of eternal progress was accompanied by lethal accidents 
during the IGY but according to Sullivan (1961, 298), “Such mishaps were due, essentially, to the 
novelty of the environment in which men and equipment had been called upon to operate.” In 
other words, the accidents reflected a lack of experience rather than the absence of risk 
assessments. According to Sullivan, a gradual learning process was initiated. 
 
As to the issue of responsibility, the reluctance of the military to take orders from scientists led to 
a dual leadership at the US stations. Problems that could not be solved at the station had to be 
referred to the Pentagon as well as to the National Academy of Sciences. Further, some 
unplanned journeys were made from the stations, without any notion of the risks involved. At 
least seven stations were damaged by fire, a hazard that does not appear to have been foreseen. 
Few precautions had been taken. The preparations and implementation of the IGY actually led to 
the loss of some 100 lives (Bulkely 2007). 
 
The Norwegian IGY planners were very much concerned with protecting Norwegian territorial 
interests in both the Arctic and the Antarctic (Friedman 2004). An example of absent (explicit) 
risk assessment is provided by the choice of location for a base in the Antarctic. Ice conditions 
did motivate a particular location and these concerns were downplayed for political reasons. 
Norway and Great Britain finally cooperated with regard to the Norway Station, which was sited 
at the second best spot in relation to the foreseen hazards. It is only in the present decade that a 
full account of Norwegian participation has been presented.  
 
An independent voice, the Swedish polar explorer Bertil Frödin participating in the Chilean 
expeditions to Antarctica in 1951 and 1953, raised the following rather unusual questions (and 
answers) about risk assessment at that time. First of all, Frödin states that polar exploration is 
dependent on more than technical equipment; the quality of men is equally important. Suitable 
skills are needed, as well as the right temperament (preferably mountaineering men with the 
proper fighting spirit) and the ambition to explore unknown lands, so that everything else is of 
diminished importance and all efforts and difficulties to reach the goals seem irrelevant (Frödin´s 
emphasis). Seemingly the heroic motive is not far away. However, Frödin then goes beyond the 
individual readiness to overlook possible risks to ask what people expect to find in the Antarctica; 
is it worthwhile risking life and spending capital, work and time on a sterile ice desert in a 
terribly hard climate? He also qualifies the local, individual risk assessments by putting them in 
136
 relation to risk perceptions in whaling and fishing, the emerging science of meteorology, future 
mineral exploitation, tourism and using Antarctica as a testing ground for atomic bombs (the 
USA, the Soviet Union and Great Britain). Frödin further states that the development of 
transportation and radar communication requires extensive polar research, both North and South. 
Each of the areas of interest pinpointed by Frödin is associated with notions of risk assessment, 
often by opponents of the respective activity. However, this is not fully developed in the text and 
Frödin concludes by viewing the IGY as a kind of high-quality culmination of all previous 
research efforts in the polar areas, although modern research is labelled earth magnetism, 
meteorology, seismology, vulcanology and oceanography (Frödin 1956, 217f). Here, Frödin 
highlights the growing degree of differentiation and specialisation that occurred during the 
launching of the IGY, while still keeping in mind the practical purposes linked to each of these 
labels. Still, a comprehensive risk assessment is subordinated to the expected benefits.  
 
What conceptualisation attended the planning of the IGY? In what terms were the efforts framed 
in the vocabulary of risks and hazards in relation to the anticipated gains? My impression so far is 
that the issue of uncertainties was somehow transformed into the issue of risks but that this did 
not happen until after the scientific and logistic operations had taken place. Certain risks and their 
levels were tacitly accepted, others were not considered at all. One very particular kind of risk in 
relation to the IGY was the ongoing Cold War. 
 
Risks and Superpower Involvement 
 
The idea of the IGY coincided with an extremely serious superpower crisis, the Korean War. 
Moreover, the non-settlement of territorial claims in Antarctica had become an issue for the US 
State Department. An IGY veteran with close ties to the Army´s research program, Paul Siple, 
describes how the launching of the IGY was soon accompanied by a renewal of US national 
interest in the Antarctic. Initially, planning processes for US commitments within the framework 
of the IGY were in progress side by side with those led by the State Department. Siple describes 
how two cultures and two missions were to cooperate during the IGY (Siple 1959).  
 
As for the US Army and Navy, I suggest that risk issues were incorporated in accordance with 
the principle of standard operating procedures (SOP). The NSC’s governing decision (NSC 
5424/1), together with the US Defense Department’s “Master Plan for Antarctica” for 
implementing the NSC decision, provide intriguing insights into the safety culture behind the 
western superpower’s immense efforts at the time. The Staff Study, later to become the 
governing decision, presenting the rationale for US involvement in Antarctica during the IGY 
among other areas of interests, clearly reveals the non-existence of an organising body for 
Antarctic activities (NSC 5424/1 28 July 1954). In this context it should be noted that, besides the 
scientific undertakings, Antarctic activities included the logistic operations, the possible use of 
nuclear energy and all sorts of activities planned for the IGY by the US. The explicit notion of 
risk is rather absent. So what about the Defense Department’s considerably more operational 
Master Plan? The Plan consisted of six sections: 
 
Objectives 
Programs (Courses of action) 
Requirements 
Assets 
Budget 
Schedule 
 
(OCB, US Department of Defense, 17 Sept 1954) 
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In the Master Plan, several of the weak points or areas regarded as potentially important for 
decision-making and policy-formulation with a direct bearing on risk assessment and safety 
procedures were simply reduced to nothing. This does not mean that precautions were non-
existent. Rather I would suggest that risk assessment had a rather low priority at the time. 
Supplies were dimensioned for two years instead of one, in case the resupply ships failed to turn 
up, but the material I have come across so far does not include any profound, highly visible plans 
or preventive routines for accidents, mishaps etc. However, plans were made for emergency lines 
of communication: 
 
…we told of the kinds of equipment, such as planes, dog teams and radios, we would be 
able to make available in case of emergency. But far more important than these were the 
discussions as to methods of making simultaneous standardized scientific observations in 
our various fields of activity (Siple 1959, 98-99). 
 
Nor were any long-term hazards or risks foreseen with regard to the environment or the 
psychological well-being of the scientists. Some psychological studies were made but not for 
dealing with any actual risk in relation to the IGY. Instead, new studies were carried out on the 
effects of isolation. Extreme weather conditions were expected, as well as being cut off from 
supply lines. Military logistic planning was a dominant feature of the major US engagement in 
the IGY (see for example Navy Statement for Antarctic Program FY 63). 
 
The decision to locate a US station at the geographical South Pole was driven by the Soviet 
Union’s announcement of plans to establish a station at the very same spot. After diplomatic 
intervention, it was agreed that the Soviet Union would opt instead for the magnetic South Pole. 
With regard to risk assessments, both the US and the Soviet Union had other priorities, namely 
their overall competition for superpower status. Although several veterans actually warned 
decision-makers about the hazards of such isolated locations, these risks were scaled down. Siple 
specifically notes that the input of veterans, i.e. men who have led or worked on previous polar 
expeditions, tended to be overlooked for reasons of prestige (Siple 1959, 93f). Despite warnings 
from Siple to the National Academy of Science and the State Department, a US station at the 
South Pole was a top priority. 
 
The Aesthetics of Risk 
 
The first component of a possible aesthetics of risk is the occurrence of risk awareness as such. 
Firstly on the individual level, among scientists and science administrators, secondly on the 
organisational level. For the purpose of this paper, the latter was reduced to the combined 
national representatives on the various national IGY committees regardless of their original 
institutional ties. However, these ties are not unimportant because the scientific community, the 
several governmental agencies and the logistic operators (often military at the time) had 
conflicting interests and objectives with their engagement in the IGY. Thus, the possible levels of 
risk needed literal negotiations. Nevertheless, within the framework of the IGY, there was at least 
a temporary consensus on the combined national achievements to come. In the end, or perhaps 
rather in the field, individual judgements were made in each “critical” situation involving a 
planned or unplanned risk assessment. 
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 A second component is the content of such awareness. What kinds of risk were perceived and by 
whom? What were the objects of risk? What kinds of risk were downplayed and to what extent as 
they refer to time and space? What degree of severity was expressed? How were issues of 
responsibility and liability addressed?  
 
A third component is the presentation of possible solutions in the sense of alternative courses of 
action. What characterized the contingency plans and to what extent were they elaborated on 
beforehand as to details about safety measures and decision-making? Was there a preference for 
identifying problems or for solving them? Extended stays were often on the agenda within the 
framework of standard operating procedures but apart from that? 
 
A fourth and last component, pertaining to the last two decades, is risk communication and 
preparations for crisis management. What was to be said, to whom and by what means? What 
roles had been allocated to the various stakeholders, actual or potential, if any? Was there any 
notable difference in how a particular risk was portrayed before and after the IGY? 
 
Conclusions 
 
A perusal of travel reports from polar history, from the late 19th century until today, leads to the 
conclusion that the aesthetics of risk, regardless of time and place, more often than not includes a 
particular repertoire of identifying and coping with risks. Further, there has been a growing 
concern with cost-benefit analysis. Today, Antarctic operators have to deal with a range of 
interested parties, more or less attached to the formal structures of the SCAR and the Antarctic 
Treaty, as well as with the general public and the media. Further, there is a wider repertoire of 
voiced opinions about the occurrence and content of risk. Such voices were already heard at the 
time of the IGY but the arenas for them were different; assessments of risks versus benefits were 
aired with other tunes. There was no politicization of either the object at risk (scientists, logistic 
staff, local environment) or the object of risk (extreme weather conditions and access to 
equipment to counter any calculated adverse effects). In the early Fifties, the concept of risk was 
therefore current in a very limited social sphere; military/logistic experts and scientists formerly 
active in polar research conducted an internal dialogue or a one-way communication from 
defence departments to scientists in the field. Risk assessments were mainly confined to issues of 
supply lines and lines of communication between bases. The temporal factor was present. At the 
same time, the themes of risks and uncertainties were constantly present in relation to superpower 
conflict, particularly in the USA and the Soviet Union. These fears seemingly overshadowed the 
more concrete, down-to-earth hazards associated with the extreme climatic conditions of 
Antarctica.  
 
Although most commentators and scientists alike made frequent references to climate, very little 
time, resources or media space were allocated to considering the degree of risk in relation to the 
impressive undertakings in advance of the IGY. Further, I have not yet come across any planning 
about the levels of risk that could be considered acceptable.  
 
This attitude of optimism and faith in unlimited progress would cause an outcry today. Media, 
public opinion and concerned scientists, among others, would demand governmental responses, 
and risks would be communicated (and negotiated) widely. The various national and international 
campaigns during the planning for the IGY were different – no local, not to mention global, risks 
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 of a personal or environmental nature were judged to constitute hazards that warranted a public 
discussion. Further, the management or regulation of risks and uncertainties was still mainly a 
matter belonging to those attending to logistic needs. 
 
The point of departure for this paper is the notion of aesthetics of risk in relation to a general 
level of a security culture that is present in all types of societies, regardless of their degree of 
economic and political development. The extent to which there is always a gap between risk 
propensity and societal development is an open question and risk assessment has featured in 
some respects in most polar explorations from early times up to the present. However, this issue 
needs to be considered from a historical and a societal point of view. Important issues of 
logistics, transportation and safety are often taken for granted in the sense of being thought of as 
neutral, settled topics. Instead I would like to emphasize the need to dissect and problematize 
what I have labelled the aesthetics of risk. Further, the concept of “risk and risk assessment” 
needs to be explored in somewhat greater depth. In addition, the issue of risk communication will 
become increasingly salient since nowadays no polar exploration is likely to be carried out in the 
absence of such communication. 
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Peder Roberts, Department of History, Stanford, USA 
 
11:15-12:00 Playing Dice: Toward a Scientific Explanation of U.S. Leadership in the  
Formation of the Antarctic Treaty of 1959 
Jason Moore, Centro de Estudios Hemisféricos y Polares, Viña del Mar, Chile 
 
12:00-14:00 Lunch 
 
14:00-18:15 Session II   
 
14:00-14:45 The Role of Antarctic Diplomacy in the Origins and Conduct of the IGY 
Rip Bulkeley, Exeter College, Oxford, United Kingdom 
 
14:45-15.30 The Search of an Organizational Framework for Antarctic Research (1948-1985) 
Jorge Berguño, Chilean Antarctic Institute, Santiago, Chile 
 
15:30-16:00 Coffee Break 
 
16:00-16:45 Science as a Component of U.S.–Chilean Antarctic Relations in the 1950s 
M. Consuelo León Wöppke, Universidad Marítima de Chile, Chile 
 
16:45-17:30 The International Polar Year (1957-1958) as Reflected in German Media 
Cornelia Lüdecke, SCAR AG History of Antarctic Research, Munich, Germany 
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 17:30-18:15 Getting the Science Done: Perspectives from McMurdo 
Ann M. Dozier, T.D. Dye and N.P. Chin, University of Rochester, Rochester, New York, 
USA 
 
19:00  Workshop dinner at Holiday Inn on the Lane 
 
  Dinner speech by Tim H Baughman, University of Central Oklahoma, USA 
Amundsen, Cook and the Belgica, the first international scientific and multi-
national expedition to the Antarctic 
 
Friday 26 October 2007 
 
9:00-12:30 Session III  
 
09:00-09:45 The development of biology as a discipline in Antarctica 
Jason Davis, The Ohio State University, Columbus, Ohio, USA  
 
09:45-10:30  British Antarctic Science, 1944-1959 
Adrian Howkins, University of Texas at Austin, Austin, USA 
 
10:30-11:00 Coffee Break -  
 
11:00-11:45 First (1957-58) Geophysical Investigation of the Filchner-Ronne Ice Shelf (FRIS) 
John C. Behrendt, University of Colorado, Boulder, CO, USA 
 
11:45-12:30 From EAP to EPICA: the shaping of a European Effort in Paleoclimatology 
Aant Elzinga, University of Göteborg, Göteborg, Sweden  
 
12:30-14:00 Lunch 
 
14:00-15:30 Session IV  
 
14:00-14:45 Towards the Centre of the Great Unknown 
Irina Gan, University of Tasmania, Australia 
 
14:45-15:30 Swedish Polar Politics 1955-1970 
Lisbeth Lewander, University of Göteborg, Göteborg, Sweden  
 
15:30 –16:00     Coffee break 
 
16::00-17:30  Final conclusions and discussion about  next SCAR Workshop during the 3rd SCAR 
Open Science Conference in St. Petersburg 2008. 
 
    End of Workshop 17:30 
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 Abstracts (Alphabetical) 
 
Amundsen, Cook and the Belgica, the First International Scientific and Multi-
National Expedition to the Antarctic 
 
T. H. Baughman, Department of History, University of Central Oklahoma, OK, USA 
 
No abstract provided. 
 
 
First (1957-58) Geophysical Investigation of the Filchner-Ronne Ice Shelf 
(FRIS) 
 
John C. Behrendt, INSTAAR, University of Colorado, Boulder, CO, USA and U.S. Geological 
Survey, Denver, CO, USA 
 
The only major field project of the U.S. International Geophysical Year (IGY) Antarctic program 
was a series of oversnow traverses (Behrendt, 1998; 2003) mostly in West Antarctica, starting in 
1957, making seismic Ice Shelf (FIS) oversnow traverse mapped snow surface elevation, ice 
thickness and bed topography of the Filchner-Ronne Ice Shelf (FRIS) area, as well as snow 
accumulation, the mean annual temperature of that era, and made a geological reconnaissance of 
the Dufek Massif. Results included the definition of the Thiel trough beneath the FIS and the 
maximum ice thickness of the southernmost area of the Ronne Ice Shelf (RIS) of 1300 m which is 
in contrast to 1100-m thickness remeasured by BAS for this area in 1994-95 of only 1100 m 
suggesting significant melting during the interval. 
 
Filchner Ice Shelf Traverse, 1957-58 
On 28 October, 1957, our five man party, co-led by Edward Thiel and Hugo Neuberg, left Ellsworth 
Station on the Filchner ice front with two Sno-Cats (in contrast to the usual three on the other US 
traverses) each pulling a 2.5-ton sled filled with fuel, food, explosives, and all of our scientific and 
other equipment. For the next 81 days we made a geophysical-glaciological reconnaissance of the 
Filchner-Ronne Ice Shelf area.  
 
The logistics of the traverse oversnow traverse program were dictated by the fact that state-of-the-
art electronics at the time depended on the vacuum tube, rather than the solid-state electronic 
microcircuits available today. The hundreds of tubes in our seismic system required large amounts 
of battery power. The power requirements, in turn, required two 250 amp-hour batteries weighing 
80 kg each to produce the 24 volts necessary for operation. The only recording system was the 
heavy oscillograph “camera” with its tanks of photographic solutions. Altogether the seismic Sno-
Cat carried a total load of about 500 kg of electronic equipment, gravimeter, magnetometer, and 
seismic batteries. Each Sno-Cat used about 3 liters of fuel per km or about 200 kg for a 50-km day 
for two vehicles. This fuel determined how frequently we needed resupply by the single-engine 
Otter aircraft available. These planes could only carry a few barrels of fuel in one trip depending on 
our range out of Ellsworth. 
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Although we commonly saw open crevasses on the traverse, the ones that gave us the most trouble 
were bridged with snow and could not usually be seen from the surface as we drove along. 
Sometimes we could safely drive across snow bridges, but other times we broke through. The Sno-
Cats were nearly as safe as a man on skis because of their relatively low weight and four wide 
tracked pontoons. It is much easier to see bridged crevasses from the air, but this method is severely 
limited, even when a plane is flying directly over crevasses. We traveled in crevasse country most 
of the 81 days of the traverse and had a number of incidents of vehicles and sleds breaking through. 
One man fell in about 10 m, but was rescued safely. 
     
We spaced seismic-glaciology stations at about each day's travel distance (~50-60 km). The 
measurements at these consisted of a seismic reflection sounding to measure the depth to bedrock; 
seismic measurement of the increase in sound velocity (and thus snow density) with increasing 
depth; and a two- or three-meter snow pit  to measure snow accumulation and other glaciological 
parameters such as density and temperature. We would lay out our 330 m seismic cables in an L 
shape, which we unrolled from chest reels. We would then hand drill a 2–8m deep shot hole at the 
apex of the L. We fired a small explosive charge of 0.5-2 kg of ammonium nitrate detonated with an 
electric blasting cap and a 0.5-kg high explosive primer charge. The sound waves penetrated to the 
ice-water contact (in the case of the floating ice shelf) and to the water-rock (or ice-rock) contact 
and reflected back to the surface where they were picked up by the geophones. Each of the 24 
geophones was attached to one of the channels in the cables. The seismic signals were amplified 
and recorded on photographic paper which spewed into my hand at 1 m/s. On a few occasions the 
wet paper record froze in my hands as I wrote the data on the back. There was some hazard 
associated with laying out the cables when we were working in crevassed areas. In these cases we 
skied, which offered some protection. We also used skis when we were not in areas of known 
crevasses, if the snow was soft. 
     
In addition to a snow pit where stratigraphy leading to snow accumulation was measured, Neuburg 
and Walker, glaciologists, would hand drill a hole 9 m deep and place an electric-resistance 
temperature probe on a cable in the bottom. We made gravity and magnetic and altitude 
measurements every 8 km to study the variations in density and magnetic properties of rock beneath 
the ice, and therefore to make inferences about the ice-covered geology. We also used the gravity 
data to determine the depth to bedrock between the seismic reflection stations. 
 
Conclusions  
I will discuss results of this first reconnaissance of the FRIS system including the definition of the 
Thiel trough beneath the FIS and the maximum ice thickness of the southernmost  area of the FRIS 
of 1300 m which is in significant contrast to BAS remeasurement (Johnson and Smith, 1997) of this 
area in the 1990s of only 1100 m suggesting significant melting during the interval.  
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The Search of an Organizational Framework for Antarctic Research (1948-
1985) 
 
Jorge Berguῆo, Chilean Antarctic Institute, Santiago, Chile 
 
This presentation is focussed on certain elements of the protracted Antarctic negotiations leading 
towards the signature of the Antarctic Treaty which have been generally neglected or, at least, 
not sufficiently emphasized in the literature on the subject. These elements concern the type of 
scientific organization most suitable for the conduct of cooperative scientific activity in 
Antarctica. While scientific cooperation stemmed from a long tradition in Antarctica and all 
parties to the “Antarctic dispute” readily accepted that such cooperation was indispensable and 
stood as the cornerstone of any agreement or regime for Antarctica, the same consensus did not 
exist regarding the various models being proposed for a possible structure and management of 
Antarctic science.  
 
The 1948 American proposals for a trusteeship, and after the rejection of the UN mechanism, for 
a condominium, presented by Caspar D. Green of the US State Department to the Chilean and 
Argentine Foreign Ministries during visits made in July 1948 to Santiago and Buenos Aires, 
circulated as well to all Antarctic claimant States through their Diplomatic Missions in 
Washington, D.C., were made under the assumption that an international administration for the 
Antarctic continent and sub-Antarctic islands would strongly promote the further systematic 
scientific exploration and investigation of Antarctic phenomena, including correlation of 
meteorological observations of practical significance in long range weather forecast, particularly 
for countries of the Southern Hemisphere. 
 
The US draft Agreement, in its Article III, created an Antarctic Commission which would 
constitute the government of the territories under its charge with full executive and 
administrative powers. The Commission, through a Scientific Board or other appropriate agency, 
would draw up plans for exploration, investigation, and scientific and technical development. 
Such plans could be carried by all or some of the Commission Members and projects of the 
individual members could be fitted into them. The Commission would prescribe appropriate 
procedures and conditions under which States and privately supported expeditions would be 
allowed to conduct scientific research, develop resources and carry on other activities consistent 
with the purposes of the Agreement. Parties to the Agreement had to pledge and insure that their 
undertakings in Antarctica were consistent with the agreed plans. 
 
The rejection of this Agreement by most claimants, with the qualified exceptions of Britain and 
New Zealand, was mostly aimed at the objective contained in Article II of the draft Agreement: 
“..the parties hereto merge and join their claims to, and interests in, specific portions of the area 
covered by this agreement (“the Antarctic Continent and all islands south of 60º south latitude, 
except the South Shetlands and South Orkney Groups) and vest such individual claims and 
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 interests in the special regime herby established…”. However, beyond difficulties in matters of 
territorial claims and sovereignty, the draft Agreement also brought opposition to its vision of an 
organized Antarctic scientific commonwealth. At the request of France, the State Department 
further elaborated on this sensitive aspect of its suggested condominium: 
The United States proposal is intended to provide for complete liberty of bona fide 
scientific research. In order to promote the rational planning and carrying out of such 
research, the proposal recommends the development by interested countries, acting 
through the Antarctic Commission, of an overall plan of scientific investigation. It is 
hoped that each of the participating countries might undertake, upon completion of 
the general plan, so to plan its individual projects as to contribute to the 
accomplishment of some portions of that general plan. It is felt that this would be a 
useful arrangement to avoid duplication of effort, and promote full, well rounded 
investigation.  
This statement could not by itself reassure the Antarctic claimants, and the overall powers of the 
proposed Antarctic Commission increased their reluctance towards the international regime 
being proposed. It is useful to recognize, nonetheless that the concept of a “general plan” and its 
intended purpose of avoidance of duplication of effort and promotion of “well-rounded” 
investigations, anticipated the decisions taken at the 1955-57 Antarctic Conferences for the 
preparation of the International Geophysical Year (IGY). 
 
The US “Antarctic Commission” was countered by a less powerful “Consultative Committee” 
suggested by Chile in a draft “Declaration” leading towards an Antarctic status quo. A five-year 
standstill would de reinforced with the following ingredients: full exchange of scientific 
information, sovereign rights not to be prejudiced by new bases or expeditions, and no taxes 
should be imposed on fishing fleets of participant States (the last reference concerned licences 
imposed by Britain in Antarctica to whalers of other nations). The proposed “Consultative 
Committee” was considered by Australia as the “thin end of the wedge in whittling away 
national sovereignty and setting up the international regime favoured by the United States and 
the Soviet Union”, a view also shared to a certain extent by Argentina.  
 
The next proposal, coming from the UK, was radical enough to rally against it all the claimant 
States and to a certain extent, to alienate also the internationalist New Zealanders, since it 
advocated a strong “High Authority” with a centralized system of scientific planning vested in a 
kind of multinational enterprise without any links with the United Nations System.  
 
The course of the International Geophysical Year (IGY) demonstrated in tangible terms that 
binding undertakings and concerted action in scientific programmes, location of stations, logistic 
support and sharing the results of scientific investigations could be achieved without transferring 
all the authority to a single scientific body. In 1958, ICSU established the Special (later 
Scientific) Committee for Antarctic Research (SCAR). During the Preparatory Meeting to the 
Antarctic Treaty the US and a majority of the negotiators supported SCAR as the scientific arm 
of the Treaty over a Chilean proposal for a Scientific Institute of the Parties. The informal ties of 
SCAR and the Treaty evolved during the years and the XIII ATCM (Brussels, 1985) 
incorporated SCAR fully, as a permanent observer, into the mainstream of the Antarctic Treaty 
System (ATS) in a still unfinished process of institutional development.  
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The Role of Antarctic Diplomacy in the Origins and Conduct of the IGY’ 
 
Rip Bulkeley, Exeter College, Oxford, United Kingdom 
 
International scientific cooperation with respect to Antarctica was extremely rare before 1945. 
Between 1945 and 1950 it began to be aired as a possibility, and limited versions of it were 
provided by two expeditions. But words and action in respect of international scientific 
cooperation in Antarctica during this period need careful interpretation, according to the personal 
position and national context from which they originated. All contained elements of exclusion as 
well as inclusion, and continued to do so during the IGY. 
   
It was no accident that citizens and officials of the United States led the way in advocating an 
international approach to Antarctica. As long as it was confined to their allies, it suited that 
country’s perceived interests and superpower status. But the State Department’s chosen solution 
met with general rejection. Behind the scenes the 1948 Escudero Proposal, from Chile, seemed 
to provide a way forward. But neither government was prepared to compromise its official policy 
by formally proposing it. 
   
After 1950 the IGY provided a solution for this diplomatic impasse. No evidence has been found 
to prove either that the State Department prompted Lloyd Berkner to propose a Third Polar Year, 
or that he had even heard of the Escudero Proposal. But he was in the right place with the right 
credentials to have been briefed on it, and his surviving papers are regrettably incomplete. 
   
Whatever the origins of the IGY, its Antarctic programme certainly was guided by diplomats. 
Though greeted at the time as ‘non-political’, it was simply less or differently political than 
previous activity in the region. Claimants went to ‘their’ sectors and issued proprietorial 
welcomes to ‘visiting’ expeditions. Non-claimants acted out their policies in turn. The United 
States prompted and materially assisted its allies to occupy as many locations as possible and 
took on extra ones itself, in a bid to exclude or at least to minimize Soviet participation. The 
Trans-Antarctic Expedition made a last gesture for British imperialism. The mother-daughter 
radio communications network was distorted by national interests. National flags, anthems and 
other symbols were flourished on all sides. And so on. 
   
The transition from the IGY to the Treaty was bumpy. The United States proposed a one year 
extension for Antarctica and the Soviet Union responded that it should be for the whole IGY. 
The resulting International Geophysical Cooperation was a voluntary, piecemeal arrangement. 
Temporary stations became permanent after awkward discussions with national authorities. The 
United States bequeathed some of its extra stations to allies on a sectoral basis; the recipients 
affected to see this as endorsement. The actual negotiations were protracted and difficult, and 
came close to failure. The Treaty was only accepted by claimant governments as having no 
implications for their claims – in short, along the lines of the Escudero Proposal as demonstrated 
by the IGY. The actual Treaty regime, underpinned by SCAR, has slightly eroded this ‘status 
quo’ position, but lies beyond the scope of this paper. If recent events in the Arctic are anything 
to go by, one effect of global warming could be to awaken Antarctic claims from their long 
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 hibernation. 
   
It took 46 years from the signing of the Treaty for the first country with an Antarctic claim to 
install a permanent station outside ‘its’ sector. Even then, France did this jointly with non-
claimant and fellow-EU member Italy. It remains the only such station. 
 
 
The Development of Biology as a Discipline in Antarctica 
 
Jason Davis, Department of Geography, The Ohio State University, Columbus, OH, USA 
 
During the International Geophysical Year of 1957-58, biology was rarely included as a serious 
scientific endeavor and little was published on the subject. Yet today, biological studies comprise 
a substantial part of the current International Polar Year. This paper seeks to understand this 
growth in the amount and prominence of biology undertaken particularly on the Antarctic 
continent and its connection to larger trends in both the history of biology and the context of 
Antarctic science. What historical, personal, or institutional factors influenced this development? 
What are the prospects for biology in Antarctica for the future? 
 
 
Getting the Science Done: Perspectives from McMurdo 
 
Ann M. Dozier, Timothy D. Dye and Nancy P. Chin, Department of Community and Preventive 
Medicine, University of Rochester, Rochester, NY, USA 
 
Undertaking research in Antarctica is inherently a complex process given the nature of the 
research, the wide variety of projects launched each season, the remote location, environmental 
conditions, and the short work season, October to February. McMurdo Station is the logistical 
hub for launching approximately 60 NSF-funded science projects each season. As science 
projects on the ice become more numerous and complicated the number of support workers 
increased concurrently. Support workers now outnumber scientists on the ice 4:1. Successful 
deployment of research projects requires coordination among those leading the various scientific 
endeavors and the McMurdo organization established to support them. Our team of social 
scientists examined the intersection of support and science in determining what factors contribute 
to successful deployment of projects and what barriers prevented successful completion. 
 
Our mixed gendered investigative team lived and worked at McMurdo Station during portions of 
the three austral summers between 2002 and 2005. Through participant observations (work, 
community and leisure venues) and interviews across the spectrum of employees, supervisors 
and scientists, what emerged was a picture of the management of science based at or supported 
by McMurdo Station. This paper analyzes the interfaces of the scientists and the 
management/support organization during pre-ice planning and on-ice work at McMurdo and in 
the field. Specific attention is paid to how the organizational bureaucracy and the scientists' 
professional autonomy create inherent tensions and how these are exacerbated by the 
uncertainties of conducting science in a polar environment. 
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From EAP to EPICA: The Shaping of a European Effort in Paleoclimatology 
 
Aant Elzinga, Department of History of Ideas and Theory of Science, University of Göteborg, 
Göteborg, Sweden 
 
An earlier paper (Second SCAR history workshop, Santiago 2006) dealt with geopolitics, science 
and internationalism during and after the IGY. In it I briefly touched upon the case of the 
European Antarctic Project (EAP). After more than five years of preparatory meetings and 
discussion the EAP was abandoned in 1975. Although envisioning an ambitious mode of joint 
action on the part of several nations, EAP had in fact a viable research plan. Comparisons with 
more successful cross-country European collaborations, as in nuclear physics (CERN) and 
astronomy (European Southern Observatory – ESO), however reveal a number of crucially 
constitutive factors that were absent at the time. 
 
After a brief rehearsal of the factors responsible for the failure to launch the EAP, the present 
paper focuses on the background history and success of the multinational European Project for 
Ice Coring in Antarctica (EPICA). Starting up in 1995, EPICA was coordinated by the European 
Science Foundation (ESF) and funded by the European Commission (EC) and national 
contributions from ten countries. It has proven to be very fruitful for understanding the climatic 
and atmospheric record archived in Antarctic ice. In particular EPICA involved drilling and 
analyzing two ice cores and comparing them with records from deep ice core drilling in 
Greenland.  
 
When a first phase for EPICA was proposed for funding in January 1992 to the EC it was 
rejected. It was met with some of the same arguments as the EAP earlier, viz., that Europe is far 
away from and has nothing to do with Antarctica. Resistance again hinged on the extreme cost of 
the project, one of the factors responsible for killing the precursor project, EAP in the mid-70s.  
 
In the early 90s the situation however was different. This time Germany, instead of its 
negativism in the 1970s, came forward to play a scientific positive role as science policy actor. A 
turning point came in 1992 when results from the analysis of deep ice cores drilled not only in 
Greenland but also by the French-Russian drilling team at the Vostok site in Antarctica were 
coming in to provide a strong scientific rationale for EPICA. The Rio conference on the global 
environment and sustainable development marked an important point of transition at the political 
level. A major conference under the auspices of the ESF, the “Grand Challenge Conference” 
organized by the Alfred Wegener Institute (AWI) and held in conjunction with a major SCAR 
conference in Bremerhaven in September 1994 finally “broke the ice”.  
 
The paper goes into some detail to consider both the scientific and political background to 
EPICA, as well as drilling site activities and the roles of some of the programme’s most 
prominent advocates. It is shown how for various reasons Europe’s road to EPICA actually went 
via Greenland. The EPICA programme originated in Greenland thanks to a powerful European 
network that evolved around the Greenland Ice Core Project (GRIP).  From the late 1970s 
onward GISP involved Danish, US and Swiss collaboration, around shallow and medium ice 
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 core drilling. These efforts in turn, however, had political and scientific roots that go back to the 
history of the Cold War and American collaboration with Denmark and Danish scientists in the 
wake of the establishment of the Distant Early Warning (DEW) radar line, and post-IGY work in 
ice coring and radio echo sounding across icefields. US/NSF collaboration with British radio-
glaciologists and Danish radio engineers in radio echo sound mapping of large parts of 
Antarctica in the early and mid 1970s is also significant in the larger picture.  
 
EPICA is an interesting example of both divergence and convergence of scientific and political 
interests that have a long-term history going back to some years immediately following IGY. 
Convergence of interests, finally, was conducive to establishing a major effort whose impact 
today goes beyond both science and the scientific advice to decision-makers faced with the 
problem of global climate change.  
 
 
To the Great Unknown: Soviet IGY Antarctic Expeditions 1955-1958 
 
Irina Gan, Institute of Antarctic & Southern Ocean Studies, University of Tasmania, Australia 
 
The IGY commitment of the USSR in the Antarctic included conducting research and 
establishing bases on the most difficult to access and unexplored areas of the Earth’s surface on 
the South Geomagnetic Pole and the Pole of Inaccessibility. The Directorate of the Northern Sea 
Route and the Academy of Sciences, the two institutions directly responsible for the Soviet 
program were confident that they had accumulated sufficient theoretical and practical knowledge 
on which to base their contribution to the IGY. 
 
Notwithstanding this weighty body of knowledge, the Soviet scientists realized that Antarctic 
reality may prove to be quite different from the conditions that they had already experienced in 
the Arctic. Their foray into the interior of the Antarctic continent was the beginning of a journey 
into the great unknown.  
 
In fact, there were many unknowns: the rugged terrain, the effect of high altitudes and extreme 
climatic conditions on men and machines and the constricted time – frames available to carry out 
work in the short austral summers. Also unknown were the circumstances of interactions with 
foreign governments and scientists.  
 
The setbacks and obstacles encountered by the Second CAE in particular almost resulted in 
failure of the whole Soviet IGY commitment. However, the perseverance of the expeditioners 
and the ability to learn from their mistakes allowed them to overcome the obstacles and bring 
their plans to a successful conclusion. 
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British Antarctic Science, 1944-1959 
 
Adrian Howkins, Department of History, University of Texas at Austin, Austin, TX, USA 
 
This paper will examine the development of British science in Antarctica between 1944-1959. It 
will focus in particular on the relationship between science and politics during the active 
sovereignty dispute that took place between Britain, Argentina, and Chile during the 1940s and 
1950s. By looking at the British perspective, this paper will “complete the triangle,” of my 
investigations into the science and politics of the Antarctic sovereignty dispute – my previous 
SCAR papers have examined Argentine and Chilean Antarctic science over the same period. 
 
This paper will begin by looking at the ways in which Britain used science both to facilitate and 
legitimate its Empire, especially in Antarctica. I will pay special attention to the Discovery 
Expeditions of the 1920s and 1930s and British claims that, through their sovereignty claims and 
research, they were seeking to promote the conservation of Antarctic whale stocks. In putting 
forward conflicting sovereignty claims to the Antarctic Peninsula region during the 1940s and 
1950s, both Argentina and Chile sought to challenge British scientific authority in the region. My 
paper will continue by looking at the British response to this challenge. Rather than giving in to 
the South Americans, the British increased their scientific activity in the region, first with the 
wartime Operation Tabarin and then with the Falkland Islands Dependencies Survey. I will also 
look at ways in which Britain co-operated with international research efforts in Antarctica such 
as the Norwegian-British-Swedish expedition to Queen Maud Land between 1949-1952, and the 
International Geophysical Year (IGY) of 1957-1958. The paper will conclude by looking at the 
ways in which Britain – along with the United States – sought to harness the scientific goodwill 
generated by the IGY to bring about political change in Antarctica leading to the Antarctic 
Treaty of 1959.  
 
 
The State of Chilean Science before and during the 
International Geophysical Year: An Interpretive Analysis 
 
Consuelo León Wöppke, Universidad Marítima de Chile, Chile 
 
This paper is based on the scientific journals, periodical sources, and government papers. It 
explores the state of Chilean science before and during the 1957-1958 International Geophysical 
Year (IGY). Convinced that its proximity and history established an irrefutable basis for its 
sovereignty over Tierra de O’Higgins, as the Chilean Antarctic is known, Chile assumed a 
cautious attitude toward the other IGY participants, especially Great Britain and the United 
States, whose motivations it distrusted. This paper reviews the state of Chilean science at this 
time before shifting emphasis to the role of political and scientific elites in shaping public 
opinion. 
 
FONDECYT Proyect 1040187 
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Swedish Polar Policies 1955-1970 
 
Lisbeth Lewander, Department of Gender Studies, Göteborg University, Göteborg, Sweden 
 
During the 1950´s and 60´s Sweden kept on its polar research although the scientific endeavours 
had taken somewhat new directions after the previous and long-lasting Hans Ahlmann epoch 
1931-52. Whereas the science of glaciology had been central the geophysics and geosciences 
came to the fore. The Arctic was the main target and the Antarctic was not to be visited again 
until the 1980´s. For the geophysical year, a scientific station was set up with Finland in 
Kinnvika, Svalbard, also with Swiss participation. The naval ship Älvsnabben acted as a supply 
ship for the expedition at the Nordaustlandet and a Catalina plane from the Swedish Air Force 
had been promised for assistance, to map the Murchisonfjord suitable for safety measures. The 
next expeditions undertaken to the Arctic were headed by Valter Schytt, pupil of Hans Ahlmann. 
He made several visits during the 50´s, to the Canadian Arctic, to north-western Greenland as 
well as a tour with the Russian icebreaker Ob. A second expedition to Murchison Bay IGY 
station was made in 1957 and 1958. In 1966 he worked at Kinnvika on a glaciological expedition 
headed by Stockholm University. In 1972 Schytt went   to West Antarctica for studies of glaciers 
and in 1980 he was the scientific leader of the major Swedish expedition YMER-80 in 
celebration of the 100th anniversary of Vega with the ice breaker YMER, in the North East 
Passage. 
 
The received view of Swedish engagement in polar areas is that all presence had to do with 
science. Evidently there was a great portion of science at the core of the expeditions but there 
were also other concerns. The topic of this presentation is that there were actually policies 
towards the polar areas, policies produced for entire other reasons than advancing scientific 
results. During this entire period there were severe concerns with the Cold War developments in 
the Arctic and the Nordic area. My argument is that this on several occasions had an impact on 
Swedish undertakings in polar areas. The instruments for vigilance, presence and continuous 
contacts with relevant actors were scientific research. Nevertheless, archive studies show that 
occasionally decision makers were hesitant on what course on action to depart upon, such as in 
the case of the political status of Antarctica in the 1950´s. 
 
 
The International Polar Year (1957-1958) as Reflected in German Media 
 
Cornelia Lüdecke, SCAR AG History of Antarctic Research, Munich, Germany 
 
In 1954, after the announcement of the International Geophysical Year (1957/1958), Antarctica 
came back into the headlines in West German newspapers. Territorial claims were seen in 
connection with the potential exploitation of mineral resources anticipated following Byrd’s 
most recent expeditions, although the economic problems of mining were not yet solved. Instead 
of the internationalisation of Antarctica, an increased emphasis was seen on the strategic 
importance of Antarctica at the national level. Against this background, Karl Maria 
Herrligkoffer’s proposal for a German South-Polar Expedition was described using military 
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 jargon as participation in a “major scientific attack on the South Pole Land” to represent  German 
claims. At that time Germany felt it had a legitimate right to be taken into account in the partition 
of Antarctica, not least because it had made significant geographical discoveries there in 1939. 
 
Political and military rivalry between Washington and Moscow built up the discussion on 
international management, referring to mineral resources and flight routes from South America 
to Australia. Scientific preparations for the IGY were seen as components of a race to still 
unclaimed regions, and to reflect the economic and military demands of the great powers, which 
were considered to be looking for an expansion of their influence. In this context there was talk 
of Antarctica as a possible launching base for intercontinental rockets. In due course, the first 
five villages with altogether 400 inhabitants were established, in effect manifesting territorial 
claims in Antarcticadepots were set for the Trans-Antarctic Expedition of 1957/58. 
 
Eventually the debate on Antarctica led up to the headline “Cold War in Antarctica” appearing in 
the magazine Stern (1956). Now the military aspect seemed dominant: Americans and Britons 
together wanted to challenge the superiority of the Russians in this arena, and the future of 
Antarctica as strategic geographical element in military operations was highlighted. In January 
1957 a magazine headline announced a “Final battle for the South Pole” between America and 
Russia. While the claims to possession were in full swing, the appearance was given that science 
was being used to cover the power-political and economic-political race at the South Pole. 
 
Military jargon was still used when the German journalist Heinz Steinitz, then living in New 
York, published a report in five parts in the Süddeutsche Zeitung under the headline “Fortress 
Antarctica will be surrounded!” between February and April 1957. Besides the scientific general 
staff, a military machine was described as an executive instrument of the scientific high 
command; this reflected the significant support for science by the military, especially in US 
operations. The journalist even resorted to national-socialist wording, using the expression 
“Triumph of science”, which recalls Leni Riefenstahl‘s famous documentary movie on the 
national-socialist convention at Nürnberg in 1934, which was called “Triumph of will”. Another 
reporter described the IGY as an “Invasion of scientific expeditions”. 
 
A new series of 14 parts from the star reporter Noel Barber of the London Daily Mail started in 
Bonner Rundschau at the end of December 1957. He described the ongoing events of the Trans-
Antarctic Expedition led by Dr. Vivian Fuchs, which included Edmund Hillary’s expedition to 
set depots between the Ross Sea and the South Pole. The tale became an adventure story with 
two protagonists. On the one hand there was the conqueror of Mount Everest, Edmund Hillary, 
who would become the third person to arrive at the South Pole by land on the other hand there 
was his fellow expeditioner, Dr. Vivian Fuchs, who had had a late start from the Weddell Sea 
coast, and whose scientific investigations of the ice thickness by seismic measurements slowed 
him down because they took such a long time. Barber also referred to a general mobilisation of 
the Soviets at the beginning of 1958, noting that they also want to participate in the exploration 
of the polar region. In his 6th report he mentioned the start of a “Cold War” between Hillary and 
Fuchs, a frosty relationship that reflected Fuchs’s annoyance that Hillary would get to the Pole 
before him, and Fuchs’s rejection of Hillary’s idea that because of the slowness and delay of 
Fuchs’s party they might have to winter over at the South Pole and continue the crossing of 
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 Antarctica the following spring. Against this background, Hillary’s unplanned and rapid advance 
towards the South Pole seemed to be a clear ‘declaration of war’. Was Hillary entirely at fault? 
Barber suggests in Hillary’s favour that it was well-known in Antarctica that Fuchs had made 
some mistakes. The tale has a happy ending. Fuchs arrived at the South Pole just in time, the 
absolute chief of the expedition, radiating intelligence and serenity. 
 
Besides these newspaper articles some polar books were published in the two separate parts of 
Germany. In West Germany you could buy a regional geography of Antarctica, a history of polar 
research, and a description of both geographic poles, which concluded with a statement to the 
effect that Antarctica was the possible “scene, deployment zone of the next world war”. In the 
German Democratic Republic a chronological account of the most important expeditions to 
Antarctica was published, also with an outlook of the upcoming IGY, but lacking any account of 
the national-socialist’s “Schwabenland” expedition of  1938-39, which took the first aerial 
photographs of the mountains in Dronning Maud Land. The book ended with the expectation 
according to the Soviet occupying forces “that the results achieved under the guidance of the 
Soviet science will contribute to the peaceful advance and welfare of all mankind.” 
 
A regionally organised account of the discovery of the different regions of the Arctic prior to 
1938 was published by the same author. In addition, a book on the milestones of polar flight 
described in great detail the achievements of the German “Schwabenland” expedition. The 
scientific results of that expedition were published by its leader and other scientists in West 
Germany in 1957-58. Finally a book sold GDR in 1959 gave a critical account of the 
“Schwabenland” expedition from the East German point of view, ending up with a description of 
the IGY, also using military terms. 
 
The use of military terms to describe interests in Antarctica at this time was not entirely 
surprising given the ongoing Cold War and the enormous size of Operation Highjump in 1946/47 
which was designed to train the US Navy in polar operations in the event of a possible war in the 
Arctic with the Soviet Union. It is therefore not entirely surprising that in Germany the scientific 
plans and endeavours of the IGY seem to have been more widely reported in scientific journals 
than in the press, while newspapers or popular books focused more on adventure, on mineral 
resources, and on the possible significance of Antarctica from the military (especially Cold War) 
perspective. 
 
 
Playing Dice: Toward a Scientific Explanation of U.S. Leadership in the 
Formation of the Antarctic Treaty of 1959 
 
Jason Kendall Moore, Centro de Estudios Hemisféricos y Polares, Viña del Mar, Chile 
 
The U.S. role in the formation of the Antarctic Treaty has been thoroughly analyzed from a 
diplomatic perspective. Herein the focus shifts to the parallel which U.S. officials drew between 
internal and external communism. In 1946 President Harry S. Truman initiated a loyalty program 
to expel communists and communist sympathizers from the federal government, lest they 
undermine his effort to halt Soviet expansion. This program was reinforced by the well-
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 publicized declarations of Senator Joe McCarthy. When Eisenhower came to office, he 
strengthened the program and left in place legislation which outlawed the domestic Communist 
Party. Meanwhile the nation established a military presence in dozens of nations around the 
world based on the conviction that the Soviet Union should not be appeased. 
 
This presentation maintains that, though U.S. Antarctic policy did constitute a form of 
appeasement, it was in keeping with other aspects of the nation’s Cold War strategy. In the late 
1950s officials sought to be more accommodating of the Soviet Union since they recognized that 
world opinion was growing increasing anti-American, and they needed to do more to counteract 
the impression that they were war-mongers. Alone their acceptance of peaceful coexistence at 
the bottom of the world did not and could not reverse this impression, but it deprived the Soviet 
Union of a further opportunity to criticize them. The nature of U.S. leadership in the formation of 
the Antarctic Treaty has often been glorified since the treaty was based on a U.S. proposal and 
signed in Washington. However, this presentation focuses on its inconsistency with a number of 
other factors which nearly led to the treaty’s non-ratification, and which expose the non-
commitment of U.S. officials to their own policy. 
 
 
“What Has All This Got To Do With Science?” The Rhetoric of Scientific 
Devotion in the Planning of the IGY 
 
Peder Roberts, Department of History, Stanford University, Stanford, CA, USA 
 
After a lunch replete with “strong drink,” Admiral George Dufek – leader of the United States 
delegation to the Paris meeting of CSAGI (the Comité Speciale de l’Année Géophysique 
Internationale) in July 1955 – fell asleep during the afternoon session. Waking in the midst of a 
“long and rambling” presentation by a Soviet speaker, he instinctively shouted “what has all this 
got to do with science?” Embarrassed American colleagues quickly silenced their leader. While 
no harm was done, the episode suggests that during the planning of the IGY, devotion to science 
was not just a way of life for the specialists in the field, but an overarching discursive framework 
that determined how political aims could be expressed rather than eliminating politics altogether. 
 
This paper focuses on British policy-makers, particularly at the Foreign Office and Colonial 
Office. I am less concerned with the motivations of the field scientists who have been identified 
as the chief constituency in most studies of the IGY. Did the widespread characterization of the 
IGY as purely scientific function as a political strategy, rather than the expression of its absence? 
How did the rhetorical configuration of science and politics as antithetical direct political action? 
Was the IGY, as Vivian Fuchs once said of the Falkland Islands Dependencies Survey (FIDS), 
inherently a “politico-scientific” activity – like all Big Science? This is a (very) early version of 
the final chapter of my dissertation, which examines changing conceptions of ‘scientific’ 
engagement with Antarctica in Scandinavia and the British Empire from the turn of the twentieth 
century to the 1950s, focused on the cultural and discursive history of the term. 
 
The paper consists of a detailed analysis supplemented by two briefer, more comparative 
sections. In the first section, I will identify some roots to the discourse of scientific exploration as 
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 normatively international, which emerged particularly strongly in the Norwegian-British-
Swedish Antarctic Expedition (NBSX) of 1949-52. In the second, I will use British Civil Service 
records two examine two related strategies: separating IGY activity from legal title to avoid 
Britain’s claims being weakened through increased foreign activity, and associating the prestige 
value of science with its separation from politics. Finally, I will connect British government 
involvement with the IGY to other elements of British Antarctic policy at this time, principally 
its sponsorship of the Commonwealth Trans-Antarctic Expedition (CTAE) and its relationship 
with the Scott Polar Research Institute (SPRI).  
 
Science functioned as a means to practical ends but also a morally freighted source of prestige. 
This is true of practically the entire history of Antarctic exploration from the voyages of James 
Cook to the present. For British bureaucrats in the early Cold War, scientific activity was a 
means of maintaining title to disputed colonial territory that simultaneously maintained Britain’s 
standing as a civilized nation. International cooperation could further both ends – especially the 
latter – as long as the partners were politically suitable. The Foreign Office recommended 
financial support for the NBSX, even though it did not involve British territory, because it would 
forge closer links with Norway and to a lesser extent Sweden. The implicit support for Norway’s 
claim to Queen Maud Land would be reciprocated. Additionally, the expedition was widely 
advertised as an attempt to ascertain whether the world’s climate was improving, with scientists 
from different nations working side by side in the quest to find knowledge of interest to all 
humanity. Like the IGY, the political value of the NBSX was tied to a strong, normative 
association between science and international cooperation, rhetorically contrasted to the tensions 
of the Cold War and trading on the cultural prominence of science. 
 
The scale and geographic breadth of the IGY threatened British territorial claims while 
emasculating it traditional status as a leading Antarctic power. The need to maintain prestige had 
earlier led the Foreign Office to respond relatively positively to proposals for an eight-power 
condominium and plans for a ‘standstill’, in which all activity after a given date could not affect 
sovereignty. British participation in the IGY was deemed necessary because declining to 
participate in an international scientific venture would damage national prestige. Retaining a 
strict boundary between science and politics protected sovereignty claims while enhancing the 
IGY’s value as an emblem of civilization. Those claims meant Britain had more to lose from the 
IGY than either the US or USSR. 
 
The discursive conventions that governed CSAGI meetings, and defined the public image of the 
IGY, dictated that issues such as the location of bases be justified on identifiably ‘scientific’ or 
‘technical’ grounds. Colonial and especially Foreign Office records convey a belief that British 
IGY scientists were political innocents requiring oversight. This was particularly evident at the 
Paris CSAGI meeting, where a Foreign Office adviser was on hand to give advice to the British 
delegation behind the scenes, and a Colonial Office bureaucrat was installed as head of the 
working group on radio communications. Detailed planning could safely be left to the Royal 
Society-led British National IGY Committee, but maintaining a purely scientific enterprise could 
not be left to scientists. 
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 The institutional framework of British Antarctic activity also came increasingly to reflect the 
importance of ‘pure’ science to prestige. This was clearest in the CTAE, which uneasily traded 
on its status as both an athletic feat and a scientific investigation, and struggled to obtain support 
within the Civil Service. Upon completing the traverse, its newly-knighted leader Vivian Fuchs 
told Queen Elizabeth II by telegram that “our scientific work is completed.” While the 
Commonwealth Relations Office championed the project as an opportunity for the “old” 
Dominions to do “something imaginative, adventurous, Elizabethan, & ultimately remunerative 
in a cooperative Empire adventure,” objections from the Foreign Office were overridden rather 
than retracted. The support of the SPRI was eventually demanded on the grounds of government 
discipline, leading to the resignation of its director. In 1958 the directorship was given to the 
physicist Gordon Robin ahead of the leading candidate, Brian Roberts of the Foreign Office, as 
the Institute shifted from a semi-governmental information service toward a new identity as a 
university research center. In a way, the SPRI’s path mirrored that of Antarctica itself. 
 
So what did the IGY have to do with science? On the surface, everything: its function as an 
emblem of international cooperation in scientific endeavor made that essential. It is salient, 
however, to ask how and why the IGY came to possess that symbolic value, and to consider it as 
an integral part of a broader political picture. 
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